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THE NEW YORK INCOME TAX

THE enactment of the New York income-tax law in 1919 marks an important stage in the fiscal history of the United States. It is the purpose of this article to put the law in its proper setting and to explain the wider aspects of a significant reform.

I

For many years the state and local revenue system of New York, like that of all other American commonwealths, consisted of the general property tax. Under the economic conditions of the period and especially where the burden of taxation was comparatively slight this constituted a relatively satisfactory method. It was not until after the Civil War that complaints began to multiply. As in every advanced industrial and commercial community, it became increasingly difficult to reach personal property; and as the expenditures of government gradually rose, this inequality of burden became more and more patent. In New York, as the foremost industrial state of the Union, the incipient discontent took the form of the appointment of an investigating commission. Mr. David A. Wells, who approached the subject flushed with the success of his efforts in reforming the federal internal revenue system, went so far in his reports of 1871 and 1872 as to recommend the abolition of the personal property tax. This suggestion, however, was so radical and premature that nothing came of it.

The disparity, however, between the growing expenditures and the dwindling receipts from the general property tax led

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in the next decade to the beginnings of a new system, namely, that of supplementing the property tax by so-called indirect taxes,—a term which now gradually came to include all other imposts. In 1880 a tax was introduced upon corporations, assessed in some cases on capital stock and in others on gross receipts. At first, however, not much was derived from this source.

In the early '80's it was the privilege of the present writer, who had returned from his university studies abroad and who was beginning to pay some attention to tax problems, to be consulted by the legislative leaders as to the best methods of extricating the state from its growing fiscal difficulties.[1] Having come to the conclusion that the general property tax was no longer suitable as the chief form of revenue and realizing the impossibility of making a successful frontal attack on the personal property tax at that time, he decided that the most promising prospect of reform lay in what soon came to be called the principle of separation of source. The two glaring defects of the general property tax at that time were the inequality in the assessment of real estate and the escape of personalty. The unequal assessment of real estate was a result largely of the utilization of the tax for state purposes. For the lower the assessment in each county, the less would be its share of the state tax. It therefore seemed clear that if the state revenue could gradually be secured from other sources, the time would come when the direct tax could be reserved for local purposes. In the second place, the conviction was borne in that while it was manifestly premature to attempt to abandon the personal property tax, it might be possible, especially under the liberal provisions of the New York constitution, to levy separate taxes on various kinds of personalty which would gradually pave the way for the disintegration of the general property tax, even for local purposes.

[1] It is with considerable reluctance that these personal details are presented. But it is thought that it might be of interest to show not only that the history of the movement has not been one of mere chance but also that even in a democracy the rôle of the reputed expert has sometimes been of more importance than is often believed.

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Under the influence of these ideas, an effort was made to induce the legislative leaders to work along the lines of separation of source as the most promising avenue of reform. From time to time, as the political situation favored, steps were accordingly taken in this direction. In 1885 a collateral inheritance tax was introduced; in 1886 the organization tax on corporations was imposed; in 1887 the racing tax laws were enacted; and in 1890 the collateral inheritance tax was converted into a direct inheritance tax. The result of these laws was gradually to provide for state purposes an independent and increasing share of the growing expenditures; but the relief afforded was inadequate to attain fully the ends desired. The new taxes constituted after all only a modest beginning of the process of separation of source; and while they prevented, perhaps, any exacerbation of the evils, they did not afford any marked relief. In fact the inequalities in the assessment of real estate persisted, and personal property continued to slip still more markedly out of the assessment lists.

Accordingly, in the middle of the '90's, a more determined effort was made to attain the ends originally planned. In 1896 the liquor-license law was passed, with the introduction of a new principle, namely, a division of the yield between state and locality. Thus the second part of the program was initiated. The principle of separation of source—utilizing new sources of revenue for state purposes alone—was intended ultimately to get rid of the state direct tax. The principle of division of yield—apportioning the proceeds of a centrally assessed tax between state and locality—was designed to lessen the local pressure upon personal property invested in business or otherwise and thus to speed the day when the tax on personalty as a part of the general property tax might be abandoned.

The system inaugurated in 1896 was gradually perfected during the next decade. In 1901 a tax at a special rate was imposed upon banks and similar institutions; in 1905 the stock-transfer tax was introduced; in the same year an annual mortgage tax was created with a division of yield between state and locality, replaced, however, in the following year by a mortgage-recording tax; and, finally, in 1911, the secured-debt tax law was passed.

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The result of all this legislation soon became apparent. The proceeds of the so-called indirect taxes now increased so rapidly that the state direct tax fell from year to year; and finally, in 1907, it became possible substantially to dispense with the direct tax for state purposes. For several years this situation continued, and an improvement in the equality of real estate assessments began to show itself. Thus one of the ends originally hoped for seemed to have been attained. On the other hand the assistance rendered to the localities through the operation of the principle of division of yield was still too slight to make any marked impression, and the old difficulties connected with the under-assessment of personal property continued in almost unabated form.

Toward the beginning of the second decade of the present century a new situation developed. An unlooked-for tendency in the direction of vastly increased outlays on the part of both state and locality now appeared; the final fruits of a democracy which was determined to utilize government to achieve definite social ends disclosed itself. In the state government the expenditures went up by leaps and bounds, not only because of the assumption by government of such functions as the care of the hospitals and the administrative supervision of many forms of industry and transportation but more especially because of the program of improved roads and of an enlarged Erie Canal. The result was that the augmented current expenses together with the provision for the rapid amortization of the large debt before long took up the entire slack of the so-called indirect taxes and rendered necessary in 1912 the reimposition of a state direct tax, first in a hesitant and then in a more determined way. It was thus made clear that the system of separation of source, which had done good service in the interval, could not be regarded as a final solution of the problem and that while it had indeed served to postpone the crisis and undeniably possessed certain elements of lasting worth, the next stage of reform must be sought elsewhere.

In the meantime the local situation had become aggravated. Just as New York state in its fiscal reforms and in its adoption of the principle of separation of source paved the way for many

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other commonwealths, so what was happening in New York City repeated itself before long in the other industrial centers of the state. In New York, as elsewhere, personal property had almost entirely disappeared from the assessment lists, so that the local tax had become virtually a tax on real estate. As the local expenses increased by leaps and bounds and as the base of taxation was gradually narrowed instead of broadened, the tax rate began to climb to alarming figures. The real-estate interests now clamored for relief; and the public at large, which realized that the tax on buildings at least was shifted to them in the shape of increased rent, seconded the efforts of the real-estate owners. Two projects of reform were now advanced. One was the plan of the single-taxers, based upon a misapprehension of what was actually happening in Canada, which demanded the exemption of buildings from taxation. This aroused so much interest that it led to the appointment, in 1915, of the mayor's tax committee, which studied the problem for two years and finally disapproved the plan for the reason that it would still further increase the inequality of taxation.[1] The other proposal was the classification of taxation in the sense of imposing different tax rates upon different kinds of property. This principle had, indeed, been followed in part from the very beginning, as we have seen, in that certain forms of property invested in corporations or securities had been taxed for state purposes at special rates. But the specific proposition now advanced, that virtually all forms of tangible and intangible personalty should be taxed for local purposes also at varying even though somewhat lower rates, proved to be inadmissible in a state like New York, where for many decades the taxation of merchants on stock in trade or of the various forms of intangible personalty had long since practically disappeared. Whatever may have been true in other less developed industrial states, the classified property tax was evidently not the desirable reform for New York.

[1] The conclusions of the committee were formulated in part as a result of the admirable study of Canadian conditions made for the committee by Professor Robert Murray Haig of Columbia University and published as a part of this report.

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Thus both separation of source and classification of taxation, much vaunted as they were for the time being, showed themselves unsuitable. It was necessary to resort to something else. This something else proved to be the income tax. Accordingly the development of this idea in the United States deserves some mention.

As far back as the beginning of the '90's in the last century the present writer had become convinced of the fact that the changing conditions of economic life were gradually making income rather than property the proper measure of wealth and of taxable capacity. When he began to discuss the taxation of corporations, although recognizing the fact that the existing defective methods of accounting and of fiscal control would delay the adoption of the correct principle, he advocated utilizing as a basis net profits or income rather than capital or gross receipts. When the federal income-tax law was enacted in 1894 he welcomed the introduction of the principle for national purposes. After the movement received a setback through the decision of the Supreme Court declaring the federal income tax unconstitutional and in view of the unreadiness of administrative and political conditions in New York, the report of the state tax commission of 1906, which was in large part framed by the present writer, recommended the nearest approach to an income tax which seemed feasible at that time, namely, the indirect income tax, in the shape of a habitation tax. This was on the theory that what a man spent for house rent was a rough indication of what he could afford to pay, especially if the rate was steeply graduated in the upper reaches. The advantage of such a system would be the simplicity of administration compared with the obvious difficulties of a locally assessed income tax, a centrally administered income tax being at that time politically quite impossible. The suggestion, however, of even an indirect income tax was, as the event proved, premature.

Before long, however, came the movement for a national income tax and the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment. The contest for ratification in New York was heated and close, and it was necessary to employ every ounce of energy in order to

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win popular approval for the amendment. Inasmuch as the agitation for a state income tax in New York would undoubtedly have defeated the Sixteenth Amendment here and imperiled its acceptance in other states, every effort was made to concentrate attention upon the national issue. It was for that reason that the adoption by Wisconsin of a state income tax in 1911, largely as a result of the indefatigable efforts of Professor T. S. Adams, failed to receive the attention to which it otherwise would have been entitled as the first serious attempt to grapple with the evils of the property tax and to substitute central for local administration in taxation.

As soon, however, as the contest had been won and the federal income tax of 1913 had been introduced, the situation became quite different. When, in 1914, Connecticut was confronted by a tax crisis, it was the privilege of the present writer to recommend to the legislature and the tax commissioner in conference the adoption of a state corporate income tax and the utilization of a duplicate return as made to the federal government. This plan was accepted, and thus was inaugurated the movement of the state taxation of incomes based on the federal tax.

When, a little later, the situation in New York became acute, the mayor's tax committee of 1915 endeavored further to develop the idea. The fiscal crisis by this time involved not only New York but other cities and the state government as well. Realizing the fact that the time for developing the principle of separation of source had passed and convinced that the principle of the classified property tax would prove no solution of the difficulties here, the present writer concluded that the time had now come for the adoption of the income tax. The former weighty objections to an income tax had now lost their force. In the first place, the country had become accustomed to the federal income tax which could no longer be jeopardized by the adoption of a state income tax; and the very existence of the federal tax was calculated greatly to simplify the administration of a state tax. Furthermore, the acute crisis made it practically certain that the localities would not object to a centralized assessment of the income tax

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—without which the plan would assuredly have been doomed to failure—provided that they were assured of a substantial portion of the yield and were thus in a position to avoid a further rise in the tax rate on real estate.

Accordingly, an effort was made not only to induce the mayor's committee to accept the project of a state income tax, but also to persuade Senator Mills, who stood at the head of the state legislative committee, that this was the proper course to pursue. The result was that in 1916 both the mayor's committee and the state committee [1] reported in favor of an income tax with division of the yield between state and locality.

The movement was now launched. In the first year, however, the progress of popular education proceeded only to the point of accepting the principle for corporations. The Emerson law of 1917 imposed what is to all intents and purposes a corporate income tax, with the exception that public utilities and banks are still subject to the old system of capital and gross receipts taxes. By the end of 1918, however, the crisis in the state, as well as in some other cities besides New York, had become so acute that a special legislative committee, headed by Senator Davenport, was hurriedly constituted. As a result of its recommendations, and of the energy and sagacity of its chairman, the law of 1919 was enacted. Thus for the first time in American history a leading industrial state discarded the general property tax and substituted a general income tax on both individuals and corporations.[2]

II

We now proceed to an analysis of the law. The first consideration that weighed with the framers of the act was a desire

[1] The report of the Mills committee was in large part written by Professor H. A. E. Chandler of Columbia University.

[2] It is true that Massachusetts, after refusing to accept the principle of the classified property tax, had sought in 1915 to solve its fiscal problem by enlarging its antiquated and moribund income tax. But the new Massachusetts tax is only a partial income tax in a double sense. It applies to only a few kinds of individual incomes (from intangibles, annuities, professions and business) and not even completely to these, and it does not apply to corporate incomes in general. In the second place, it still retains the taxation of tangible personalty according to the old methods.

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to reduce to a minimum the difficulties of the administrator and the annoyance of the taxpayer. While it did not seem wise to go quite so far as to demand a duplicate of the federal return, an effort was made to use as far as possible in the state law the same language as that employed in the federal law. The definitions, the exemptions and the deductions are virtually identical. The consequence is that to all intents and purposes the returns made by individuals for the federal tax can be utilized with insignificant changes for the state tax.

In a few important points, however, the New York law differs from the federal law. For instance, the federal law allows a partial deduction for dividends of corporations; the state law includes dividends as a part of regular income. The reason for this distinction is twofold. In the first place, whereas in the federal system corporations are taxed on their entire income, the New York corporate income tax attempts to reach only the income earned within the state, so that if the federal exemption were permitted the great mass of dividends accruing to New-Yorkers would be taxable neither to the individual nor to the corporation. In the second place, the legislature is gradually becoming conscious of the fact, quite familiar to the economist, that a corporate income tax ought really to be regarded as a business tax and that there is as little reason for exempting from the individual income tax the dividends of corporations, on the ground that the corporations are taxed, as there is for exempting the income from real estate on the ground that the real estate is taxed. The tax on corporations and the tax on real estate are both impersonal or real taxes, to be sharply distinguished from the individual income tax which is a personal tax. To subject individuals to a personal income tax and the source of the income to a real or impersonal tax does not necessarily constitute unjust double taxation. The federal law accepts this principle in part, in that it permits a deduction for corporate dividends so far as the normal tax is concerned, though not for the supertax. Inasmuch as the supertax forms the more important part of the tax, it is clear that the federal system is in practice not so different from that of New York. This is seen to be all the more true when we re-

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member that the federal corporate income tax may more properly be regarded as a part of the individual income tax with collection at source so far as dividends are concerned and that the impersonal or business tax is represented by the excess-profits tax. At all events the New York law properly includes the income from all sources, irrespective of whether some of the sources themselves, like corporations and real estate, are reached in other ways by impersonal taxes such as business taxes and taxes *in rem*.

The second distinction between the federal and the state tax is that far less scope is given to the principle of graduation in the latter. The justification for this is obvious. The progressive scale in the federal income tax is so steep that any attempt to superimpose on the federal tax a similar state tax would result in a quite impossible burden, meaning in many cases a confiscation of the entire income. Moreover, a steeply graduated scale would, in New York at all events, yield far more revenue than is needed and thus conduce to extravagance. The calculations of the present writer[1] were to the effect that a 2 per cent. income tax would yield between fifty and sixty millions of dollars, which seemed adequate for the purpose. This suggestion was adopted as the rate on the great mass of incomes between $10,000 and $50,000; but the rate on incomes under $10,000 was reduced to 1 per cent., and that on incomes above $50,000 was increased to 3 per cent. If, as does not seem likely, the federal scale should be lowered in the near future, and if the necessity of a greatly increased revenue for state and local purposes should at the same time disclose itself, it will always be possible to modify the scale of the state tax. For the present as well as for the immediate future, however, there is neither need for nor likelihood of this eventuality.

The next significant point in the law is the adoption of the principle of central administration. It is here that the weak-

[1] These are set forth in detail in an address delivered at Albany in January, 1919, entitled "Our Fiscal Difficulties and the Way Out". *Cf.* Proceedings of the Eighth State Conference, in *New York State Tax Bulletin*, volume iv, no. 4, pp. 22–27.

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ness of the former method is overcome. In the case of the real-estate tax there is much to be said for a local assessment by experts familiar with local conditions. The sad history of American taxation, however, has shown the necessity even here of some form of central control. In the case of personal property and especially of intangible personalty the difficulties of local assessment are far greater; among the reasons responsible for the breakdown of the personal property tax are not only the high rate but also the local assessment. Had an attempt been made to levy a local income tax, it would have resulted in a similar breakdown; for it is impossible, under modern economic conditions, to localize incomes. It so happened, however, that New York was fortunate in having developed a centralized system in the corporation tax, the inheritance tax, the excise tax and the like. It was therefore comparatively easy to place the administration of the new tax in the hands of state officials. Unfortunately, purely political considerations prevented its assignment to the state tax commission, where it naturally belonged, and relegated it to the office of the state comptroller, who had vigorously opposed the passage of the law. Whatever may be thought of this, it is nevertheless a matter of congratulation that the tax was not left to the tender mercies of local officials. The signal step of progress is the centralized state administration of the system.

Another interesting provision of the law is the adoption of the principle of division of yield. Both the state and the localities were clamoring for more revenues; the state was reluctant to impose a larger direct tax and the localities were equally opposed to an increase of the local real-estate tax. The obvious solution, therefore, was to devise a system which would satisfy state and localities alike; and this clearly implied a new source of revenue in which each would share. The income tax satisfied the demands of the situation; and the adoption of the principle of division of yield brought to the support of the tax both the state and the localities. Moreover, the particular method adopted for the apportionment of the tax to the localities discloses the advantages of the income tax over the direct or property tax. The law provides that, after the retention of

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a small fund from which to pay refunds and abatements, one-half of the proceeds of the tax shall be apportioned to each locality in the ratio of the real-estate assessments.[1] Under this system the higher the assessment in any locality, the greater will be its share of the tax; whereas, under the general property tax, just the reverse is true and the higher the assessed valuation, the greater will be the burden of the locality. In the income tax the locality is the recipient; in the property tax it is the giver. The adoption of the income tax will tend, therefore, greatly to stimulate the movement for a more equal assessment of real estate. Thus, whereas the general property tax lies athwart the path of equality, the income tax now facilitates the attainment of equality.

III

We must now consider the question which has aroused perhaps the most discussion, namely, the treatment of non-residents. The American jurisprudence on this subject, which has been elaborated in connection with the general property tax and to a minor extent with the inheritance tax, is of little use here because it deals largely with the problem of the *situs* of the property. In the discussion of income taxation we must break into new fields.

The controlling considerations here are: where is the income earned or received, and where is the income spent? From the standpoint of abstract justice, if the individual lives and spends his income in a jurisdiction different from that in which the income is earned, the tax ought to be divided between the two. This principle would, however, in the absence of any effective federal regulation, encounter a difficulty of practical administration so formidable as to be virtually inapplicable. There are only three possible solutions of the problem.

In the first place, everybody, resident and non-resident alike, might be taxed upon only that part of his income received from

[1] The Wisconsin method differs from the above plan in two respects: it utilizes the assessment of property in general instead of real estate; and it adds as a further criterion the school population. In both these ways it foregoes the advantages of the New York plan.

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sources within the state. The obvious objection to this course, especially so far as residents are concerned, is that the other state or foreign country where part of the income is received, might not impose an income tax, so that the individual would not be paying a fair share as compared with his fellow citizen whose income was received entirely within the state. Above all, such a solution, however acceptable in a debtor state like Wisconsin, would be open to the objection that in a financial center like New York, the proportion of income received by its inhabitants from sources outside New York forms the overwhelming percentage of the whole. A creditor state like New York would accordingly find such a solution inadmissible. If the time should ever come when capital and industry are equally distributed throughout the union and when every state imposes an income tax of its own, the above solution would be relatively satisfactory as among the separate states, although still open to criticism in its international aspects. But in default of these two vital conditions, the principle is unacceptable at present in a state like New York, so far as the individual income tax is concerned. The matter is, of course, quite different with a corporate income tax, where this principle is not only legitimate but is actually applied under the Emerson law. For corporations are taxed in virtually all states, either upon their income or upon the sources of the income.

In the second place, residents might be taxed on their entire income and non-residents might go scot-free. The difficulty with this solution is equally great. For, in the first place, there is no assurance that the other state will impose an analogous income tax, in which case residents will be subject to a disadvantage. Why, for instance, if New Jersey imposes no income tax, should its residents who carry on their business in New York in competition with New-Yorkers be exempt from taxation in New York on that business or on the income derived from that business? Why should the New-Yorker who is pursuing his occupation side by side with the Jerseyite be put at a disadvantage? In the second place, this solution of the problem would involve the important practical consequence that any New-Yorker who desired to avoid his taxes could

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easily do so by transferring his legal residence to a summer home in New Jersey. It is well known that the chief reason why the general property tax has broken down so completely in New York City is the facility afforded to wealthy New-Yorkers to claim their legal residence in the environs. One great advantage of the income tax over the property tax is that it tends to decrease this movement. Such a result, however, would be entirely defeated if non-residents were exempted on their income earned within the state of New York. No solution of the problem which fails to put a stop to this deplorable practice of local expatriation can be acceptable. The exemption of non-residents from income taxation would fail to cure the existing inequality of the general property tax and would create a new and still more indefensible inequality.

We are led, therefore, to the remaining solution as the only satisfactory one, namely, to subject residents to a tax on their entire income, from whatever source derived, and to subject non-residents to a tax on the income from land or other property situated within the state or from business, professions or occupations carried on within the state. This solution, acceptable so far as it goes, is open to the criticism that if two adjoining states follow the same principle, cases of unjust double taxation may ensue. If A earns his money and spends it in one state, he will be taxed on his entire income; while B, with the same income, who earns his money in one state and has his legal residence in another, will be taxed twice, once by the state where the income is earned and again by his state of residence. An escape from this difficulty can, however, be found in a provision whereby the state where the income is earned will in assessing the tax give the non-resident an allowance for the tax which might be levied by the state of residence. This was the solution suggested by the present writer and adopted in the law.[1]

[1] Section 363 reads: "Whenever a tax payer other than a resident of the state has become liable to income tax of the state or country where he resides, upon his net income for the taxable year, derived from sources within this state and subject to taxation under this article, the controller shall credit the amount of income tax payable by him under this article with such proportion of the tax so payable by him

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The operation of the system would then be as follows. If, in the first place, New Jersey imposed no income tax, the Jerseyite would be subject to taxation in New York on his income earned within the state. To this there can be no reasonable objection. If two contiguous pieces of land are owned by a New-Yorker and a Jerseyite; if two competing business premises are occupied by a New-Yorker and a Jerseyite; if two dentists, one a New-Yorker and the other a Jerseyite, carry on their profession on opposite sides of the same street, is there any reason why, in the absence of an income tax in New Jersey, the Jerseyite should be preferred to the New-Yorker? Far from imposing any additional burden upon the Jerseyite or interfering in any way with interstate commerce, the taxation of the Jerseyite would bring about a substantial equality in treatment with that of the New-Yorker. To do less than this would be to give him an unjustifiable preference.

As a matter of fact, however, such a preference is actually accorded to him in one respect. While the resident is taxed on his entire income, including that from intangible personalty, the non-resident is exempt from income tax on his intangibles unless these are employed in his business. This preference is explicable on the ground that otherwise the market for New York securities and the preëminence of New York as a financial center might be jeopardized. The grant of a favor to the non-resident is preferable to the decay of New York. But the point remains that in this respect non-residents are actually favored.

On the other hand, if New Jersey should levy an income tax, New York allows the Jerseyite to deduct from the New York tax the proportionate part of the tax levied by New Jersey—subject, indeed, to the condition of reciprocity, that New Jersey will agree to treat New-Yorkers in the same way. The conse-

to the state or country where he resides as his income subject to taxation under this article bears to his entire income upon which the tax so payable to such other state or country was imposed; providing that such credit shall be allowed only if the laws of said state or country grant such similar credit to residents of this state subject to income tax under such laws." The admirable clarity of the language here, as indeed throughout the law, is due to the counsel of the committee, Laurence Arnold Tanzer.

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quence is that if the New Jersey tax rate were the same as that of New York, the Jerseyite would in final result pay nothing in New York. Since, however, he would pay an equivalent tax in New Jersey, this would operate to prevent the evil referred to above, *i. e.*, the inducement on the part of wealthy New-Yorkers to claim a legal residence in New Jersey. The law, therefore, not only prevents the fictitious emigration of New-Yorkers but also subjects bona-fide Jerseyites to the same burdens as those borne by their New York competitors. It does not impose any additional burden on them and, therefore, it does not create any discrimination against citizens of another state.

This solution of the problem constitutes a forward step in the treatment of non-residents. In subjecting them to taxation on the income derived from sources within the state, the act does not differ from either the federal law or any other important income-tax law. In every country without exception foreigners are taxed upon their income from sources within that country. The chief difference between the New York law and that of most countries is that in the case of the latter no such equitable provision is made for a proportionate and reciprocal deduction of the tax when the home country imposes a tax on the same income. Hence the New York law marks a distinct advance in the treatment of the problem. Residents and non-residents alike are subject to taxes on income earned within the state; residents are subject in addition to a tax on income from all other sources; and non-residents are freed from double taxation by a reciprocal deduction which operates similarly to free residents of New York from double taxation by a sister state. The net result is substantial equality.

There is only one point in which residents and non-residents are treated differently. In the case of residents the law allows an exemption of from one to two thousand dollars together with two hundred dollars for each dependent person. It would seem that the absence of any such exemption in the case of non-residents constitutes a real discrimination. As a matter of fact, however, there is no validity in such a criticism.

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The theory underlying the law is, as we have seen, that the state of residence may also impose an income tax. If New Jersey or Connecticut were to impose an income tax, it could avoid all possible injustice to its residents on the part of New York by permitting an exemption similar to that granted by New York to its residents. As a result of the reciprocal provision of the law just mentioned, all the difficulties would then be at once adjusted. If New Jersey preferred not to grant such an exemption, the discrimination would be chargeable not to New York but to New Jersey. The only possible case of inequality chargeable to New York would arise where New Jersey does not impose any income tax and where the income of the Jerseyite is wholly or almost wholly earned within New York. Such a situation, not contemplated by the framers of the law, who looked forward to the speedy adoption of the income tax by the neighboring states, can, however, be easily remedied. The non-resident might be permitted to file a declaration of his entire income within and without the state and might be granted such proportion of the statutory exemption as corresponds to his income within the state. A still simpler solution of the problem would be to grant to non-residents whose income from wages, salaries or professional earnings in New York are under a modest figure, say, five or ten thousand dollars, the same exemption as that accorded to residents. But this provision should be applicable only as long as New Jersey does not levy an additional income tax of its own.

It appears, therefore, that in the main the New York law meets the legitimate demands of interstate comity. It does not subject non-residents to additional burdens; and it paves the way for an adoption of a system whereby all individuals will be treated on an equality, according to the principles of an equitable apportionment of the obligation to pay taxes. To go beyond what the law now provides for (with the exception of the minor and temporary amendment suggested in the last paragraph) would be to confer an unfair advantage on non-residents and to create an artificial inducement to the illicit emigration of residents.[1]

[1] There are two minor cases of difference between residents and non-residents.

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IV

Adequately to appreciate the larger aspects of the law and to realize what it means in the progress of tax reform in the United States, it is necessary in conclusion to call attention not only to what has been achieved but to what still needs to be accomplished.

The general property tax as the sole or chief source of revenue has long since disappeared in every other country of the world, the principal reason being that under modern economic conditions property no longer forms so accurate an index of wealth as does income. It is only in the case of real estate that, as a result of the paramount considerations of administrative expediency, property or selling value is still utilized as a criterion of taxable ability. But in the rest of the modern economic field not only are there large incomes which are never capitalized, because derived from exertions rather than from possessions and spent in lieu of being accumulated, but the prosperity of the average business man is much more faithfully reflected in his income account than in his capital account. With the emergence of the newer industrial and commercial life the continuance of property taxation necessarily imposes an unequal burden upon those whose incomes are derived from other sources than real estate. Equality of taxation, therefore, means the replacement of the general property tax by the general income tax. With this problem all the American states have been wrestling. Separation of source, classification of taxation and all the other expedients have been tried, one after

One is a mere slip in the law, sure to be corrected before it goes into operation and in fact already corrected by a ruling of the comptroller, whereby non-residents are taxed in certain cases at the flat rate of 2 per cent. instead of the graduated rate of 1, 2, and 3 per cent. In the second place, employers are obligated to withhold the tax from the salaries of their non-resident employees. From the administrative point of view, however, it would be practically impossible to insure otherwise the payment of the tax from non-residents engaged in salaried occupations in New York. This difference in administrative treatment between residents and non-residents is simply a method designed to secure a real equality of taxation. It imposes no discriminatory burden upon non-residents but, on the contrary, endeavors to prevent a discrimination against residents. The ostensible inequality resolves itself into a higher equality.

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another. New York is the first important industrial state to adopt the new system as applied to individuals and corporations alike, and its action thus marks a distinct stage in the progress of American taxation.

It may be asked, however, what is the exact relation of the new income tax to the old property tax? The general property tax, as is well known, consists of three parts, the tax on real estate, the tax on intangibles and the tax on tangible personalty. Inasmuch as the tax on real estate, as we have seen above, ought to be retained as the important source of local revenue, it becomes both inadvisable and difficult entirely to discard the system of property taxation. In the case of intangible personalty the situation, however, is quite different. To retain a tax on this is as undesirable as it would be unfortunate. It is unnecessary to tax intangibles because, through the income tax, we reach the income from intangibles. Moreover, the attempt to retain a tax on intangibles would be most unfortunate. For, in levying a tax on the income from intangibles, we necessarily disclose a knowledge of the source of the income. To endeavor to utilize this knowledge for the purpose of taxing the capital value of the securities at a rate even remotely approaching that on real estate would result in the same evasion of the tax that we find everywhere at present. For even in those states which have adopted the so-called classification of taxation and imposed a low-rate tax on intangibles there is not even a pretence of succeeding in reaching anything but an insignificant fraction of existing wealth. To continue the attempt to tax intangible personalty would surely result in the breakdown not only of the property tax but of the income tax as well. The only adequate solution of the problem is found in such an exemption of intangibles from the property tax as is provided for in the New York law.

There remains, finally, the question of the taxation of tangible personalty. Tangible personalty consists of two chief divisions—personal property from which an income is derived or expected, or what economists call productive capital, and personalty which is held primarily for purposes of enjoyment or consumption. In the first category are to be put the stock

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in trade of merchants, the machinery of manufacturers and the livestock and implements of farmers. In all these cases the property in question is one of the necessary elements in securing an income; and if the individual is taxed on his income, he really pays a tax on the property which constitutes the source of the income. When, therefore, an income tax is imposed, there is no reason for a continuance of the tax on the property which yields the income. It is difficult to see the justification of a distinction between tangible and intangible personalty in this respect. Moreover, the income tax is a far better method of reaching the ability of the individual than the tax on tangible personalty. A merchant with a small stock in trade may have a more rapid turnover and therefore enjoy greater profits than another with a large stock in trade. The same is true of manufacturers or farmers. The income tax, so far as it includes income from trade, industry or agriculture, ought to be considered a substitute for and not an addition to the tax on the tangible personalty which yields the income.

The other category of tangible personalty is that which affords no money income, like household furniture and jewelry. The distinction, however, is less marked than would at first blush appear; for many things that are commonly regarded as consumption capital are really productive capital. We must remember that there is productive as well as unproductive consumption. Thus the library of a professional man, the instruments of a physician and a not inconsiderable part of the household furniture of the ordinary man, especially where he carries on his occupation at home, are really to be considered sources of business or professional income, differing in no vital respect from stock in trade or machinery. An income tax is therefore merely a better method of reaching the taxable ability of the owners of such tangible personalty. There remain, then, only such things as automobiles, jewelry, paintings and luxurious furniture. Automobiles are now almost everywhere reached by a separate tax; while the desirability of taxing works of art is open to serious question. Finally, as to jewelry and luxurious furniture, these are, in the aggregate, so insignificant as scarcely to warrant an effort to reach them; and the

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administrative difficulties in the way of actually ascertaining the possession of such property are well-nigh insuperable. Above all, it is questionable whether it is desirable in any modern fiscal system, except in war time, to impose a tax on consumption, even on luxurious consumption, and whether it is not better to reach the taxable ability of a luxurious individual through a progressive income tax.

The net result of this discussion is the needlessness as well as the inexpediency of a tax on tangible personalty.[1] In New York that stage has long since disappeared. Merchants' stock in trade is scarcely, if ever, assessed; the taxation of the tangible personalty of the farmer is almost unknown; and the assessment of household furniture and jewelry has long been a farce. Since, therefore, virtually no attempt is made to reach tangible personalty, it did not seem wise to refer to the matter at all in the new tax. Definitely to have exempted personal property might have aroused some unintelligent opposition; whereas, as a matter of fact, the same result is achieved in practice. Any attempt to enforce a tax on tangible personalty, whether low rate or high rate, would meet with insuperable obstacles and would be as unnecessary from the point of view of principle as it would be inexpedient from that of practice.

In those states, however, which will no doubt soon follow the example of New York in the imposition of a general income tax but where the economic conditions have made it possible still to levy, however inequitably, a tax on tangible personalty, it may become a question as to what is politically wise. From the point of view of principle, as we have seen, the income tax ought to be a substitute for the tax on both tangible and intangible personalty. While local conditions may make it impossible to bring about this result, there is but little doubt that

[1] It is for the above reasons that the present writer dissents from the recommendation of the committee of the National Tax Association on a model tax system. The framers of that report all happened to live in states which are still in process of emerging from the old general property tax system, and their conclusions are not in harmony with the needs of the most modern and industrially developed commonwealths. It is significant that in none of the important European states which have substituted income taxes for the older methods is there to be found a retention of a tax on tangible personalty.

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before long all states having a general income tax will reach the stage now attained in practice in New York and in law by every other country. Tangible like intangible personalty need not be taxed and ought not to be taxed when there is a general income tax.

If then we proceed to inquire as to what farther steps ought to be taken in New York in order to complete the project of tax reform and to bring about a well-rounded tax system, we should put, in the first place, as a matter of theory, the abolition of the tax on tangible personalty. This, however, as we have just seen, is a counsel of perfection which is really unnecessary in practice.

The second defect in the law is the absence of differentiation or the distinction between earned and unearned income. This, again, is not so serious as it seems. The doctrine of differentiation arose at a time when existing income taxes were proportional. It was quite natural, therefore, to contend that a large income derived from property ought to be taxed at a higher rate than income from labor. More recently, however, we have become accustomed to steeply graduated income taxes, and inasmuch as so many of the very large incomes are derived from property we have, in practice, a higher taxation of property incomes. The need of differentiation, accordingly, has diminished and is nowadays to be found primarily in the lower stages of income. In these, however, the distinction to be observed between earned and unearned incomes is still justifiable; and when our administration of the income tax has proceeded to a point of high efficiency, it will no doubt become possible, as it will be desirable, to introduce the principle of differentiation.

The third defect in the law pertains to this very question of administration. It was originally intended, as pointed out above, to entrust the practical operation of the law to the state tax commission, which has already succeeded so admirably in administering the Emerson, or corporate income-tax, law. The substitution at the last moment of the state comptroller for the tax commission is an illustration of party politics which we unfortunately encounter so frequently. Not only was the admin-

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istration of the law put into the hands of an official who, however estimable as a personality, figured prominently as the chief opponent of the entire plan; but we have the deplorable spectacle of a separation of the general income tax into two parts, each entrusted to a different supervising body—the personal income tax to the comptroller and the corporate income tax to the state tax commission. It is sincerely to be hoped that this situation may be only temporary and that before long the administration of the income tax will be put where it belongs.

One other reform is needed in order to bring about a well-balanced system. Under the old system corporations in general, while still subject to the local property tax, were made liable to a state franchise tax in lieu of the personal property tax. From this obligation general manufacturing and commercial corporations were in part exempt; while public utilities and financial institutions were taxed according to a special and complicated system. The Emerson law of 1917 removed this exemption of general manufacturing and commercial corporations and subjected them to what is virtually a corporate income tax. It was, however, not thought wise at the time to interfere with the public utilities and financial companies. These, accordingly, still stand outside the general system. For this there is no excuse save the force of tradition; and one of the desirable changes of the immediate future will be to abolish this exceptional treatment and to bring public utilities and financial companies under the corporate income tax. When this is accomplished it will be possible to abandon the special franchise tax, which is a unique product of the former most unsatisfactory and chaotic system of corporate taxation. It was designed primarily to reach those public utilities which had taken advantage of the law permitting a deduction of debts from personal property and which thus, by creating a bonded indebtedness, escaped all local taxation. With a generalization of the corporate income tax accompanied by a division of the yield, neither the state nor the localities will require the continuance of this makeshift and nondescript tax which has been the despair of the administrator and the court.

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When these reforms shall have been accomplishd New York will have a thoroughiy satisfactory and modern system of taxation so far as state finance is concerned. There will even be no objection to the continuance of a moderate "direct" tax. For the objections urged against a state tax on real estate—and a direct tax is now virtually a tax on real estate—are to a large extent eliminated by the adoption of the income tax. The temptation of the local divisions to under-assess real estate in order to diminish their quotas of the state tax will henceforth be counteracted by the desire to secure as much as possible of the proceeds of the income tax; for, as we have pointed out above, the lower the assessment in any locality, the less its share of the income tax. With the far greater future fiscal importance of the income tax, the old tendency will tend to disappear. Moreover, the continuance of a moderate direct tax will provide the needed elasticity in the budget, which, for the present at least, it would be undesirable to attempt through the income tax. It cannot, however, be too strongly emphasized that the direct state tax ought to be kept down to a low figure and that the chief revenue must be sought from the income tax.

While the problem of state finance is therefore in a fair way of settlement, the same cannot yet be said of local finance. It is true that the aid afforded to the localities by their share of the income tax is by no means negligible and that the income tax may be counted upon to do its part in keeping down the local tax rate. It is, however, by no means improbable that this aid will turn out to be inadequate; while it may be inexpedient to increase the rate of the income tax to such a point as to afford all the localities the needed relief. For such an increase in the income-tax rate may either be undesirable in itself, in the face of a high federal tax, or it may result in giving to the state or to some of the localities more revenue than they need, while at the same time starving others. If this not entirely unexpected result comes about, it will be worthy of serious consideration whether it may not be desirable to adopt the project proposed by the present writer, which found favor with the joint legislative committee but which it was not deemed necessary to

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press at this time, namely, an optional local tax in the shape of either a business tax or a habitation tax to be administered by the locality for purely local purposes and which would operate still further to prevent a rise in the local rate on real estate. This suggestion may, however, safely be left to the future.

Summing up, then, the entire discussion, it will be realized that the New York law is of more than passing significance. It strikes out a new path in at least five points: in its close adherence to the language of the federal law, in its principle of local apportionment, in its treatment of residents and non-residents, in its virtual elimination of personal property taxation and in its commanding importance as the paramount factor in the fiscal system. It is thus the first comprehensive attempt made in the United States by a leading commonwealth to substitute for an outworn and makeshift policy a well-rounded system of state and local taxation. From this point of view, it is of far more than local importance; for if, as is confidently to be expected, the law should prove to be a success from both the fiscal and the economic points of view, there is but little doubt that it will serve as a model to be followed by other states as they approach the stage of economic development attained in New York. The public at large, which is always more ready to criticize than to appreciate and which naturally looks askance at any method of extracting increased funds from the pockets of the unwilling taxpayer, can perhaps not be expected to recognize the far-reaching implications of the present reform. But to the discerning student it is clear that what has been accomplished in New York is a real fiscal revolution, the beneficent results of which will gradually be realized by the community at large. In this sense the New York income-tax law of 1919 constitutes an important milestone in the economic and political development of the United States.

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EMPIRICAL LAWS OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY AND THE FLEXIBILITY OF PRICES

SEVERAL months ago, on February 18, 1919, in New Orleans, the Southern States Cotton Acreage Reduction Convention held its meeting in which four hundred delegates from ten Southern states participated. The immediate object of the convention, as reported by the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, was to give definiteness to a "movement to organize the cotton farmers, merchants and bankers of the entire South in reducing cotton acreage during the coming year, so as to free them from the shearing operations of the interests, American and foreign, which have been holding down the price of cotton." But the aspiration of many workers in the cause went beyond the planning for a single year and looked toward a permanent policy. Mr. Clarence Poe, the well-informed editor of the *Progressive Farmer* of Dallas, Texas, impressively urged, according to the *Times-Picayune*, that "the fight should be to secure permanently higher prices of cotton. . . . Our determination should be to put cotton on a level with other crops in the matter of wages paid for producing it. We should simply 'go on a strike' against raising cotton on the cheap-labor, child-labor starvation basis of production heretofore obtaining." The chairman of the convention, Governor R. G. Pleasant of Louisiana, expressed a common sentiment in saying "we must organize in every ward in the South and show the people that a reduction of at least one-third of the cotton acreage is necessary, proper and profitable. . . . Planting more than two-thirds of our present acreage in cotton is waste, and waste is criminal. The extra one-third should be devoted to feedstuffs, cattle, swine and sheep." Mr. J. M. Parker, "the federal food administrator for Louisiana, brought to the convention one thousand copies of a pamphlet setting forth to the cotton farmers, merchants and bankers of the South his plan of meeting the situation." According to

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Mr. Parker "an intimate knowledge of many years of conditions, both as a cotton producer and as a large handler of cotton" justified his statement "which, he says, can be readily proven" that "by selling 70 per cent. of their crop the farmers would really receive more money than they would by selling 100 per cent. . . ."

The impassioned editor from Texas, Mr. Poe, to whom reference has already been made, concurred in the recommendation to reduce the acreage one-third in 1919 and supported his plea for a permanent policy of small acreage by describing the state of cotton farming from 1890–1900: "What happened then was that we managed to keep soul and body together by taking the price paid for cotton and mortgaging the farms we owned to make up the difference between the price of cotton and the cost of living. I know, because my father and I were making cotton then, as I am now, and the old farm which had been in the family for three generations had to be mortgaged to meet living expenses. The period from 1890 to 1900 was a period of wholesale heartsickening change from land ownership to tenancy in the South, and this is the explanation: We were simply selling cotton for less than cost and paying for the privilege by giving away our homes to boot." But this is not the darkest view of the situation. Mr. Poe tells us further that cotton "has brought a low price because it has been largely a child-labor crop; largely also a woman-labor crop; and because the labor which has produced it has lived largely under slum conditions. . . . . While children in all other states and countries have been going to school and getting an education, together with all the advantages and benefits which education confers, we have been keeping our children in the fields and letting them grow up in ignorance—comparative ignorance at the very least. . . . But the main point is this: That we have done all this for nothing. We have made this shameful sacrifice of the immortal minds of our boys and girls for nothing. Why do I say for nothing? Because by keeping our children in the fields instead of in the schools, we have simply produced larger crops than the world was willing to pay high prices for. And the net result is that we here in the South have gotten no more for

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making big crops of cotton and keeping our children in ignorance to do it than we should have gotten for the smaller crops of cotton we should have made if we had sent our children to school as all the rest of the world is doing."

The course of the Southern planters is giving concern to manufacturers everywhere. For example, we read in the *New York Times* of June 9, 1919, "British textile manufacturers are chafing under the necessity of buying so largely from America, and the threat of the cotton planters to reduce their acreage has aroused their resentment. . . . . Since the signing of the armistice many manufacturers from the Lancashire district have made visits to India, Japan, and South America," and the "manufacturers . . . have repeatedly expressed the view that the world's markets are bare of cloth."

Here certainly is a staggering conjuncture of facts: "The world's markets bare of cloth", and the producers of the raw material organizing to curtail their output in order that, immediately, they may increase their profits and, ultimately, raise the standard of living of their women and children. One of these facts is *fait accompli*: "The world's markets are bare of cloth." But as yet the plans for a systematic reduction of the acreage have not been successfully put into operation, and there is great need to consider the basic arguments of the planters as well as the conditions in which their discontent has its origin.

Is it true that, by reducing their acreage, the farmers are likely to increase the amount of their profits? Is it possible to calculate the approximate production that would yield the farmers the maximum return? To answer these questions one must be able to forcast the variations of price that will follow upon variations in the output; to estimate the marginal price that is necessary to call forth any stated supply; and to compute the aggregate profits corresponding to different amounts of product. These desiderata are not peculiar to the problem before the Southern planters,[1] but they occur again

[1] An illustration may be given from President Wilson's address to Congress on August 8, 1919, embodying recommendations designed to reduce the cost of living:

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TABLE I

DATA FOR THE EMPIRICAL LAW OF DEMAND FOR COTTON

(One Year Base)

Year	Equivalent 500 Pound Bales, Gross Weight (Millions of Bales)	Production-Ratio	Percentage Change in Production	Price per Pound Upland Cotton (Cents)	Price-Ratio	Percentage Change in Price
1889 . .	7.47			11.5		
1890 . .	8.56	115	+15	8.6	75	—25
1891 . .	8.94	104	+ 4	7.3	85	—15
1892 .	6.66	75	—25	8.4	115	+15
1893 . .	7.43	112	+12	7.5	89	—11
1894 . .	10.03	135	+35	5.9	79	—21
1895 . .	7.15	71	—29	8.2	139	+39
1896 . .	8.52	119	+19	7.3	89	—11
1897 . .	10.99	129	+29	5.6	77	—23
1898 . .	11.44	104	+ 4	4.9	88	—12
1899 .	9.35	82	—18	7.6	155	+55
1900 . .	10.12	108	+ 8	9.3	122	+22
1901 . .	9.51	94	— 6	8.1	87	—13
1902 . .	10.63	112	+12	8.2	101	+ 1
1903 . .	9.85	93	— 7	12.2	149	+49
1904 . .	13.44	136	+36	8.7	71	—29
1905 . .	10.58	79	—21	10.9	125	+25
1906 . .	13.27	125	+25	10.0	92	— 8
1907 . .	11.11	84	—16	11.5	115	+15
1908 . .	13.24	119	+19	9.2	80	—20
1909 . .	10.00	76	—24	14.3	155	+55
1910 . .	11.61	116	+16	14.7	103	+ 3
1911 . .	15.69	135	+35	9.7	66	—34
1912 . .	13.70	87	—13	12.0	124	+24
1913 . .	14.16	103	+ 3	13.1	109	+ 9

and again in practical as well as in theoretical economic questions, and for that reason they should receive a general abstract treatment. The primary purpose of the following pages is to offer suggestions in regard to the more general problems, but it is hoped that light may thereby be thrown upon the perplex-

"In a few foodstuffs the prices had declined, but in nothing like the proportion in which supply had increased.

"For example, the stock of canned tomatoes had increased 102 per cent., and yet the price had declined only 25 cents per dozen cans. In some cases there had been the usual result of an increase of price following a decrease of supply, but in almost every instance the increase of price had been disproportionate to the decrease in stock." What would be the normal increase in price corresponding to the indicated reduction of stocks?

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ing and momentous question which is being agitated among the cotton planters.

Preliminary Notions

In the accompanying Table I are figures relating to the production and the price of cotton in the United States from 1889



Figure 1. The law of demand for cotton.

$$Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3.$$

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to 1913. The third column of the Table expresses the ratio of the production of any one year to the production of the preceding year, and the sixth column expresses the ratio of the mean price of any one year to the mean price of the preceding year. If these two columns of ratios are plotted as in Figure 1, where the production-ratios are measured on the horizontal line and the price-ratios on the perpendicular line, the series of scattered points depicted in the Figure will be obtained. The smooth curve passing among the points is the graph of the mathematical equation,

$$Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3,$$

which gives a general description of the relation of the price-ratios to the production-ratios. We learn from the smooth curve, which may be called the graph of the law of demand, the probable change in the price of cotton that, before 1914, would have followed upon a change in production. For example, the ratio of the production in 1914 to that of 1913 was 114, and consequently, in normal times, the probable ratio of the price in 1914 to that of 1913 would have been expressed by 93.

The data of Table I might have been treated in a different way. Column 4 expresses the percentage change in the production of any one year over the production of the preceding year, and column 7 gives similar information regarding prices. The mathematical equation describing the relation between these two series of figures is

$$y = 8.2 - 1.113x + .00113x^2 + .0000572x^3,$$

where x expresses the percentage change in the amount of production, and y expresses the percentage change in the corresponding price. This device for dealing with the data may be called the *method of percentage changes*. It is to be distinguished from the contrivance described a moment ago to which we shall refer as the *method of progressive ratios*.

A very valuable characteristic of these two methods is that we may pass, by a simple algebraic substitution, from the re-

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sults obtained by the method of percentage changes to the results derived by the method of progressive ratios and *vice versa*. The equation to the law of demand when the method of progressive ratios is followed is

$$Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3,$$

and when the method of percentage changes is used, the equation is

$$y = 8.2 - 1.113x + .00113x^2 + .0000572x^3.$$

If in the latter we put $y = Y - 100$, $x = X - 100$, we obtain the former equation.

From the point of view of regulating the amount of agricultural output with the object of bettering the farmer's condition, a matter of the first importance is the information given by the slope of the curve of demand. In Figure 2 are two hypothet-



Figure 2.

ical curves in one of which—the continuous curve—the slope is great, while in the other—the dotted curve—the slope is small. From the run of the two curves it is clear that for a given restriction of output, the price will rise sharply in the continuous curve and only moderately in the dotted curve. If,

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for example, the production should be reduced from $O\,P$ to $O\,P_1$, the price, in the case of the smooth curve, would rise from $P\,p$ to $P_1\,p_1$; while, in the case of the dotted curve, it would rise only to $P_1\,p_2$. If the equation to the law of demand is given in either of the two forms which we have already described, the slope of the curve of demand at any point may be determined. Since the equation to the law of demand for cotton, in the percentage form, is,

$$y = 8.2 - 1.113x + .00113x^2 + .0000572x^3$$

the slope of the curve is $\frac{dy}{dx} = -1.113 + .00226x + .0001716x^2$, which may be computed for any given value of x, e. g., when $x = 10$, $\frac{dy}{dx} = -1.073$. The same result for the slope will be obtained if we take the equation in the form given by the method of progressive ratios. The appropriate equation for cotton, we have ascertained, is

$$Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3,$$

and therefore

$\frac{dY}{dX} = .377 - .03206X + .0001716X^2$, which, when $X = 110$, gives $\frac{dY}{dX} = -1.073$.

The technical term *flexibility of prices* may be used to describe the variation of prices following upon a variation in the quantity of production, and we shall understand by this term the degree of bending in prices consequent upon an infinitesimal variation in the quantity of the output. We shall measure the degree of flexibility of prices by the *coefficient of flexibility*, which we shall define as the ratio of the relative change in price to the relative change in the supply of the commodity when both changes are infinitesimal. Symbolically, if the equation to the law of demand in the percentage-change form is $y = f(x)$,

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then the coefficient of flexibility of prices is $\frac{dy}{dx} = f'(x)$; and if the law of demand as given by the method of progressive ratios is $Y = F(X)$, the coefficient of flexibility of prices is $\frac{dY}{dX} = F'(X)$. We have already seen that these values $\frac{dy}{dx}$, $\frac{dY}{dX}$ are represented graphically by the respective slopes of the two types of curves. The letter f may be used to represent the coefficient of flexibility of prices, and we shall agree to speak of prices as being flexible when f is numerically greater than unity; and as being inflexible, when f is numerically less than unity. A while ago, when we were discussing the law of demand for cotton in the percentage-change form, we found that $\frac{dy}{dx} = -1.113 + .00226x + .0001716x^2$. If, in this equation, we put $x = 0$, we have $\frac{dy}{dx} = f = -1.113$, and since this value is numerically greater than unity, we say that the prices of cotton are flexible.

Whether the prices of a particular commodity are flexible or inflexible is of critical importance in the problem of determining the quantity of output which will yield the producer the maximum return in profits. For, if the prices should be inflexible, we should know at once that, assuming there is no secular trend in prices, an increase of one per cent. in the quantity of commodity produced would be followed by a fall of less than one per cent. in the price, and, consequently, as far as concerned the demand for the commodity—for the moment ignoring the question of the cost of production—it would be to the advantage of the producer to increase his output. If, on the other hand, prices are flexible, a reduction in the supply of one per cent. would be followed by more than a one per cent. rise in price, and the farmer would find his profit in curtailing the amount of his production.

If in any particular case, let us say the production of cotton, it should be found that prices are flexible and the inference be drawn that the farmer should reduce his acreage, the question

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would immediately arise as to the amount by which his output should be reduced. The farmer's aim will obviously be so to restrict his production that, with the resulting increase of price, he will have a surplus over the costs which will be the maximum surplus obtainable under the existing law of demand and the prevailing costs of production. Let us for a moment ignore the law of supply and consider whether it is possible to ascertain the amount of production which, according to the law of demand, will yield the maximum income. If we take the law of demand in the ratio-form described in Figure 1, we have a means of solving the problem. In the equation to the law of demand in this form,

$$Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3,$$

where X describes the ratio of the production of a given year to the production of the previous year, and Y gives the corresponding ratio of the price of the given year to the price of the preceding year. The goal of the farmer will be so to determine X that the product $X\ Y$ shall be a maximum. According to the mathematical rule for finding the maximum, the above product $X\ Y$ will have its greatest value when $\frac{d\ (X\ Y)}{d\ (X)} = 0$; that is, when

$$173.6 + .754X - .04809X + .0002288X^3 = 0.$$

The solution of this last equation shows that $X\ Y$ will be a maximum when $X = 98$.

Here, then, we reach an arresting conclusion. If cotton were a free gift of nature, costing nothing whatever for its production, it would be to the advantage of the owners, according to the preceding reasoning, to reduce the quantity placed upon the market by two per cent. But does the reasoning we have traversed justify so fateful a conclusion? In the presentation of our preliminary notions we have had occasion to speak of (1) the coefficient of flexibility of prices; (2) the empirical law of demand; (3) the empirical law of supply; (4) the economic amount of production, or the amount of output that will

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yield the planters the maximum income. In order to gain a more comprehensive view of the problem we shall consider these questions more in detail.

The Coefficient of Flexibility of Prices

We have defined the coefficient of flexibility of prices as the ratio of the relative change in price to the relative change in the supply of the commodity when both changes are infinitesimal. Symbolically, if x represents the percentage change in the amount supplied, y the corresponding percentage change in price, and f the coefficient of flexibility of prices, then $f = \frac{dy}{dx}$, and the value of f will depend upon (1) the method of measuring the raw values of percentage change in commodity and price, and (2) the type of equation chosen to represent the connection between x and y.[1] In the construction of Table I, our raw data were the percentage change in production of any one year over the production of the preceding year and the corresponding percentage change of price of the given year over the price of the previous year. But we might have taken the percentage change of production of any one year over the average production of the two preceding years, or of the three, or four, or more preceding years,—together with the corresponding percentage changes of price. We might have used

[1] Perhaps some justification should be offered for the introduction of the new term *flexibility of prices*. It might be said that the coefficient of flexibility of prices is simply the reciprocal of the coefficient of elasticity of demand. I should gladly agree to the criticism and should point out that in 1914, in *Economic Cycles*, chap. iv, and in 1917, in *Forecasting the Yield and the Price of Cotton*, chap. v, I had done my best to give to the ideas of elasticity of demand and of law of demand, as we inherited them from the masters of statical economics, a concrete, dynamic significance. But there will probably always be co-workers who will prefer to restrict the term elasticity of demand to a statical meaning, and this is one reason for the use of the term flexibility of prices. A second reason is that, just as in trigonometry a facilitation of thought has been gained by having for the sine, tangent, and secant, separate names for their reciprocals,—cosecant, cotangent, and cosine—so in many economic problems real assistance will be afforded by keeping the mind upon the aspect of phenomena represented by flexibility of prices rather than upon that represented by elasticity of demand. The former term sees the movement of prices primarily from the point of view of the producer; the latter, primarily from the point of view of the consumer.

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as the foundation of our computations an arrangement of raw data illustrated in Table II, where the percentage changes in production and in price are calculated with reference to a four-years base.

Our first query, therefore, in case of an alleged value of f, refers to the breadth of base of the raw data upon which the computation rests, whether the percentage changes have reference to a single year, or to a mean of several years. If it should be said that the price of cotton is flexible and the acreage should be reduced, we should wish first of all to know whether the computed flexibility was based upon a simple year to year change or upon a change covering a term of years. For one purpose it may be desirable to compute f in a particular way, and, for another purpose, in quite a different way.

Empirical Laws of Demand

Whether the raw data are taken with a base of one or more years, we should in each case have to choose a type of curve to use in connecting the variables x and y. The simplest assumption would be that the relation between x and y is linear and may be represented by $y = a\,x + b$, where the constants a and b are then derived from the raw data. But while this type of curve is simple, it may not fit the observations, and any conclusion which might be derived from the assumed law of demand would, where the fit is poor, probably be either inadequate or erroneous. We have no *a priori* knowledge as to the appropriate type of curve, but we do know that whatever may be the proper type it is representable by means of the series[1] $y = a + b\,x + c\,x^2 + d\,x^3 + \ldots$, and that the greater the number of terms in the series, the better the curve will fit the observations. Our object should be to retain a simple working equation by taking as few terms in the series as will give a fit sufficiently good for the problem in hand.

In the subsequent part of this paper the typical equation is

[1] This follows from Maclaurin's theorem that $f(x) = f(0) + x\,f'(0) + \frac{x^2}{\lfloor 2}\,f''(0) + \frac{x^3}{\lfloor 3}\,f'''(0) + \ldots$

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TABLE II

DATA FOR THE EMPIRICAL LAW OF DEMAND FOR COTTON

(Four Years Base)

Year	Equivalent 500 Pound Bales, Gross Weight (Millions of Bales) P	Production-Ratio $P/\overline{P}_4$	Percentage Change in Production $\frac{P-\overline{P}_4}{\overline{P}_4}$	Price per Pound Upland Cotton (Cents) p	Price-Ratio $p/\overline{p}_4$	Percentage Change in Price $\frac{p-\overline{p}_4}{\overline{p}_4}$
1886	6.31	. .	. .	10.3	. .	. .
1887	6.88	. .	. .	10.3	. .	. .
1888	6.92	. .	. .	10.7	. .	. .
1889	7.47	. .	. .	11.5	. .	. .
1890	8.56	124	+24	8.6	80	—20
1891	8.94	120	+20	7.3	71	—29
1892	6.66	84	—16	8.4	88	—12
1893	7.43	94	— 6	7.5	84	—16
1894	10.03	127	+27	5.9	75	—25
1895	7.15	87	—13	8.2	112	+12
1896	8.52	109	+ 9	7.3	97	— 3
1897	10 99	133	+33	5.6	78	—22
1898	11.44	125	+25	4.9	73	—27
1899	9.35	98	— 2	7.6	117	+17
1900	10.12	101	+ 1	9.3	148	+48
1901	9.51	91	— 9	8.1	119	+19
1902	10.63	105	+ 5	8.2	109	+ 9
1903	9.85	99	— 1	12.2	147	+47
1904	13.44	134	+34	8.7	93	— 7
1905	10.58	97	— 3	10.9	117	+17
1906	13.27	119	+19	10.0	100	0
1907	11.11	94	— 6	11.5	111	+11
1908	13.24	109	+ 9	9.2	89	—11
1909	10.00	83	—17	14.3	137	+37
1910	11.61	98	— 2	14.7	131	+31
1911	15.69	137	+37	9.7	78	—22
1912	13.70	108	+ 8	12.0	100	0
1913	14.16	111	+11	13.1	103	+ 3

assumed to be $y = a + b\,x + c\,x^2 + d\,x^3$, and when we express the equation in the percentage-change form we use the small letters x and y, and when we express it in the form of progressive ratios we use the capital letters X and Y. Now it makes no difference whether the percentage changes in the raw data have, as their base, quotations for one year or for an average of several years, we may always pass from the law of demand in the percentage form to the law of demand in the form of progressive ratios and *vice versa*. For example, the

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law of demand for cotton derived from percentage changes with a base of four years is

$$y = 17.1 - 1.099x - .06566x^2 + .0019275x^3.$$

Put $y = Y - 100$, $x = X - 100$, then

$$Y = -2357.1 + 69.858X - .64391X^2 + .0019275X^3,$$

which is the law of demand in the form of progressive ratios. The method of arranging the raw data for computing these equations is given in Table II.

In concluding the preceding section we found that it is wise always to ask whether an alleged value of the coefficient of flexibility of prices is derived from raw data with a base of one year or of a mean of several years. With reference to cotton we may now see that the value of f is practically the same whether the law of demand is computed from raw material with a base of one year or a base of a mean of several years. In the former case the law of demand is

$$y = 8.2 - 1.113x + .00113x^2 + .0000572x^3,$$

which gives $f = \frac{dy}{dx} = -1.113 + .00226x + .0001716x^2$,

and when $x = 0$, $f = -1.11$.

The law of demand with a four-years base is

$$y = 17.1 - 1.099x - .06566x^2 + .0019275x^3,$$

which gives $f = \frac{dy}{dx} = -1.099x - .13132x + .0057825x^2$,

and when $x = 0$, $f = -1.10$.

The practical significance of this constancy in the value of f, which is numerically greater than unity, is to fortify the conclusion that the cotton farmers will find their interest in decreasing the amount of their production.

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Empirical Laws of Supply

In treating this question a distinction must be made between (1) the empirical law of supply under circumstances of free competition, and (2) the empirical law of supply under circumstances of a deliberate restriction of the amount of production.

We have seen that the present movement among the cotton farmers takes the form of an agreement to reduce their acreage as a means of limiting the amount of their production. The aggregate production, it is true, is dependent upon the yield per acre as well as upon the acreage, but the farmers have no way of estimating, before the planting, the probable yield per acre, and their effort at regulating supply is limited to increasing or decreasing the acreage. Our problem therefore resolves itself into a search for the empirical law according to which the farmers regulate the area planted in cotton.

In Table III material is given with which to treat the problem. We would suppose that one important factor leading the farmers to increase or to decrease the number of acres planted is the movement of prices in the preceding years. If the price of cotton has been falling, fewer acres will be seeded in that crop; and, on the other hand, if prices have been rising, there is likely to be an increase in the acreage. In Table III data are given with which to compute the relation between the two variables, namely, the percentage change in the acreage of a given year over the acreage of the preceding year, and the percentage change in the price of cotton from the price prevailing two years before the current year to the price the year before the current year. The correlation between the two variables is $r = .532$, and the equation expressing their relation is

$$y = .375x + 2.76.$$

This equation gives the empirical law of the variation of cotton acreage under free competition. For any given percentage change in the price of the preceding year x, we may compute, by means of the equation, the probable percentage change in the acreage y. We may also observe that, just as we could pass from the results of the law of demand in the percentage-

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TABLE III

DATA RELATING TO THE EMPIRICAL LAW OF SUPPLY OF COTTON

(Conditions of Free Competition)

Year	Acreage of Cotton (Thousands of Acres)	Acreage-Ratio	Percentage Change in Acreage	Price per Pound Upland Cotton (Cents)	Price-Ratio	Percentage Change in Price
1888 . .	. . .	. .	. .	10.7	. .	. .
1889 . .	20,180	. .	. .	11.5	107	+ 7
1890 . .	21,886	108	+ 8	8.6	75	—25
1891 . .	23,876	109	+ 9	7.3	85	—15
1892 . .	15,228	64	—36	8.4	115	+15
1893 . .	23,837	157	+57	7.5	89	—11
1894 . .	24,959	105	+ 5	5.9	79	—21
1895 . .	21,896	88	—12	8.2	139	+39
1896 . .	32,823	150	+50	7.3	89	—11
1897 . .	28,861	88	—12	5.6	77	—23
1898 . .	25,174	87	—13	4.9	88	—12
1899 . .	24,278	96	— 4	7.6	155	+55
1900 . .	24,982	103	+ 3	9 3	122	+22
1901 . .	26,897	108	+ 8	8.1	87	—13
1902 . .	26,940	100	0	8.2	101	+ 1
1903 . .	26,952	100	0	12.2	149	+49
1904 . .	31,350	116	+16	8.7	71	—29
1905 . .	27,205	87	—13	10.9	125	+25
1906 . .	31,301	115	+15	10.0	92	— 8
1907 . .	29,848	95	— 5	11.5	115	+15
1908 . .	32,493	109	+ 9	9.2	80	—20
1909 . .	31,060	96	— 4	14.3	155	+55
1910 . .	32,467	105	+ 5	14.7	103	+ 3
1911 . .	36,045	111	+11	9.7	66	—34
1912 . .	34,283	95	— 5	12.0	124	+24
1913 . .	37,089	108	+ 8	. .	. .	. .

change form to the results of the law of demand in the form of progressive ratios, so, in case of the empirical law of supply, a similar transition may be made. If, in the above equation, which expresses the relation between percentage changes, we put $y = Y - 100$, $x = X - 100$, we get

$$Y = .375X + 99.01,$$

which is the law of variation of acreage with price, expressed in terms of ratios.

We come now to the consideration of the law of supply of cotton when there is an agreement between the producers to restrict the acreage. We wish especially to ascertain whether

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it is possible so to determine the empirical law of supply, under conditions of restricted acreage, that we may estimate the amount of output which will afford the planters the maximum return for their expenditure of labor and capital. In order to narrow our inquiry and to illustrate a particular method of dealing with the problem, let us seek to determine in a concrete case what prices are necessary in order to call forth production of definite, indicated quantities of cotton. In Table IV is an arrangement of data which I have compiled from *Bulletin No. 659* of the United States Department of Agriculture, entitled "A Farm Management Study of Cotton Farmers of Ellis County, Texas." The Bulletin was published June 17, 1918, and its conclusions are "based on data obtained in a survey of the business of 120 farms in Ellis County, Texas, in 1914" (p. 1).

This county not only is one of the oldest agricultural sections of Texas but is also "one of the leading cotton sections of the state" (p. 14). Table IV, I should like to give in greater detail, but it is as full as the Tables from which it is derived[1] will admit. For the use we shall make of the data it would be highly desirable to have a much finer classification of the farms according to yield per acre, and perhaps it may be useful to suggest that future official investigations along similar lines will be greatly increased in value if the classifications are more detailed; are kept equidistant and constant in the range of the subclasses; and are retained in investigations covering different parts of the Cotton Belt so that many sample inquiries may be compounded into a representative index. This suggestion will not, I hope, be regarded as an ungracious criticism of an exceptionally able and useful report.

Returning, now, to Table IV, we see that in Group 1, which according to column VIII produces 18.6 per cent. of the total yield of the 115 farms, the average cost of producing cotton lint is 10.5 cents a pound (column IX). In a similar manner, the cost of production in each of the four yield-groups is given, and we see by a comparison of columns III and IX that there

[1] *Bulletin No. 659*, pp. 34, 35.

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TABLE IV

DATA RELATING TO THE PRODUCTION OF COTTON IN ELLIS COUNTY, TEXAS

I Group	II Yield of Cotton Lint per Acre (Pounds)	III Average Yield of Cotton Lint per Acre (Pounds)	IV Number of Farms	V Average Crop Acres per Farm	VI Mean Yield per Farm (Pounds of Lint)	VII Total Yield of the Group (Pounds of Lint)	VIII Percentage of Product in Respective Groups	IX Average Cost of Production per Pound of Lint (Cents)
1	136 to 208	170	31	120	20400	632,400	18.6	10.5
2	209 to 240	227	33	133	30191	996,303	29.4	8.6
3	241 to 277	275	25	127	34925	873,125	25.8	8.2
4	278 to 402	345	26	99	34155	888,030	26.2	6.7
Total	. . . .	. . . .	115	. . . .	. . . .	3,389,858	100.0	

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is a crude inverse relation between the yield per acre and the cost per pound of lint: *The greater the yield per acre the smaller the cost per pound of lint.* This crude relation gives us a clew to the path to follow in the search for the empirical law of supply. By an inspection of Table IV we find the following: If a full crop is to be produced the average cost of production of the marginal group, 10.5 cents per pound of lint, must be covered, and this cost is 93.7 per cent. of the average price,—11.2 cents a pound,—received for the five years previous to 1914 (Bulletin, p. 14); if the crop is to be reduced by agreement 18.6 per cent. (column VIII), the average cost of production in the new marginal group, 8.6 cents (column IX), must be covered, and this is 76.8 per cent. of the average price of 11.2 cents; if the crop is to be reduced 48.0 per cent., the average cost of production in the marginal group is 8.2 cents, which is 73.2 per cent. of 11.2 cents; finally, if the crop is to be reduced 73.8 per cent., the average cost of production in the marginal group is 6.7 cents, which is 59.8 per cent. of 11.2 cents.

Supposing that these percentages, instead of being derived from a single county in Texas, were the mean percentages of many samples from different parts of the Cotton Belt, we should be able to construct from them a general empirical law of supply which could immediately be brought into relation with the empirical law of demand. We shall illustrate how this might be done. The law of demand for cotton based upon the material of Table I is

$$Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3.$$

If in this equation we put $X = 100$, we get $Y = 108.2$, which shows that there is a secular trend in prices tending to increase by 8.2 per cent. annually. Our empirical law of supply may be brought into relation with this law of demand only when we make a similar allowance for the secular change in the cost of production, and this has been provided for in the accompanying Table V. Columns III and V of this Table give the coördinates of four points in the empirical supply curve, and if

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we fit a parabola of the third order to these four points, we obtain as the equation to the empirical law of supply

$$Y = 1.0 + 3.842X - .06295X^2 + .0003457X^3.$$

The Economic Amount of Production

Our empirical laws of supply and demand, which are graphed in Figure 3, enable us to throw some light upon the method of answering the final question asked by the cotton planters, namely, what is the amount of production which, with the given laws of supply and demand, will yield the farmers the greatest

TABLE V

DATA FOR THE EMPIRICAL LAW OF SUPPLY OF COTTON

(Conditions of Restricted Competition)

I Group	II Percentage of Total Production Contributed by Groups	III Cumulative Percentage of Total Production	IV Cost of Production Expressed as Percentage of Selling Price	V Product of Column IV by 1.082
1	18.6	100.0	93.7	101.4
2	29.4	81.4	76.8	83.1
3	25.8	52.0	73.2	79.1
4	26.2	26.2	59.8	64.7

income? If we express the above law of demand in the form $Y = F(X)$, and the above law of supply in the form $Y = \Phi(X)$, then the mathematical equivalent of the farmer's question is: For what value of X will $X[F(X) - \Phi(X)]$ be a maximum? By making the above substitutions for $F(X)$ and $\Phi(X)$, and solving the problem according to known mathematical rules, we find that the income of the farmers will have a maximum value when $X = 64.99$, that is to say, the farmers' greatest profit will be obtained when they restrict their output 35 per cent.

It will not be forgotten, I hope, that I have gone through

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

Figure 3. Laws of demand and supply in the case of cotton. (Conditions of restricted competition in production.)

Law of demand: $Y = 173.6 + .377X - .01603X^2 + .0000572X^3$

Law of supply: $Y = 1.0 + 3.842X - .06295X^2 + .0003457X^3$.

the details of this problem, primarily in order to illustrate a method of dealing with fundamental economic questions, and

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not to test the accuracy of the planters' propaganda aiming to bring about a reduction of their acreage by one-third. The remarkable coincidence between the above theoretical results and the estimates of the farmers might suggest, in the heat of controversy, that the numerical accuracy of the farmers' contention had been mathematically demonstrated. This, of course, is not true; first, because the empirical law of demand is based upon data ending in 1914; and secondly, because the empirical law of supply rests only upon a sample survey, in 1914, of one county of Texas. The propagandists, however, would doubtless declare, as to the empirical law of demand, that the experience of the twenty-five years before the World War is a most reasonable foundation upon which to base their plans in the period of reconstruction; and as to the law of supply, that faith in their recommendation would seem to be justified upon the assumption that the law of supply derived from a painstaking, official survey of conditions in our leading cotton-producing state is reasonably representative of the Cotton Belt.

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THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SLESVIG QUESTION[1]

I

"THE frontier between Germany and Denmark shall be fixed in conformity with the wishes of the people."[2] These are the introductory words of the articles of the peace treaty that deal with Slesvig. In the case of this territory, at least, the principle of self-determination has triumphed, and the provisions that have been made for its application are such that we may look for a boundary which will have some degree of permanence because based upon "essential justice" and as far as possible upon nationality.

The solution of the Slesvig-Holstein problem not only marks, as we hope, the end of a "question" which has wrought havoc among diplomats in the past but affords a unique example of territory taken from a vanquished power and bestowed freely on a weak neutral state. Stranger still, we find, in the words of a Vienna newspaper, "a fairy-tale come true", and witness the spectacle of "a little country to the north that does not wish to annex land" to which nationality gives it no claim. Moreover, the effective recognition of self-determination by the treaty is the fulfillment of the one great purpose for which the Danes under Prussian rule have been striving for the past half-century, a purpose which has given unity to all their nationalistic efforts. Furthermore, Slesvig presents an excellent field for the study of self-determination put into practice. There were no possible claimants to the land except little Denmark and vanquished Germany—no lusty protegés of the Entente with conflicting demands—nor was the issue obscured by an appeal to arms. The battle, however bitter, was one of words, propaganda and intrigue, not of violence, and helped to clarify

[1] Acknowledgment is made of the courtesy of the American-Scandinavian Foundation in placing recent files of Danish newspapers and other material at the disposal of the writer.

[2] Treaty of Peace with Germany, art. 109.

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the problem. In view of all these facts the effort during the months following the signing of the armistice to reach a satisfactory solution of the Slesvig problem and the conflict with regard to the manner in which the basic principle of settlement should be applied, are of more than local interest, even in this day of tremendous problems. No attempt will be made in this paper to describe the part played by the Slesvig question in the peace conference or to follow the tortuous paths of diplomacy. It is offered as a study, based mainly on the Danish newspapers, of the discussion of the Slesvig problem as it developed in Denmark and Slesvig in the effort to influence the final settlement.

II

Slesvig, or South Jutland, has been the scene of border conflict between German and Dane from very early times. It seems to be clearly established, however, that all of this region down to the Eider River and the Kiel Canal was originally Danish.[1] This fact was recognized in an agreement between Charlemagne and King Godfred of Denmark and was reaffirmed in several later international agreements. Yet it was to the interest of the feudal nobles of Slesvig to decrease the power of the Danish royal line over the duchy, and a succession of weak kings in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gave these nobles the desired opportunity to secure greater independence. To attain this they allied themselves with the German counts of Holstein, who finally acquired feudal control of the northern duchy also. In 1460, when the direct Holstein line died out, Slesvig reverted to the Danish crown, and the right to choose a duke of Holstein fell to the nobles of that duchy. Since many of the latter had acquired fiefs across the Danish border in Slesvig, they found the union between the two duchies profitable. They therefore agreed to choose Christian I of Denmark as their sovereign on condition that he would keep the two duchies united and not incorporate them into his kingdom. Thus arose the fatal agreement of perpetual union,

[1] *American Scandinavian Review*, Sept.–Oct., 1918.

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"up ewich tosammende ungedelt", between Danish Slesvig and German Holstein. During the four centuries that followed, these districts were repeatedly parceled out, border conflicts frequently broke out, treaties and agreements were made and forgotten. The difference in the status of the two duchies was, however, always maintained. Holstein remained a part of the Holy Roman Empire and was admitted in 1815 into the German Confederation; its relation to the Danish ruling house was purely personal. Slesvig, on the other hand, was a part of the realm of Denmark.

Nevertheless, Slesvig was subjected to German influence. The little strip of territory directly north of the present Kiel Canal never had any considerable Danish population. The line separating it from the rest of Slesvig is marked by the old fortification, Dannevirke. "Queen Thyra's Wall" this rampart is fondly called, in memory of the beloved queen who, in the ninth century, contributed to the construction of this bulwark against German incursions. And even north of Dannevirke German influence made progress, both through immigration and through the conscious efforts of German lords who introduced German officials, teachers and pastors.

Not till the national awakening of the nineteenth century did Denmark, loyally supported by the Danish population of Slesvig, take any conscious steps against the aggressions of Germanism. The advance of Germanization was stopped, but Danism never succeeded in regaining the lost ground. In 1848 all the nationalist movements among Danes and Germans brought the old racial conflict to a sharp crisis in the Slesvig-Holstein rebellion. The liberal nationalists of Germany insisted on intervention to free the duchies from Danish "tyranny", but the threat of help from Russia and the brave stand of the Danes saved the duchies for the Danish king. It is important to remember that the Danish population in Slesvig remained loyal to Denmark—a fact generally overlooked by German historians.

With the growth of nationality and democracy it was not unnatural that the will of the people and the principle of nationality should be regarded as the true basis for a permanent set-

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tlement of the border conflict. Even in the thirties, voices were raised for the principle of self-determination, and it was suggested as a solution of the problem in 1848, notably by the estates of the duchies; but it found no general adherence, and the old problem was only intensified.

It is not within the scope of this article to try to unravel the tangled story of events from 1848 to 1864. Suffice it to say that in 1864 the efforts of the Danish king to attach the duchies more firmly to Denmark afforded Bismarck an opportunity to interfere in behalf of the German population, and the result was the united attack of Prussia and Austria on Denmark.

During the truce in the war of 1864, while the Powers were trying in the London Conference to adjust the dispute, the appeal to a plebiscite was again suggested, and though this plan was not given much consideration, a serious effort was made by the Powers to reach a settlement based on nationality, which would have involved a division of Slesvig on a line corresponding roughly to the language line. No agreement, however, could be reached. Denmark had no desire to retain Holstein. But, as the Danish historian Jörgensen writes: "To give up any, even the smallest, part of the land north of the Eider seemed to public opinion in Denmark an almost intolerable thought, nor did the people of North Slesvig desire it except as an imperative necessity".[1] The war was renewed, and Denmark was forced to cede Holstein and all of Slesvig to the two victors.

Two years later the principle of self-determination in Slesvig received international sanction. By the Treaty of Prague, at the close of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, Austria ceded her claims to the conquered duchies to Prussia, but with one limitation. At the request of Napoleon III the following clause was introduced into Article V: "The population of the northern districts of Slesvig shall be ceded to Denmark, if, by a free vote, they express a wish to be united with Denmark."[2] Prussia, however, took no steps to carry out the promised pleb-

[1] A. D. Jörgensen, Fortællinger fra Faedrelandets Historie, p. 432.

[2] Europaeischer Geschichtskalender, 1866, p. 279.

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iscite, and in 1878 the Treaty of Vienna between Austria and the German Empire annulled the clause in question.

Nevertheless, this provision has proved invaluable to the Danish Slesvigers. It has furnished them with a program—a definite purpose about which they could unite in resistance to Germanization during the fifty-four years of Prussian rule. Its fulfillment has been the ultimate goal of all their activities, and their steady adherence to the principle which it expressed has given remarkable unity and consistency to the development of Danism within the German realm.

How and when a plebiscite should be held was not specified, but the Slesvigers construed Article V of the Treaty of Prague to mean that it should be by electoral circles. Therefore they concentrated their efforts on preserving the vitality of Danism in the north of Slesvig, thus emphasizing the difference between that section and the south. Till Article V was repudiated, the Slesvigers looked upon themselves as connected only temporarily with Prussia, and the chief aim of their leaders was to secure the promised vote. The repudiation of the promise was followed in the eighties by a short period of weary discouragement, but the Danes always refused to recognize the annulment of the treaty provision.[1]

Their immediate efforts, however, were now directed toward the preservation of their Danism, for Prussia's efforts to Germanize Slesvig were carried on with systematic thoroughness and ever-increasing severity. It is interesting to notice the parallel between the history of the Poles and that of the Danes in the Prussian monarchy. The oppression of the two went hand in hand, the same measures generally being applied to both. Every new outburst of militarism was accompanied by new repressive measures against each of the dissident nationalities.

The resistance of the Danes to any forcible imposition of

[1] Debates of the Prussian Landtag, 1898, vol. ii, p. 1259. "Johanssen: I stand on the Treaty of Vienna. . . . I stand also on the Treaty of Prague . . . in a definite article of which our political position is described." "Abolished" was shouted from the Right. "It is not abolished . . . you may speak of abolition as much as you like, but I cannot recognize it."

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Kultur was firm and unyielding but admirably self-restrained; it kept within the law with scrupulous care. They had one representative in the Imperial Reichstag and two in the Prussian Landtag. The purpose of these leaders, as they repeatedly said, was twofold: (1) to insist on the civil rights of the Slesvigers as Prussian citizens to equality before the law (something that was often denied them) and (2) to demand their right as a self-conscious group to retain their national culture. At present, the most prominent leader in Slesvig is H. P. Hanssen-Nörremölle, its last deputy in the Reichstag. He has done more than anyone else to organize the various societies in North Slesvig which have been the chief agencies of Danish resistance. He has also maintained constant opposition in Berlin, steeled his countrymen to endure the sufferings of the last five years and prepared for the final consummation of the long hoped for reunion with Denmark.

North Slesvig furnishes a striking example of the futility of all attempts to secure uniformity by force. When Danish was excluded from the churches, free churches were built in which it continued to be used; when Danish organizations were forbidden to use public halls, new private club-houses were erected to accommodate them; when Danish was driven out of the common schools, private schools were built, in which it continued to be taught; when these were closed, the people sent their children to school in Denmark; when they were no longer permitted to do this, they resorted to itinerant schoolmasters who taught the children Danish in their homes; and when instruction in the homes was forbidden, the children still managed to continue to use their mother tongue. Persecution changed the rather indifferent Danism of half a century ago into the fervor of martyrdom.

Throughout the struggle, Article V of the Treaty of Prague was never lost sight of. In 1867, the first Danish representatives in Berlin made this declaration: "We are Danes and always wish to remain Danes",[1] and on October 23, 1918, H. P. Hanssen made the following demand in the Reichstag:

[1] Mackeprang, Nordslesvig, p. 42.

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"As a representative of the Danish population, in the name of right and justice, I request the execution of the Prague Treaty, and I propose that when peace is made the North Slesvig question be finally settled on the basis of a free disposal of the peoples."

III

During the war there was little opportunity for open agitation of the Slesvig question. The Danish government maintained strict neutrality and directed that citizens of Denmark should do nothing that might increase the difficulties of its already precarious position. During the last weeks of the war there was a rumor, which was widely circulated in the Danish press and was never entirely discredited, to the effect that Denmark had opened negotiations with Germany, but this was denied by both governments. Later, Eric Scavenius, the Foreign Minister of Denmark, stated officially that his government had throughout taken the position that it could not assume the initiative with regard to Slesvig.[1] Owing to these rumors and to some suggestion that it interfere, the government, on October 23, 1918, called a closed meeting of the Rigsdag and laid before it a resolution which was adopted with the assent of all four parties—Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals and Socialists. This resolution expressed a unanimous desire to adhere to the policy of neutrality, asserted "that no change in the status of Slesvig except one based on the principle of nationality would accord with the desires, feelings, and interests of the Danish people" and stated that the Rigsdag desired a solution of the problem that would not disturb Denmark's friendly relations with either of the belligerents, since only thereby could the permanence of the settlement be guaranteed.[2] Thus the Danish government made an unequivocal statement of its policy.

In Slesvig, even more than in Denmark, all open nationalistic activities were suppressed during the war. At the outset, the possibility of any united action was prevented by the temporary

[1] *Social Demokraten*, May 18, 1919.

[2] *Politiken*, Oct. 26, 1918.

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suppression of Danish newspapers, the immediate arrest of all the political leaders of Slesvig, the hasty call to arms of as many Slesvigers as possible and the severance of all communication with Denmark. Later, severe censorship of the press and stringent enforcement of laws against the dissident nationalities prevented any demonstration. Moreover, the Danish Slesvigers considered it a matter of honor as well as of expediency to maintain their former policy of scrupulous obedience to German and Prussian laws.[1] Yet the old method of resistance was still followed. Nis Nissen and Kloppenborg-Skrumsager continued the opposition in the Landtag to all measures of Germanization,[2] while Hanssen did the same in the Reichstag.[3] That the ultimate aim was kept in view we have already seen in Hanssen's appeal for the execution of Article V of the Treaty of Prague.

The signing of the armistice afforded the longed-for opportunity for open action and found the Danes, both in Denmark and in Slesvig, prepared, in spite of all suppression, for effective and united work. Almost at once, on November 14, an appeal was sent to the German government asking that at the peace negotiations the question of North Slesvig be settled "on the basis of self-determination for all peoples". This was signed by 302 societies — cultural, economic, religious and political—and furnished proof of the vigor of the movement and of the cooperation of the many organizations that participated in it. At Berlin, Hanssen obtained from Dr. Solf, the German Foreign Secretary, a statement that Germany, in recognizing the Fourteen Points, conceded the right of Danish Slesvig to be returned to Denmark if the people so desired.

On November 17 occurred a dramatic meeting at Aabenraa of the North Slesvig Electoral Society, the great political organization of the Danes in Slesvig. The meeting was one of

[1] There was, as a result, no resistance to military service and of the 25,000 Slesvigers conscripted, over 6,000 were killed, *i. e.* four per cent. of the population, while the average loss for Germany was three per cent.

[2] Notably in the budget debates, March, 1915 and 1916; LaCour, Sönderjylland under Verdenskrigen, pp. 107–10.

[3] Speech on the language question, June 9, 1916; LaCour, pp. 104–8.

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tremendous enthusiasm and buoyant hope. H. P. Hanssen, the president, presented a resolution which was adopted with practical unanimity. The society declared itself in favor of a plebiscite in North Slesvig as a whole, the suffrage to be exercised by men and women over twenty years of age and guarded from interference by the German authorities, and also of the grant of a two-year option period to the inhabitants on both sides of the border. It was taken for granted, the resolution continued, that adjacent districts in Central Slesvig which might make the demand would be given the opportunity to express whether or not they wished to be returned to Denmark. This resolution was sent to the Danish government with a request that it lay the matter before the peace conference. Through the reply of the Danish Foreign Minister, Scavenius, the government repeated its adherence to the resolution of October 23, declared itself in perfect accord with the aims of the Electoral Society and promised that it would gladly present their requests to the peace conference since the population most directly concerned had taken the first step.[1] So the Aabenraa resolution became the platform of the Danish government as well as of the political organization of the North Slesvigers themselves.

The time seemed ripe for the execution of the oft-quoted Article V, which had been annulled forty years before. Self-determination as the principle of settlement had finally won the recognition not only of the people concerned and of the Danish government but also of the new German government. The principles as well as the interests of the Entente would certainly prompt them to favor a rectification of the Danish boundary line, and there seemed to be a growing sympathy for the Slesvigers among the peoples of the Entente. As one indication of this it might be mentioned that both in England and in France the Danish Slesvigers were segregated from the other German prisoners and placed in separate camps where the treatment accorded them was both generous and hospitable.

That the Danish people were eager to "welcome home"

[1] *Politiken*, Nov. 17 and 25.

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their brothers in Slesvig is more than evident. Scarcely had the necessity of guarding against any breach of neutrality been removed when the generous sympathy of the Danes for Slesvig was manifested in every form of activity. There is scarcely an issue of a Danish newspaper that does not contain reports of various forms of aid sent to Slesvig, of Red Cross work there, of efforts to furnish occupational training for South-Jutlanders who had been disabled in the war, of accounts of the hundreds of under-nourished children brought from Slesvig to Denmark for vacations. There was much gratification when the negotiations of the government with England and Germany were finally successfully concluded and the importation of food into North Slesvig was allowed. The South Jutland prisoners of war who were sent to Copenhagen from England and France were greeted with unbounded enthusiasm. Slesvig meetings all over the country expressed confidence in the early reunion of the whole Danish people.

Preparations for reunion were begun on both sides of the border. In Slesvig not only were Danish flags made and village carpenters overwhelmed with orders for flag-poles, but serious discussion was begun of the problems of readjustment—the economic, educational, administrative and even constitutional changes that were necessary to insure a happy reunion. The Aabenraa meeting chose committees of the Electoral Society to plan for the necessary action, and later, on April 2, the Rigsdag appointed a committee of twenty members, five from each party, to prepare the necessary legislation. The economic problems were to receive attention first. In short, before the close of November, the solution of the Slesvig question was confidently expected, but the discussion had not advanced far enough to produce any clearly marked parties.

IV

In the months of suspense between the signing of the armistice and the first draft of the peace treaty sharper differences, however, developed with regard to the application of the generally accepted principle of self-determination. The question of the extent of territory to which the plebiscite should

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apply was the chief cause of dispute. On this point the Aabenraa resolution was explicit. Naturally no mention was made of Holstein,[1] since the Danes had no imperialistic ambitions that would make them wish to obtain control again of the German duchy. With regard to Slesvig the resolution favored a division on the basis of nationality. The distinction between the three sections of Slesvig was clearly recognized. With respect to the northern, which is thoroughly Danish, the resolution asked that it be allowed to vote as a whole. Its southern boundary was carefully described. This is the so-called "Clausen line", based on statistics compiled by Professor H. V. Clausen, and does not differ materially from the language line of 1867.[2] In the central region, on account of the mingling of nationalities, it was desired that the communes which contain a sufficient Danish element to make the demand should be allowed to vote. South Slesvig, which is German, was not mentioned, since there seemed no reason for holding a plebiscite there.

The Aabenraa resolution was in agreement with the aims of the North-Slesvigers throughout the last half-century, and, as we have noticed, became likewise the public statement of Danish policy. Reasons for its modest demands have been repeatedly given both by North-Slesvigers and by members of the Danish government. In the first place, the resulting boundary would be permanent because based on nationality, and a failure to make a settlement on this basis had earlier proved to be disastrous both for Denmark and for Slesvig. An unnatural boundary could be maintained only by the support of the Allies; Denmark would again be involved in international complications, and her border lands might once more become a pawn in the diplomatic game. Since 1864, her chief strength has been her national unity, and any settlement giving to her any soil inhabited mainly by Germans would create a

[1] The return of Holstein has been advocated outside of Denmark, notably by the London *Globe* and *The New York Times*.

[2] As Slesvig took part in a German election in 1867 for the first time, that election was considered a test with regard to the extent of Danism.

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German *irridenta* within her borders and would constantly tempt her big neighbor to interfere in her domestic affairs. Moreover, history has shown that the Germans and the Danes do not easily assimilate, and the German population would form a dissident national group in the legislative body as well as a foreign cultural influence which could only be harmful to Danish development.

Hardly were the Aabenraa resolution and the response of the Danish government known before indignation meetings began to be held throughout Central Slesvig. They protested that the future of Central Slesvig had not been given due consideration, and the Danish government was petitioned to take over the interests of this section as it had those of North Slesvig.[1] The government gave a favorable reply and again expressed its belief in a plebiscite as the safest basis of settlement. A sharp discussion about Central Slesvig was started, which was complicated by the rumors from Paris that the boundary line would probably be fixed without a plebiscite. What would then be the fate of Central Slesvig? The storm center was the old city of Flensborg, which had been looked upon as an outpost of Danism, but which had now an overwhelmingly German population.[2] The Danish government declared that it would accept North Slesvig and Danish parishes in Central Slesvig even without a vote, but that it could not accept Flensborg unless the people expressed a desire for reunion. Vigorous attacks on the government followed. "Flensborg meetings" were held, not only in Central Slesvig but all over Denmark. The government was accused of a cowardly disregard of this old royal city before its wishes had been consulted. The group that favored a vote in Central Slesvig was continually gaining strength. It believed in taking every precaution to give Danism a "fair chance", especially in Flensborg. It was suggested that the plebiscite be postponed for ten years in order to give time for educational work to counteract the Germanization of the past. More feasible was the suggestion to make a

[1] *Berlingske Tidende*, Jan. 25, 1919.

[2] Clausen claims that at the most one-tenth speak Danish, *Politiken*, Dec. 3, 1918.

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forty per cent. vote sufficient to transfer the region to Denmark. Another proposal was that the rural vote should be decisive, the city going politically with the region to which it belonged economically. The rural population, it was argued, was more static, its vote would be a fairer indication of the sentiment of the district, nor did it seem improbable that many rural districts would vote for Denmark. It was believed that the extensive Germanization of the cities was superficial, due to the activity of the official and military classes and to an influx of German laborers, and that it could therefore soon be counteracted.

Others held that Central Slesvig and particularly Flensborg ought to be Danish, plebiscite or no plebiscite. The agitation was led by *Flensborg Avis*, the paper which had in the past been the ablest and most ardent champion of Danism in Slesvig. Economically, it was argued, Flensborg was part of Danish Slesvig and could not be separated from its hinterland without financial ruin. Moreover, not language but national feeling was the true basis of a decision, and although there was a growing Danish sentiment even among the German-speaking population, this could not be freely expressed on account of the German officials. Still stronger was the historic plea. Flensborg, the home of so many Danish memories, ought once more to stand, it was urged, as an outpost of Danism. Denmark ought not to disown a population which, after years of suffering under the German yoke, wished to be free. Wherever the line might run, Flensborg ought to be Danish.

Another smaller party, with Admiral Richelieu as its spokesman, was active despite the fact that accusations of militarism and chauvinism were hurled in its face. This party wished the boundary line to extend even farther south, to the River Sli and the old frontier rampart of Dannevirke. It had visions of a great future for Denmark and considered it cowardly for her to shirk the responsibility of accepting land that rightly belonged to her, even though the population was largely German. The German shell would soon fall off, as one of their orators said, and the Danes who lived farther south should be most warmly welcomed into the kingdom as their fight for Danism

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had been hardest. It was even suggested that the people might later be given an opportunity to return to Germany. In April, an address with more than 4000 signatures was handed to the Danish government, making a plea for the "Dannevirke line".[1] Two meetings expressed the rather prudent and moderate view that if the Entente should see fit to give Slesvig to the Dannevirke line to Denmark—in spite of the principles involved—practical reasons would speak strongly for its acceptance.[2]

Though the appeal for the Dannevirke line was made largely on historic grounds, Slesvig historically includes also the narrow strip south of this line, extending to the Eider River and the Kiel Canal. A few persons argued for this latter line, which would mean an undivided Slesvig. They attempted to revive the argument of the "Eider men", who in 1864 destroyed any hope of a compromise by insisting on Denmark's right to all the land that was once part of her realm. They took their stand on historic right and strategic advantage.

The development of opinion among the Germans has also an important bearing on the solution of the Slesvig question. We have seen that the Slesvigers obtained from the revolutionary government at Berlin a formal recognition of their right to self-determination. Later Count Brockdorff-Rantzau expressed himself to the same effect, and so did other German leaders and officials. A dramatic incident at the Aabenraa meeting on November 17 remains to be mentioned in this connection. A representative from the nearest soldiers' and workmens' council, arriving in an airplane, brought the happy news that the new German government was wholly in sympathy with the aims of the Slesvig Danes, and that no restraint would be placed on them, even if they should float the Danish flag. This was greeted with an outburst of jubilant applause. But it was soon found, as a Danish paper expressed it, that "revolutionary Germany has the spirit of old Germany, only more brutal."

[1] A sharp arraignment of their methods is found in *Social Demokraten*, April 20, 1919.

[2] *Berlingske Tidende*, Jan. 9, 1919.

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The few Slesvigers who did display Danish colors were summarily arrested; the laws against non-Germans were enforced as of old; petty hindrances were placed in the way of distribution of food even when the consent of Berlin had been secured; requisitions of cattle were levied; mobs interrupted Danish meetings; and a strong German agitation sprang up to combat "Danish chauvinism and the Danish danger".[1] There was a constantly growing friction between the Danes and the German local officials, and more and more limitations were suggested with regard to the plebiscite for Slesvig.

Most serious of all, the spirit of Slesvig-Holsteinism, with all its irreconcilible hatred, once more came to the fore; in other words, strong sentiment was aroused for the continuation of the union between the two duchies. As of old, the slogan was "ewich tosammende ungedelt", and the deep-seated differences between the sections—historical, economic, national and cultural—were left entirely out of consideration. Mass meetings were held, where "Schleswig-Holstein meerumschlungen"—the song most hated by the Danish population—was sung with new vigor. The National Liberal party seems to have been particularly active in these demonstrations. Protests were made against parting with land that had been won with German blood and against the yielding spirit shown at Berlin. Resolutions expressing loyalty to Germany were adopted and declarations that "we will never be Danes; we will always remain Germans".[2] The provincial assembly of Slesvig-Holstein passed a formal protest against the surrender of any German soil, and the *Kieler Zeitung* said, "A shriek of anger would rise from the German parts of the northland if Danish nationality should be forced upon them."

Though this movement was mainly pan-German and had for its aim the greatness of the Fatherland, particularism reappeared here as in other sections of the German realm. Before 1867, the German Slesvig-Holstein party had wished to have the duchies form a separate federal state in the German Con-

[1] *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, quoted in *Berlingske Tidende*, April 21, 1919.

[2] *Berlingske Tidende*, Feb. 18, 1919.

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federation, but after their incorporation into Prussia this party was absorbed into the pro-Prussian party. The Holsteiners became fanatic Prussians and pan-Germans and consequently the most determined and watchful enemies of Danism. Now, however, the formation of the duchies into a separate German state or even an independent republic was again advocated in several quarters,[1] especially, it seems, within the revolutionary parties. Some regarded this as the only means of preventing the division of Slesvig-Holstein, and they were encouraged by expressions in certain foreign newspapers, notably *Le Temps*, in favor of a buffer state north of Germany.[2] *Le Temps* wished this to include the German part of Slesvig together with Holstein, Lauenburg and the adjacent regions about the mouth of the Elbe. When it became clear that the guardianship of the Kiel Canal could not be imposed upon Denmark, a free buffer republic was, in the opinion of this paper, the best means of preventing German control of the Kiel Canal and the Baltic trade.

As a plebiscite could not be prevented and it became evident that at least a part of Slesvig would without doubt become Danish, the Slesvig-Holstein movement developed a new phase. In a leading article, *Schleswig-Holsteinsche Volkzeitung* declared that if an independent Slesvig-Holstein, which it preferred, were impossible, an effort should be made to preserve the union of Slesvig by giving all of it to Denmark.[3] The Germans would then have the majority in Slesvig, pan-German leaders could start a separatist movement and Slesvig could be regained by Germany.[4] How numerous the adherents of this plan were cannot be estimated, but they were strong enough to exert an important effect on developments in Slesvig.

Naturally, there was a reciprocal influence between the currents of public opinion that have been sketched and the development of the Slesvig question in Paris. The Danish gov-

[1] *Politiken*, Dec. 4, 1918. *Berlingske Tidende*, April 3, 1919.

[2] *Le Temps*, Mar. 12, 1919.

[3] *Social-Demokraten*, March 21, 1919.

[4] *Hamburger Nachrichten*, quoted in *Berlingske Tidende*, May 3, 1919.

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ernment instructed its minister at Paris, Bernhoft, to act in this matter and sent to his assistance H. V. Clausen as a specialist on the Slesvig question. Later a larger commission was sent, including several members of the ministry, notably H. N. Anderson, who has acted for the government in this matter, and also a number of leading men from Slesvig. Among the latter were H. P. Hanssen and the two former members of the Prussian Landtag, Nis Nissen and Kloppenborg-Skrumsager. In presenting their case at Paris, the Danish delegation asked for the execution of the Aabenraa resolution, that is, a plebiscite in North Slesvig as a whole and in Central Slesvig by communes. They reported that they found the allied statesmen on the whole open-minded. On March 8, a tentative draft of the clauses of the treaty regarding Slesvig was read by the French Foreign Office to Hanssen, Clausen and Bernhoft. Most of the members of the delegation now returned to Denmark seemingly confident of the success of their mission.

There appear, however, to have been two points of omission in their work. When asked why they desired no plebiscite in South Slesvig, they answered that the region was too German to desire one but failed to say that Denmark would under no condition accept that district. Nor did they propose any detailed plan with regard to the manner of carrying out the plebiscite. Meanwhile, there had arrived in Paris a deputation headed by Dr. Jonas Collin and Count Bent Holstein, representing the elements in Denmark and Slesvig that wished to draw the boundary line farther south. They asked for a plebiscite in South Slesvig to the Dannevirke-Sli line (not to the Kiel Canal) but requested that the vote be taken here later than in the northern belts. The Dannevirke resolution, a monster petition to which 65,000 signatures had been secured, was presented at Paris and seemed to indicate a real demand for a vote in the southern belt. Those German Slesvig-Holsteiners, who, as we have seen, desired to maintain the union of Slesvig at any cost, were also intriguing for the same end. Little news of the machinations at Paris reached the public at home, and there was a comparative lull in the discus-

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sion during the days immediately preceding the publication of the first draft of the treaty on May 8.

V.

The provisions of the treaty relating to Slesvig as first published came as a surprise to most persons interested in the solution of the Slesvig problem. They differed in several respects from the draft that had been read to the Danish representatives in March, notably with respect to South Slesvig, and precipitated the sharpest debate that had yet taken place on this question.

The treaty provided for a plebiscite as far south as the Dannevirke-Sli line. Within ten days after the treaty came into force the region north of this line was to be evacuated by German soldiers and officials and the control placed in the hands of an international commission of five, three to be chosen by the Allies, one to be designated by the Swedish and one by the Norwegian government. The vote was to be given to all men and women of twenty years of age or over who were born in the zone or had lived there since January, 1900, or had been exiled from it by the German authorities. The voting district was divided into three zones: (1) The northern, down to the Clausen line, was to vote as a whole, and the Danish government was empowered to occupy it as soon as the result was published. (2) In Central Slesvig the vote was to be by communes (gemeinde) within five weeks after the plebiscite in the first zone. (3) In the southern zone the vote was also to be by communes within a period not to exceed two weeks after the vote in the middle zone. The boundary was to be determined by a commission of seven, five chosen by the Allies, one by Germany and one by Denmark. Germany was to resign the land north of this line to the Allied and Associated Powers, who would then hand it over to Denmark. The right of option within the period of two years was to be given to Germans on Danish soil, but the same right was unfortunately not extended to Danes on German soil as in the earlier draft The provision for the extension of the plebiscite to the southern region, the "third zone", provoked sharp opposition, both in Germany and in Denmark.

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The German note in reply to the proposed treaty objected strongly to the vote in South Slesvig. The German press for the most part denounced it as a perversion of the right of self-determination, an insult to the Germans, a vote under abnormal conditions and a mean effort to induce a German population starved by the blockade to seek material relief by joining Denmark. But the *Kreuzzeitung* rejoiced; for the continued union of Slesvig, it believed, would mean the eventual return of all Slesvig to Germany. The Germans in the section ceded to Denmark were warned not to weaken the German element therein by making use of their right of option. Most interesting was the stand of the Social Democrats of Slesvig-Holstein. On account of their professed internationalism little opposition to the Danish cause had been looked for from them. In fact the "Dannevirke men" had hoped that they might help to carry South Slesvig for Denmark, as they professed to place the emphasis on economic rather than on nationalistic considerations. There had been indications that this hope might be realized, but in May, Mickelsen, the local party leader, came out strongly for Germany, and the meeting of the Electoral Society of the Social Democrats adopted resolutions of loyalty to Germany and pledged the party vote for Germany.[1] They joined those Germans in Slesvig-Holstein who favored a campaign to retain as much territory as possible for Germany. Naturally, they found most support in Germany, but the smaller group of extremists, who planned to attain their ultimate aim of "ewich tosammende ungedelt" by the temporary cession of Slesvig to Denmark were also more active than they had been.

Among the Danes the debate was almost exclusively on the "third zone". Consequently there were now two distinct parties: those who favored the extension of the vote to this region and those who opposed it. The former believed that historic and economic considerations should be seriously taken into account; the latter, that nationalism should be the only basis of settlement.

In government circles the third zone was an unwelcome

[1] *Social Demokraten*, May 21, 1919.

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surprise. At a secret session of the Rigsdag on May 12, a resolution was adopted briefly stating that the government adhered to the resolution of October 23.[1] This was at once communicated to Bernhoft. The Social Democrats, Liberals and Radicals all voted for the resolution; but the Conservatives opposed it because, so their statement read, they believed that at present it could have no influence and would only dissipate the generous good-will of the peace conference.

The provision for a vote in the third zone was a brilliant victory for the "Dannevirke men". Now, they thought, Denmark could avoid the disgrace of saying "no" to any people who wished to become her citizens and must act boldly in her hour of destiny. All the arguments of history and sentiment were on their side. Many who had earlier worked for the victory of Danism in Central Slesvig and especially in Flensborg now became bolder and were willing to accept the unexpected gift offered in the treaty. The editor of *Flensborg Avis* saw no reason to protest against the vote in the third zone nor to fear that those who voluntarily became Danish citizens would later cause trouble. Kloppenborg-Skrumsager came out definitely in favor of the third zone. He believed that the chance to return to Denmark should be given to all who desired it and was glad to find that there was more sympathy for Denmark in South Slesvig than he had supposed. "Planting Dannebrog on the old Eider line", he said, "will open a new honorable chapter in the history of Denmark".[2] Propaganda was started and in three months 116,485 signatures were attached to the "Dannevirke Address".[3] *Heimdal*, H. P. Hanssen's newspaper, asserted, however, that only 150 of these signatures came from the region concerned.[4] On May 30, a meeting in Aabenraa of the executive board of the Electoral Society of North Slesvig defeated a resolution in favor of the third zone by a vote of 34 to 22 and by a narrow

[1] *Berlingske Tidende* and *Social Demokraten*, May 13, 1919.

[2] *Berlingske Tidende*, May 24, 1919.

[3] *Ibid.*, June 11, 1919.

[4] *Ibid.*, June 11, 1911.

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majority declared itself in accord with the Rigsdag resolution of May 12.[1]

Thus the majority of the Electoral Society and the Danish government were still in harmony, both being in opposition to the third zone. They were in all probability supported by a substantial popular majority both in North Slesvig and in Denmark. Nis Nissen sharply assailed the representatives of the Central and South Slesvig interests for underhand methods at Paris in making use of the Entente to force the will of a minority on the majority.[2] Hanssen saw reason for grave fear in the treaty provision. The desire of the Slesvig-Holsteiners to create as large a German problem as possible within the new Danish boundaries, combined with a wish to escape from German taxes and anarchy, might, he thought, foist a large unwelcome German population upon Denmark.[3] Many prominent men expressed views that in the main accorded with his. The acquisition of a large German population which might start a separatist movement was looked upon as a real danger. The "Dannevirke men" were accused not only of chauvinistic national ambitions but also of cooperation with the bitterest enemies of Danism, the extreme Slesvig-Holsteiners.[4] Many feared that the Dannevirke line would mean "Slesvig won and lost once more".[5] Thus we have the anomaly of the extreme nationalists of the two rival countries striving for the same immediate end.

All the old arguments for a settlement that would assure a truly national state were employed with new force. The fact that Denmark had none of the rights of a conqueror made it even more imperative that she should seek nothing beyond a settlement based on justice, *i. e.*, on nationality.[6] Importance was also attached to the military consideration. If a settle-

[1] *Morgenblad*, June 2, 1919.

[2] *Berlingske Tidende*, June 4, 1919.

[3] *Ibid.*, May 9, 1919.

[4] *Politiken*, May 30, 1919.

[5] Birck in *Berlingske Tidende*, May 10, 1919.

[6] Zahle in *ibid.*, May 10, 1919.

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ment were made on a nationalistic basis, Denmark would not, it is true, have a strategically satisfactory boundary; but she would make no pretense of having a military policy. On the other hand, the Dannevirke line, which would place within Denmark's boundaries some 400,000 Germans, would force her to abandon her old non-militaristic policy and assume the responsibility of defence, futile though it might be.[1] The disastrous consequences that might result from a vote in the third zone were painted in the darkest colors.

The opponents of the third zone hoped confidently, however, that they would be able to secure a revision of the treaty clauses that would accord with their principles. They were by no means ready to attribute the undesired generosity of the Powers at Paris to pure, unsullied good-will, and *Social Demokraten*, in particular, was sharp in its attack on the treaty, which would not allow even one little country to secure a settlement really in harmony with the Wilsonian principles.[2] The opinion most generally expressed, however, was that the statesmen in Paris were disposed to be generous but had no clear conception of the situation in Denmark and Slesvig. As they had given Denmark more than she desired, they would in all probability listen to her representations and rectify their mistake in accordance with her wishes. And even if the third zone were allowed to vote and should decide in favor of union with Denmark, this would not secure to the German population an entry into the Danish civic body.[3] The Entente, as Scavenius said, did not see fit to refuse to South Slesvig the privilege of an expression of opinion, but they would never take the unprecedented course of forcing Denmark to accept territory against her wishes. The final decision as to who should be given citizenship would have to be made by the Danish people alone.[4]

In the midst of this agitation came the report that at the request of the Danish government the Slesvig clauses of the

[1] Dalhoff-Nielsen in *Berlingske Tidende*, June 18, 1919.

[2] *Social Demokraten*, May 17, 1919.

[3] *Politiken*, June 6, 1919.

[4] *Social Demokraten*, June 6, 1919.

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treaty had been revised. The objectionable clause, providing for a plebiscite in the third zone, was omitted. In regard to the other regions the former provisions stood. The first zone was to vote as a whole and the second zone, Central Slesvig including Flensborg, by communes, within three weeks after the vote in the northern region. Then it would remain for the international commission to fix the exact boundary, taking into consideration the particular geographical and economic conditions of the localities in question.

This revision of the treaty meant the triumph of the principles laid down in the Aabenraa resolution. At her own request Denmark's historic rights and the affection of her people for "Thyra's Wall" were set aside, and the division of the old crown land of Slesvig was finally decided on in order to create a truly national Danish state.

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ABSENTEEISM IN LABOR

IT is only within the last four years that American students of labor problems have realized the instability of modern labor.[1] The amount of the labor turnover has clearly demonstrated that the modern wage relationship is transitory as well as impersonal.[2] Miss Jane Addams mentions the case of a workman who had never met the employer for whom he had worked for twenty years. The real marvel in this case, however, is not that they had never met but rather that the workman had remained with one firm for so long a time. The investigations into labor turnover have been numerous, and they have uniformly shown that the average workman rarely stays more than one year at any one job and that more often than not he changes jobs from two to three and in many cases from six to twelve times a year. These conditions, moreover, seem to apply, not only to manufacturing but to shipbuilding, lumbering, farm labor, construction work and navigation as well. Indeed, the turnover seems to be higher in the non-machine than in the machine industries.

There is, however, another factor in the instability of labor, which has not been given the attention that it deserves, namely, that of absenteeism or, as it is called in England, "lost time". Absenteeism means absence from work at the job at which one is employed. Although often confused with turnover and by no less authorities than the United States Bureau of Labor

[1] The importance of labor turnover was recognized by German scholars as early as 1908–10. See Marie Bernays, "Auslese und Anpassung der Arbeiterschaft der Geschlossenen Gross Industrie", *Schriften des Vereins für Social Politik*, vol. 133, 417 pages; Marie Bernays, "Berufswahl und Berufschicksal des Modernen Industrie Arbeiter", *Archiv für Social Wissenschaft und Social Politik*, vol. 35, pp. 123–176 and vol. 36, pp. 884–915; Richard Sorer, "Untersuchung über Auslese und Anpassung des Arbeiters", *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Social Politik und Verwaltung*, vol. 21, pp. 727–747. I am indebted to my friend Dr. Paul F. Brissenden for calling my attention to the German literature upon the subject.

[2] For a statement of the extent, cost and causes of labor turnovers, see an article by the writer in the *American Economic Review*, June, 1918, pp. 306–316.

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Statistics and the National Association of Employment Managers,[1] it is in reality entirely different, since turnover involves the leaving of a position by one worker and his replacement by another, while absenteeism involves absence from work before the position is vacated.

Absenteeism or "lost time" includes absence for full days, absence for half days or more and absence for less than a half day, the most important item in this last class being time lost through tardiness. The percentage of absenteeism for any given period may be obtained by dividing the total number of hours lost by the total number of hours that would have been worked, had all employees worked full time. It is seldom possible, however, to measure absenteeism so accurately because most attendance records give only the days and half days lost, not the total time lost because of tardiness.

1. *The Amount of Absenteeism*

The first extended investigation of absenteeism was made in England during the war for the British Health of Munition Workers Committee by Professor Thomas Loveday of the University of Durham.[2] This study was followed by one con-

[1] The National Association of Employment Managers on May 11, 1918, adopted the following method for computing labor turnover which was approved by the Bureau of Labor Statistics: Divide the number of separations in a given period by the average daily attendance and reduce to a yearly basis. This use of the average daily attendance, instead of the average number actually on the pay-roll as the divisor, confuses absenteeism with turnover. The difference between the two may be illustrated by the following example: A plant with an average force of 1,000 on the pay-roll has an average attendance of 900 for the week with 200 replacements; using the average attendance as the divisor we have the following equation: $\frac{200}{900} \times 52 = 1154\%$. Using the average number actually on the pay-roll as the divisor, we have the following equation: $\frac{200}{1000} \times 52 = 1040\ \%$. The method of the Bureau of Labor Statistics gives a turnover percentage of 114% higher than the second method, an excess which largely represents absenteeism rather than an actual chang. ing of positions.

[2] Thomas Loveday, "The Causes and Conditions of 'Lost Time'", Committee on Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency, Report of Health of Munition Workers (no. 7), 1917, [Cd.] 8511, pp. 41–67.

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ducted by the section on Economic Science and Statistics of the British Association and published in their 1917 volume, edited by Professor A. W. Kirkaldy.[1]

Professor Kirkaldy reports 657 establishments where the average number of hours lost per head for the week ending February 16, 1917, was 2.4 for males and 5.1 for females. For the week ending March 16, 1917, the men in 789 engineering establishments lost 2.9 hours on the average and the women 1.8 hours, while for 654 firms in the week ending March 30, 1917, the average number of hours lost by the men was 2.2 and by the women 2.0.[2]

Unfortunately the total normal working-time is not given, so that is is impossible to derive any percentage computation. The attendance figures for a Scotch shell factory, however, were such that a study of the records for eight selected weeks in 1917 showed that the men lost 5.3 per cent. of the total possible hours which could have been worked had all worked the schedule planned by the firm, and that the women lost 7.8 per cent.[3] The statistics secured for a large Leeds firm, which employed 12,000 workers, indicate that for 1913, 3.23 per cent. of the time was lost; for the first six months of 1914, 2.80 per cent.; for 1915, 3.63 per cent.; and for the first six months of 1916, 3.24 per cent.[4] Professor Loveday's investigation of two small factories which have trustworthy records shows that the percentage of time lost through absenteeism, in one factory was 7.3 per cent. for the year ending October 1, 1916 and in the other, 5 per cent. for the month of August, 1916.[5] A more intensive investigation of one department of a large factory, covering over three months in 1916, showed that the men lost 5.5 per cent. of their gross normal time and that the women lost 7.6 per cent.[6] The Health of Munitions Workers Committee found that in one plant which they investigated the women on day work lost 10.4 per cent. of the possible normal

[1] A. W. Kirkaldy, Industry and Finance, especially pp. 44–62.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–49.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 46 *et seq.*

[5] Loveday, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

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time and those on night work lost 13.2 per cent.[1] While the number of hours and the percentage of time lost varied greatly from plant to plant, the result of the British investigations proved that it formed a large fraction of the working time of the average employee.

Within the last two years several investigations into absenteeism in labor have been made in the United States which, incomplete as they necessarily are, have nevertheless disclosed something of its extent in industry. The study by Sydenstricker, Wheeler and Goldberger, conducted in 1916 in seven South Carolina cotton-mill towns for the Public Health Service, but not published until November, 1918, gives some interesting results concerning absenteeism for the months from January to May, 1916, inclusive, which are shown in the following table:[2]

Average no. wage-earning persons per month	Total no. possible working days	Days not at work	Percentage of total possible working days lost
1541	183,918	20,807	11.3

The Industrial Management Council of Rochester conducted an inquiry into the amount of absenteeism in fifteen industrial plants for the month of November, 1917. The following table shows the result of their investigation:

Possible productive hours	Number of hours lost	Percentage of time lost
2,655,552	69,744	2.6

The amount of absenteeism was found to be much less in the largest plant investigated than it was in the fourteen smaller establishments.

[1] [Cd.] 8511, p. 34.

[2] Sydenstricker, Wheeler and Goldberger, "Disabling Sickness Among the Population of Seven Cotton-Mill Villages of South Carolina in Relation to Family Income", Reprint no. 492 from Public Health Reports, p. 11.

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Dr. Boris Emmett, in his analysis of the employment records of a large motor-vehicle plant, found that the average amount of absenteeism for the year ending April 1, 1918, was 6 per cent.[1] A New York manufacturing plant, with a working force of about 800, lost through absenteeism and tardiness the following amounts of time:[2]

Month	No. of hours lost	Average number of hours lost per worker (approximately)
April	9171	11.5
May	6892	8.5
June	5846	7.3
July	6894	6.6

Since the average length of the working week was not given no percentage can be computed, but it seems probable that the loss for the various months averaged from 3 to 5 per cent. A Newark firm estimated that they were compelled to employ 5 per cent. more workmen than were absolutely necessary because of absenteeism, while a certain New York firm found that its percentage of daily absences for July, 1918, was approximately 10 per cent. Part of this latter amount was, however, due to vacations. The Curtis Publishing Company had an absentee percentage of 4.2 per cent. in January, 1917. The absentee rate at the Compton-Knowles Loom Company for part of 1917 was 8½ per cent., while at the Hood Rubber Company it was 10 per cent. for the night shift and 8 per cent. for the day shift.[3] At one time the Beacon Falls Rubber Company's absentees numbered 40 per cent. of their force,[4] and

[1] Dr. Boris Emmett, "Labor Turn-Over and Employment Policies of a Large Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Establishment", *Monthly Review*, United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1918, (vol. 7, no. 4) p. 10.

[2] Bulletin no. 1, on Absenteeism, issued by the Information and Education Service, United States Department of Labor.

[3] John S. Keir, "The Reduction of Absences and Lateness in Industry", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1917, pp. 141–4.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 141.

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7.54 per cent. of the working force of the American Pulley Company were absent daily for the year 1917.[1]

Probably the most thorough study of absenteeism that has ever been made is that which was conducted by the Industrial Relations Division of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The table on the next page covers only full days lost and does not include tardiness or half-day absence. It includes ninety shipbuilding companies, employing over 320,000 workers in September, 1918, for which continuous weekly records were available from January to September, 1918, inclusive.[2] The table shows the following very interesting facts: (a) The percentage of absenteeism was extremely high. In steel-ship yards 17.8 per cent. or over one-sixth of all full working days were lost through this factor, while in the wood-ship yards 13.2 per cent. or over one-eighth of the days were lost. (b) The percentage of absenteeism was considerably higher for steel than for wood yards. (c) Absenteeism was highest in the winter months, being 22.3 per cent. in the steel yards for the first quarter of the year, as contrasted with 16.0 per cent. and 15.5 per cent. for the second and third quarters respectively. (d) Absenteeism was lowest in the Pacific Coast yards and highest in those of New England.

It is undoubtedly true that the shipbuilding industry, during the abnormal period of 1918, was not typical of industry as a whole, but when taken in conjunction with other industries studied, both here and abroad, it discloses a leakage in labor due to absenteeism, which, while it cannot be definitely estimated, is of the utmost importance and is probably not far from being between 6 and 10 per cent. S. R. Rectanus, as the result of an independent investigation of several steel mills, estimates the amount of absenteeism at 10 per cent.[3]

[1] W. A. Sawyer, "Installing Employment Methods", *Industrial Management*, Jan., 1919, p. 7.

[2] The table in the text is adapted from one in an article by F. E. Wolfe and P. H. Douglas, entitled "Labor Administration in the Shipbuilding Industry During War Time II", *Journal of Political Economy*, May, 1919, p. 387.

[3] S. R. Rectanus, "Absenteeism", p. 2. This was an address delivered before the National Association of Employment Managers, 1918, and privately printed.

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AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DAILY ABSENTEES OF ALL EMPLOYEES OF 90 SHIPBUILDING COMPANIES

Steel Ship Yards

District	No. yards reporting	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	1st Quatr.	2nd Quatr.	3rd Quatr.	9 Mos.
Atlantic	7	32.1	32.0	29.0	27.0	21.9	20.9	20.3	16.7	21.7	31.0	23.0	19.6	23.7
Del. River	6	26.2	21.5	15.3	14.6	15.8	13.2	16.0	14.3	18.8	20.9	14.6	16.4	16.9
Mid. Atlantic	2	35.9	27.9	22.9	23.6	21.3	17.7	22.8	25.4	19.8	28.7	20.7	22.7	23.5
Southern	4	10.9	10.6	15.4	19.5	15.4	15.9	13.7	13.6	14.1	12.7	16.6	13.8	14.5
Gulf	..	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
Gt. Lakes.	14	23.0	20.6	16.9	15.5	16.3	11.2	14.0	13.5	16.2	20.1	14.4	14.6	15.8
Nor. Pacific	8	7.6	10.5	11.8	11.1	10.5	12.3	14.9	14.4	16.7	9.9	11.3	15.3	12.4
No. 11	..	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
So. Pacific	4	9.1	11.9	12.1	11.2	9.5	7.5	11.2	6 0	17.5	11.3	9.3	11.6	10.7
Fabricated	3	38.5	26.5	22.6	26.1	17.8	12.8	16.6	19.7	17.8	30.2	18.5	18.0	21.6
All Districts	48	26.0	21.7	18.9	19.0	16.0	13.4	16.1	15.2	18.3	22.3	16.0	16.5	17.8

Wood Ship Yards

Atlantic.	12	20.7	23.3	16.9	16.0	13.8	12.2	13.2	11.4	19.5	20.0	13.7	14.5	15.1
Del. River	..	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
Mid. Atlantic	2	31.0	22.9	23.5	25.3	20.9	20.1	21.9	16.2	20.8	25 7	21.4	20.0	21.3
Southern	4	21 8	21.0	16.2	19.3	20.1	13.6	19.9	18.6	22.1	19.4	17.4	20.3	19.1
Gulf	5	26.0	19 6	17.2	15.0	16.3	19.5	20.0	21.6	22.2	20.5	16.9	21.2	19.4
Gt. Lakes.	1	18.6	25.8	4.7	7.4	14.1	10.3	1.7	.0	.3	17.5	10.8	0.8	11.4
Nor. Pacific	6	9.3	11.0	9.9	9.5	7.0	7.3	8.9	5.7	9.6	10.1	7.7	8.2	8.4
No. 11	7	8.1	9.1	9.3	8.6	8.3	7.5	10.7	6.7	7.6	8.9	8.1	8.5	8.4
So. Pacific	5	9.8	12.8	10.9	9.9	6.8	5.8	7.3	4.9	7.4	11.1	7.4	6.6	8.0
Fabricated	..	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .	. .
All Districts	42	15.3	15.9	13.4	12.8	12.2	11.4	13.5	11.3	15.2	14.7	12.1	13.4	13.2

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2. *The Losses of Absenteeism*

It is of course impossible to measure accurately or perhaps even approximately the loss which absenteeism entails. Nor should it be thought that all absenteeism is a net loss. For example, a perfect attendance record would mean no vacations, which would cause a decrease in the net productivity of the workers, for a certain amount of absence from industry is undoubtedly necessary in order to obtain the highest efficiency. We do not know how large a percentage this should be, but what does seem perfectly clear is that the amount of absenteeism which now exists is far in excess of that which is necessary to maintain the worker in the highest efficiency.

It is this unnecessary absenteeism that brings with it a loss to the consumer, to the employer and to the employee as well. The consumer of course loses the goods which might have been produced had the worker been on the job. The cost to the employer may be classified as follows:

(a) *Machinery or equipment rendered less efficient by the absence of the worker.* The absence of a man on the pay-roll means either that the equipment and machinery provided for him to work with must go unmanned or that another worker, probably less competent, must assume his job. Since absences can rarely be foretold, it follows almost invariably that some of the equipment and machinery is unmanned. When this occurs the employer has an overhead expense with absolutely no return. When a less competent worker takes the absentee's place, a lessened output results, with greater danger of damage both to the output and to the machinery itself. It follows from this that the more elaborate the machinery and the more highly skilled the worker, the greater will be the loss. Absences, for example, are more costly to the cotton manufacturer than to the street-paving contractor.

(b) *Extra administrative and clerical force required.* The absentees as well as those at work require the services of a clerical force to account for them and to maintain the pay-roll. Indeed they require more because the recording and handling of absence in itself necessitates more attention from the clerical force than do other types of work.

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(c) *Lessened productivity of the absentee's associates.* Where work is done by gangs men are seldom, if ever, completely interchangeable, and the absence of one man often decreases the efficiency of those who are working with him.

(d) *Loss of profit upon the labor of the workman himself.* Whatever may be the theoretical truth of the claim that labor gets what it produces, in the actual conduct of industry it is clear that from lack of actual bargaining strength or otherwise, the laborer often does not receive the marginal production of his class but instead loses a part of it to his employer.

The workman's loss is also great. The absentee loses his pay for the period of absence, and this is a large item. The approximately 2,600,000 working days that were lost because of absenteeism in the shipyards during the months of June, July and August, 1918, meant easily an average loss in wages of $5 per man per day or a total probable loss of $13,000,000. This for a year would have amounted to $52,000,000. The prospects are that the loss would have been even greater since there is less absenteeism in the spring and summer than in the autumn and winter. The annual loss of wages per shipbuilder, caused by absenteeism, apparently ranged therefore from $175 to $200. If, therefore, we estimate the average amount of absenteeism at 6 per cent. or 18 days per year, it appears that, on the basis of 30,000,000 workers, the annual loss is 540,000,000 working days. Using the extremely conservative estimate of $3 as the average daily wage, the total annual wage loss would amount to $1,620,000,000. If we estimate absenteeism at 10 per cent., the annual wage-loss would be $2,700,000,000. It should be realized that this does not include the time lost through unemployment or by strikes. These are only rough estimates, but they serve to show the truly enormous loss which the United States suffers annually because of absenteeism in labor.

Absenteeism, however, not only causes a money loss to the workman but is also a demoralizing influence. Continual absences, whatever may be their cause, tend to make a man more "foot loose" and less anxious to work steadily or stay at one job for any length of time. Working is something of an acquired habit, which, if interrupted, is frequently difficult to regain.

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3. *The Causes of Absenteeism*

The causes of absenteeism, like those of any social phenomenon, are manifold and not susceptible of precise measurement. They are rarely separated but are rather so closely interwoven that the absentee himself can seldom tell which is predominant. There has been sufficient investigation, however, to disclose some of the more important causes, which may be listed as follows:

(a) *Sickness and ill health.* In the two English factories where the time-keeping records were especially accurate, Professor Loveday found that in one, sickness accounted for 54 per cent. of all absences and in the other, for 46 per cent.[1] The time-keeping records of a Scotch shell factory in eight selected weeks in 1917, which Professor Kirkaldy secured, showed that illness caused 62.7 per cent. of the total time lost.[2] Professor Loveday states that where the time-keeping records are not accurately kept, the percentage due to illness tends to be underestimated. A well-known study of Sydenstricker and Warren estimated that the average American workman lost nine days annually from work because of illness.[3] This conclusion is, in the main, supported by the various health surveys which have been conducted by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Sydenstricker, Wheeler and Goldberger's study of South Carolina cotton-mill towns showed that illness caused 32.2 per cent. of the total days lost.[4] It seems clear, therefore, that poor health is the greatest single cause of absenteeism.

(b) *Accidents.* In the Scottish shell factory which Kirkaldy mentions, accidents caused 5.1 per cent. of the time lost.[5] This, of course, does not cover the time lost by workmen being compelled to leave their positions because of accidents. In this country, although no definite statistics are available, the hun-

[1] Loveday, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[2] Computed from statistics given by Kirkaldy, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[3] Sydenstricker and Warren, "Health Insurance and its Relation to the Public Health", Bulletin no. 76, of the United States Public Health Series.

[4] Sydenstricker, Wheeler and Goldberger, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

[5] Compiled from Kirkaldy, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

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dreds of thousands of injuries which occur annually must bring with them the loss of millions of days.[1]

(c) *Long hours.* The English investigations have served to show that long hours result not only in the decreased efficiency of the worker while at work but also tend to increase the amount of absenteeism. The experience of 83 English shipbuilding firms is illustrative of this fact. The approximate number of hours lost by each worker during the week ending March 17, 1916, through avoidable causes only, excluding sickness, accidents, loss by absence *etc.* was 4.24 hours or 60.1 per cent. of the average number of hours worked overtime.[2] The male employees in 789 engineering establishments for the week ending March 16, 1917, lost 2.9 hours or approximately 50 per cent. of the overtime that they worked, while for the women, the loss through absenteeism was 1.8 hours or 75 per cent. of the overtime worked.[3] Statistics for 654 plants for the week ending March 30 of the same year show that the men lost 45 per cent. of the work gained in working overtime and the women 80 per cent.[4] These statistics should not be interpreted to mean that all this loss was due to overtime work. The effect of overtime should always be considered in connection with the normal working day. For men on an eight-hour day to work ten hours is, of course, the same physiologically as for men on a ten-hour day at a similar job to work ten hours. But there can be little question that a protracted working day means in the end an increase in absenteeism.

(d) *Women in industry.* As has been shown by the statistics which have been quoted, women have an almost uniformly higher rate of absenteeism than men. This is caused not only by their greater susceptibility to illness but also by the pressure of home ties which often compel them to be absent from or tardy at their work. This is, of course, especially true of married women.

[1] There is an excellent opportunity for some one to investigate the records of the various workmen's compensation commissions and determine the total loss of time due to accidents.

[2] Kirkaldy, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

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(e) *Nature of the employment.* Heat, dust or excessive noise all increase absenteeism. Monotony is also an important factor. One need not be an implicit believer in the "instinct of workmanship" or the "creative impulse in industry" or the other terms used by the exponents of the behavioristic school, to recognize that anything which makes a task unpleasant serves to make men shun it at every possible opportunity.

(f) *Prevalence of other work.* If work is plentiful and men hear of other jobs which seem to promise more money, they will take time off to investigate them. This was a very common practice in all industries during the war.

(g) *Payment of overtime bonus.* Under the basic eight-hour day overtime work and work on Sundays is paid for at special rates. It was a common practice of the shipyard workers during the war to work on Sunday at double time and then "lay off" on some week day. They would thus receive seven days' pay for six days' work and have their holiday.

(h) *Lack of materials.* A considerable amount of absenteeism is caused by lack of materials with which the workman can work. This may cause either a general tie-up of the plant as a whole or merely of a specific department. The freight congestion in the winter of 1917 caused a shut-down in many industries and therefore increased absenteeism. This was an example merely of what often happens upon a smaller scale in consequence either of faulty planning or of the lack of coordination in different branches of work.

(i) *Climatic conditions.* Excessive cold or heat, humidity, snow and rain also operate to produce absenteeism. This is particularly true of industries exposed to the weather. The statistics given for shipbuilding show that absenteeism was highest in the winter months and in those states where the weather was most severe and lowest in the Pacific Coast and Southern Atlantic yards, where the temperature was equable and climatic conditions favorable. The hot weeks of the summer were also accompanied by a considerable increase in absenteeism, particularly in the steel yards.

(j) *Housing conditions.* Absenteeism is more frequent when the worker is compelled to live at a distance from his place of

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employment. The barrier of distance between him and his work may be sufficient to turn the scale many times in favor of staying at home. Bad housing accompanied by increasing illness will also, of course, affect absenteeism.

(k) *Inadequate transportation facilities.* When transportation is poor, tardiness is unavoidable. When this is combined with distance of residence the loss through lateness becomes all the greater.

(l) *Liquor.* The influence of liquor in causing absenteeism cannot be accurately measured. The majority of employment managers, however, state that from their observation, drinking men are absent far more frequently than abstainers. It is also true that shipyards in dry states have somewhat better attendance records than those in wet states. Although the whole matter is one on which no absolute statement can be made, it seems reasonably certain, all other things being equal, that complete prohibition will bring with it a decided improvement in working attendance.

(m) *Wage income higher than standard of living.* When a workman receives more money than he wishes to spend or save, he will stop working and thus bring his income down to his standard of living. "Laziness", when it is not physiological, is to be explained by this fact. The Southern negro is a frequent absentee from work because his wants are few and easily satisfied. After he has his "bacon, pipe and watermelon" he prefers leisure to the satisfaction of additional material wants. The only difference between the negro and the average white in this matter is that the latter's higher standard of living requires him to work harder and absent himself less often from work in order to gratify his wants. If therefore real wages increase faster than the standard of living, absenteeism necessarily results. This was the situation created in several war industries where wages increased faster than the wants of the worker. It was undoubtedly a factor in certain sections of the shipbuilding and munition industries.[1] A higher stand-

[1] Mr. L. C. Marshall, Director of the Industrial Relations Division of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, called attention to this fact in a bulletin issued by his division in August, 1918.

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ard of living, therefore, decreases absenteeism as indeed does an increase in prices. It should be clearly realized that the term "higher standard of living" carries with it no ethical implications. It might perhaps more accurately be called "more expensive standard of living". The new wants which go to form it may be vicious. The Hawaiian planters are said to prefer dissolute laborers, addicted to drinking and gambling, to sober men, because they work harder and more constantly to satisfy their wants. From the standpoint of human values, therefore, absenteeism with all its waste may be far more profitable than some additional wants. Those who believe that progress consists in the multiplication of wants would do well to consider the qualitative as well as the quantitative aspects of the standard of living.

(n) *Separation of interests between workman and employer.* The modern employer and employee are separated from each other to such a degree that neither appreciates the other's functions or tasks. The workman who seldom sees his managers and for whom the stockholders are but shadows can scarcely be expected to take much interest in the welfare of the business. When in addition owners and managers receive rewards which to the workman, at least, seem exorbitant, for contributions which to him are intangible or non-existent, the estrangement is increased. Even when this feeling of separateness does not express itself in "sabotage" or "ca-canny" and conscious interference with production, an unconscious hostility or apathy which results in withheld effort is almost everywhere apparent. It is this psychological factor as well as the difference in economic interest which produces so many inefficiencies in production. Absenteeism in common with other wastes is increased by the attitude which the worker assumes, consciously or unconsciously, towards his employer.

4. *Methods of Reducing Absenteeism*

(a) *Establishment of an efficient employmeut department.* Such a department is necessary to measure the extent of absenteeism in the various departments as well as in the plant as a whole. Statistical information such as it would collect is not

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only necessary to show the real state of affairs but would furnish valuable data for interdepartmental comparison and for questions of promotion and discharge. An employment department is needed also to discover the causes of absenteeism and to act as a central agency in applying remedies. For the effective performance of these two latter functions, however, a broader conception of the subject is requisite than the present group of employment managers on the whole possess.[1] At present the majority of employment managers are little but glorified timekeepers who have no voice in determining the fundamental labor policies of their concerns, without which no real settlement of labor problems can be effective.

(b) *Investigation of absences.* Many plants have systems whereby absentees are visited. This method is likely to arouse antagonism unless carefully safeguarded. In some plants the visit is made by either a nurse or a doctor in order that suspicion may not be excited. The Hood Rubber Company and the Ford Company use this method very effectively and find that the situation is made much easier by the assumption that absences are caused by illness.[2] Medical attention can be given by this method to those who need it and complaints against the firm heard and presented for settlement. This method, however, must be delicately applied or it will be resented.

(c) *Imposition of fines for tardiness and absence.* These fines may be either deductions of pay for time lost or deductions of more than this. In the latter case the resentment of the worker is quite generally aroused, particularly when the fines are, as so often happens, excessive in amount. This resentment is heightened when the employers themselves receive the fines. Moreover, many workers are absent or late on justifiable grounds and should not be fined, but it is almost impos-

[1] It is not intended to include in this statement such broadminded and liberal experts as Captain Boyd Fisher, Willard E. Hotchkiss, Meyer Jacobstein and many other leaders.

[2] R. S. Quimby, "How we Investigate Absences and Why", *Factory*, Sep., 1918, pp. 438–9.

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sible to draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable "lost time" and attempts to do so invariably cause bitterness. Employees who are frequently absent or tardy without good cause may, of course, properly be discharged, but while employed, it is probably better not to impose fines or penalties.

(d) *Bonuses for attendance.* A better plan than the system of fines is that of paying bonuses for good attendance. Professor Davis R. Dewey, formerly, of the Information and Education Service of the Department of Labor, has issued bulletins which summarize the plans in operation in fourteen establishments.[1] These bonuses are of various kinds and are aimed to reduce tardiness as well as absenteeism. They are generally payable weekly or at most monthly and usually vary from 5 to 10 per cent. of the wage. One firm gives a flat bonus of twenty-five cents a day to those who have had a perfect attendance record. In several cases a cumulative bonus is given if another period goes by without absence. To this bonus for attendance is often added another bonus to lessen turn-over, whereby a man is rewarded if he stays with the firm for a given period, which is generally six months or a year. While the bonus plan is, on the whole, probably effective, it presents certain very decided difficulties. In the first place, as in the case of fines, the settlement of exemption is provocative of discontent. Many excuses are just, but judgment is not easy, and men whose excuses have been denied are likely to become dissatisfied at the loss of the bonus, although not to so great a degree as if they had been fined. To avoid the adjudication of excuses some firms have adopted hard-and-fast rules whereby a man who is even a few seconds late automatically loses the bonus. Moreover, when employees lose their chance of a bonus early in the working period, either by absence or by tardiness, they generally lose interest for the rest of the period and do not care much about punctuality or good attendance thereafter. This, however, lasts only during that one period since they have a chance at the bonus during the next period. This is in itself

[1] See Bulletins 1 and 3, issued by the Economic Division of the Information and Education Service of the United States Department of Labor.

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sufficient reason why the period for which the bonuses are given should be as short as is convenient.[1]

(e) *Competitive devices to stimulate interest.* Another method is to have attendance contests between the departments or plants, with a prize or bonus for the winner. This has the advantage of arousing group enthusiasm and of being easy to administer, and with proper publicity it can be somewhat effective.

(f) *A shorter working day with the omission of the overtime bonus.* The remedies previously proposed are such as could be introduced without any changes in the method of conducting industry. They are extrinsic to the "labor problem" as such and, while important, are not sufficient to cope fully with the problem. More fundamental readjustments are necessary if absenteeism is to be reduced to a minimum. As one of the steps in this program, there can be little question that the working day in most industries should be reduced. The physiological effects of a long day are such as necessarily produce absenteeism, and it seems clear that the introduction of the eight-hour day or its equivalent, in arduous industries, would result in better time-keeping and less absenteeism. Nor should the basic eight-hour day be substituted, for this is not an eight-hour day at all. The overtime bonus is not a sufficient check upon the length of the working day.

(g) *Improvement of working conditions.* Shop sanitation and accident prevention will produce a more constant as well as a more efficient working force. The reduction to a minimum of noise, heat, dust and fumes together with the introduction of properly spaced rest periods are necessary steps in reducing absenteeism. The problem of decreasing monotony is far more difficult and still seems insoluble.

(h) *Prohibition.* The prevention of the sale and use of intoxicating liquors, resulting from the Prohibition Amendment, will probably have among other results the effect of decreasing absenteeism and insuring a more dependable labor force.

[1] For a summarization of the objections to attendance bonuses, see *Factory*, Aug., 1918, p. 223.

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(i) *The cultivation of the cooperative spirit between employers and workmen.* The more or less conscious hostility which workmen cherish toward their employers cannot be removed by statements that the interests of the two parties are identical. The confidence and cooperation of the workers can be secured only by sharing with them control over the conditions of labor and by acquainting them with the problems of management. The institution of shop committees charged with the direction of matters that affect labor would be justified if, as seems probable, it released the withheld effort and interest of the worker. Nor should the shop committees be designed as substitutes for the unions but rather as supplements to them in the endeavor to increase production while allowing collective bargaining to be handled by the unions themselves. Works committees of this nature reduced absenteeism in England during the war to a marked degree, especially in the mines.

(j) *Improvement of certain social conditions.* But absenteeism cannot be reduced to a minimum solely by measures within a given plant. Basic social conditions must be improved. Illness is undoubtedly the chief cause of absenteeism and is, itself, chiefly caused perhaps by low wages, poor housing and inadequate sanitation. The economic argument for a decent wage, for health insurance, for good housing and for public health measures finds an added support in the disclosure of the extent and losses of absenteeism. It is important that American employers should investigate carefully the amount of absenteeism in their industries and should try to determine its basic cause.

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BERNARD BOSANQUET'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE

THE reaction against post-Kantian and more particularly against Hegelian idealism, which is so marked in contemporary logic and metaphysics, has in recent years extended to the "idealistic" or "metaphysical" theory of the state.[1] Not uncommonly this reaction takes the form of a condemnation of post-Kantian idealism as something exotic in the thought of English-speaking countries, an importation from Germany, which is foreign, if not false, to the native temper of the English mind. Those who uphold this view generally take Locke and Hume, Mill and Spencer as their measure of what is characteristically English in philosophy, or, like Mr. L. T. Hobhouse, they oppose the "rational humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" to the "false and wicked doctrine" of Hegel's "God-State".[2] But against these estimates we have to set Bosanquet's claim that it was only when transferred to a "more congenial home in the English-speaking world", with its "direct audacity, its decisive rejection of representative ideas in favor of directly apprehended unities—such as, for example, the living social unity", that the constructive impulse of post-Kantian idealism, or "speculative philosophy", as Bosanquet prefers to call it, came to its full fruition. It needed "the fresher and more originative medium of minds inspired by the English habit of handling the actual world—of self-government and self-expression." A theory which in its German home had been something of a romance "became in the English-speaking arena of vital politics, industry, poetry

[1] "The state" is a technical term used to indicate that the object of study is the *nature* or *essence* of states *as such*, exactly as a physician might study the structure and function of "the heart" or an engineer "the steam-engine". *Cf.* Bosanquet, Social and International Ideals, p. 274.

[2] L. T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 6.

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and religion, a literal transcript of experience."[1] It is clearly impossible to maintain that a theory which has come to count among its adherents such thinkers as Bernard Bosanquet and F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green and William Wallace, R. L. Nettleship and the two Cairds—not to mention many other names second only to these—can be disposed of as being merely a foreign fad. Moreover, it should be remembered, in the first place, that the impulse of post-Kantian idealism took root in English thought at a time when, at least in its Hegelian form, it had completely gone out of fashion in the land of its birth, and, in the second, that among English thinkers this idealism *never* developed into a theory of two sharply-sundered worlds —an "outer" world of brute mechanism to be efficiently managed and an "inner" world where the "free" spirit dwells with values and ideals. This two-world theory, as Professor Dewey has correctly pointed out, is the form in which post-Kantian idealism survived or revived in Germany.[2] For better or for worse, the English idealists have followed Hegel rather than Fichte, the Kant of the *Critique of Judgment* rather than the Kant of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in striving for a one-world theory, for seeing ideal values realized in the actual. No doubt, the spell of Plato, to whom Hegel himself owed so much, prepared them to welcome a philosophy moving towards this goal. Yet no weight which we can reasonably attach to these historical influences and affiliations suffices to account for the hold which post-Kantian idealism has gained upon English thought during the last fifty years. That hold can be explained only on the assumption that idealism seemed to the thinkers of this period to render with substantial truth the meaning of life as they saw it, that it was to them a "literal transcript of experience." Let us attempt, then, to see what that experience actually was.

[1] These quotations are taken from Bosanquet's article on "Realism and Metaphysics" in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. xxvi, no. 1, Jan., 1917, p. 7.

[2] See German Philosophy and Politics, ch. i, and *passim*. For illustrations see *e. g.*, the writings of H. Münsterberg, *passim*; especially his distinction between the *causal* and the *teleological* point of view and generally between *facts* and *values*, *nature* and *spirit*.

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I

Lord Morley in his *Recollections* has drawn for us in these words a glowing picture of that Victorian Age in the midst of which idealism became the dominant philosophy in England.

> In our country at least it was an epoch of hearts uplifted with hope, and brains active with sober and manly reason for the common good. Some ages are marked as sentimental, others stand conspicuous as rational. The Victorian Age was happier than most in the flow of both these currents into a common stream of vigorous and effective talent. New truths were welcomed in free minds, and free minds make brave men. Old prejudices were disarmed. Fresh principles were set afloat, and supported by the right reasons. The standards of ambition rose higher and purer. Men learned to care more for one another. Sense of proportion among the claims of leading questions to the world's attention became more wisely tempered. The rational prevented the sentimental from falling into pure emotional. Bacon was prince in intellect and large wisdom of the world, yet it was Bacon who penned that deep appeal from thought to feeling, "the nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath." This of the great Elizabethan was one prevailing note in our Victorian age.[1]

These fine phrases—"brains active with sober and manly reason for the common good", "men learned to care more for one another"—give the clue to the attitude toward the state of all the idealist writers of this period, from F. H. Bradley in his *Ethical Studies* and T. H. Green in his *Principles of Political Obligation* to Bosanquet in his *Philosophical Theory of the State*. They express the social facts transcribed in their social theory. It was an age when the national conscience was beginning to be profoundly stirred by the social and economic effects of the industrial system upon large masses of the population. The *laissez-faire* individualism then dominant in much of English thought was being weighed and found wanting. Mill, though an individualist in his conception of "liberty", inspired with his principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" a movement of social reform which in practice aimed

[1] *Recollections*, vol. ii, pp. 365–6.

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not at "pleasure" but at raising the concrete standard of life and thereby developing a higher type of mind and character. Ruskin challenged a political economy which divorced commercial success from responsibility for its effects upon the lives of the workers as human beings. Both Ruskin and William Morris preached and fought for the restoration of individual spontaneity and artistic initiative in the handicrafts. Arnold Toynbee stimulated the movement for the breaking down of class-ignorance and class-exclusiveness which took shape in Toynbee Hall—the prototype and model of many other "settlements". The London Charity Organization Society experimented in the administration of charity so as not to pauperize the sufferer and make him dependent upon further charity but rather to cut at the root of the trouble by building up character, by "helping the sufferer to help himself." Throughout this period we note a keen and active public spirit, a sense of social responsibility, a recognition of duties which are also opportunities for service. In neighborhood-spirit and citizen-spirit the ideal of the *common good* took for the individual concrete shape according to his "station", which defined for him what we may, with equal appropriateness, call his functions, his duties and his rights.

Bosanquet's theory of the state is instinct with the best temper of this age. It attempts to be the philosophical interpretation of the implications of public-spirited citizenship. He wrote in 1890:

> We look forward to a society organized in convenient districts, in which men and women, pursuing their different callings, will live together with care for one another, and with in all essentials the same education, the same enjoyments, the same capacities. These men and women will work together in councils and on committees; and while fearlessly employing stringent legal powers in the public interest, yet will be aware, by sympathy and experience, of the extreme flexibility and complication of modern life, which responds so unexpectedly to the most simple interference; they will have a pride in their schools and their libraries, in their streets and their dwellings, in their workshops and their warehouses. . . . The only thing I dread in the system known as Socialism is the cutting off individual initiative outside

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certain duties specified by rule. . . . What is wanted is the habituation of the English citizen to his rights and duties, by training in organization, in administration, in what I may call neighborly public spirit. . . . Such as the citizen is, such the society will be; and the true union of social and individual reform lies in the moulding of the individual mind to the public purpose.[1]

In passages such as these we have the roots of Bosanquet's theories of the "general will", of the state as a "moral organism" and of institutions as "ethical ideas". For him the mainspring of healthy political life lies in the individual, but *in the individual as organ of the common good.* This does not mean that every man is to become a public official. "The duties of citizenship will not necessarily drag us out of private life into politics."[2] It is enough that we should understand that our lives, in all their special interests and activities, bear upon the quality of the common life, perhaps only in our immediate neighborhood, perhaps affecting the wider circle of the nation. Individuals cannot escape the fact that, as fellow-citizens, they are very literally "members one of another". Home and family, workshop, profession, trades union, church—all these are "nurseries of citizenship" and "symbols of the social will, and must be made more so". The formula for the moral life is simple and plain. "While remaining in some recognized groove, some accepted form of duty, men should bear in mind that their little life has value only as embodying some element of a common good. Therefore, while faithfully working in their groove, they must apply to it the best conception of human welfare that they can".[3] Thus, for example,

we all employ labour. The least wealthy of us, as an aggregate, employ most. How we spend our money and what labour we employ determine nothing less than this: on what things the working people of this and other countries have to spend their lives and under what conditions their lives are to be spent. If we will have nasty things, shoddy things, vulgar things, ugly things, we are condemning some-

[1] Essays and Addresses, pp. 24–27.

[2] Aspects of the Social Problem, p. 12.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

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body to make them. If we will have impossibly cheap things, we are condemning somebody to work without proper pay.[1]

It must be abundantly clear that Bosanquet, whatever else he may do, does not feed the individual into the maw of a moloch called "the state". But he summons individuals to think of themselves as citizens, *i. e.*, as foci of public spirit, as organs of the general will which is the will for the common good.

His attitude toward governmental action illustrates this point. He welcomes the expert official with his detailed knowledge and trained mind, but he looks for initiative to the private citizens. Theirs it is to organize themselves for the furtherance of their various interests. Theirs it is to devise a solution of their own problems by joint action. It is "only when private action runs against a barrier, that it must have the power of transforming itself into public action".[2] Hence his well-known principle that state-action should remove obstacles and hindrances or create opportunities, in short, open channels for the exercise of the individual's public-spirited initiative, but that it should avoid relieving the individual citizen of duties or taking away from him functions in the discharge of which he can develop his judgment and his character and learn by experience, in success or failure, his wisdom or his folly, his strength of purpose or his weakness.

We are often told that German theory and practice sacrifice the individual to the state, make him a mere wheel in an efficiently organized machine, discourage his initiative and independence of judgment. Be this true or false, at any rate it is worth pointing out that there is nothing to which Bosanquet's theory attaches greater value than the development of strong, self-reliant, enterprising individuals, ready to shoulder their responsibilities and to meet with courage and self-control whatever fortune may bring. At the same time Bosanquet steers completely clear of that "individualism" which postulates a fundamental antithesis of "self" and "others", individual and

[1] Aspects of the Social Problem, p. 11.

[2] Essays and Addresses, p. 40.

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community, precisely because he insists on the *citizen-character* of his individuals, *i. e.*, because he reminds each man that his various social relations, summed up in his membership in the state, not only give positive guidance and content to his will but are his chief source of inspiration, of the sense that his life is worth while. Individuals alive with the spirit of citizenship need, in his view, a minimum of that kind of government action or compulsion which takes away from them some element of their responsibilities and hands it over to public machinery and public officials. In this spirit he criticized in 1906 the proposal to pay old-age pensions out of public funds, on the ground that to relieve men and women of the responsibility of planning for their old age during the years of health and strength for work is inevitably to weaken their purpose, to shorten their views, to make their lives so much more shiftless and thriftless. Similarly, I have heard him argue that it is better for a man to be paid, say, monthly or quarterly rather than daily or weekly, because it requires more self-control to administer a larger sum; the man has to look further ahead and plan the economy of his life on a more comprehensive scale instead of living from hand to mouth, meeting only each day's needs as they arise. He was opposed even to providing free meals for school children from very poor families on the ground that this policy means taking away from families, anyhow trembling on the brink of complete demoralization, one of the last effective stimuli toward continuing the effort to meet their parental responsibilities. In all these instances Bosanquet's attitude is manifestly open to criticism, and I need not stop to enumerate the obvious replies that can be made or to point out that the policies which Bosanquet criticised have frequently been adopted and have not, in the judgment of competent observers, led to the abuses and ill-effects which he feared. There is nothing more debatable in the whole field of social theory than the correct application of general principles. What I wish to insist on is his principle that all state-action should be judged by its effects on the moral character of the citizens. He has before him throughout the ideal of men meeting the problems and difficulties of

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their lives as far as possible out of their own resources of character and intelligence, singly or by voluntary cooperation, rather than looking for relief to paternal state-interference. At any rate, there can be no doubt about what Bosanquet admires most in the political genius of his race.

When people deny logical capacity to the English mind I always take a distinction. I say, Yes, distaste amounting to incapacity for formal logic, if you please. Leave that to others. But for concrete logic, the creative spirit of things, what is really the common basis of politics and poetry, I am convinced there is not, and never has been, a national mind more highly endowed than the English. I point to the great organized institutions which have sprung unaided from the brain of our wage-earning class. I ask if the civilized world can show a practical logic to match them.[1]

Here the philosopher acclaims the same institution-building sense for self-management which the historian thus describes:

Throughout this period, both before and after 1867, one of the features of British life was the increasing multiplication of local bodies for all kinds of purposes—Boards of Health, Burial Boards, Road Boards, Boards of Guardians, School Boards. Their multiplicity formed one of the most impressive contrasts between self-governing Britain and the bureaucratic lands of Europe, where all this administrative work was, for the most part, highly centralised. At the same time, the older local authorities, and especially the Municipal Councils of the towns, were steadily enlarging their powers, and assuming a multitude of new functions. There was no uniformity or system in all this development. Each Town Council, when it found the need for new powers, applied to Parliament for a private Act. And all this pullulating activity was submitted to scarcely any supervision or control by the national government. It was the spontaneous activity of a self-governing people, other aspects of which were to be found in the innumerable voluntary organisations for religious, charitable, political, commercial, and industrial purposes which daily sprang into being. . . . Some co-ordination and concentration was obviously necessary. The process was begun by the institution of the Local Government Board in 1871. But it is profoundly characteristic of Britain, and an

[1] Social and International Ideals, pp. 18, 19.

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evidence of the strength of the self-governing spirit by which the whole community was permeated, that the organisation of the British Society for common purposes proceeded thus, not from the top downwards, but from the bottom upwards.[1]

What Muir here says about getting new powers from Parliament and about the coordination of the powers so given, corresponds exactly to two of the functions which Bosanquet assigns to the state, *viz.*, that of removing hindrances and that of ultimate adjustment. In any case, the bottom fact in his analysis of the state is the "creative logic" of citizens working out the realization of their common purposes. And though friction and conflict often accompany this process, yet behind it lies the broad basis of the actual many-sided life of the community. It is from the individual's membership in this life that his public spirit draws its substantial orientation—the scheme of purposes and values which, in daily living, he sustains and acknowledges, though he may not have any explicit theory about it at all.

II

In outlining the experience to be transcribed we have already touched on many of the central doctrines of the idealistic transcript. It is plainly an attempt to give an adequate rendering in theory of that public-spirited individualism in practice which has been the happy birthright of the English people. Its merits are best appreciated by comparison with that other interpretation of individualism of which J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer are the best representatives. Because of their distrust of "the state", the individualism of these thinkers divides the citizen's life between "private" and "public" interests and functions and thus misses the clue to a concrete analysis of citizen-spirit and citizen-duty. Their theory inclines toward Seeley's principle that complete liberty consists in absence of all government. It is interested in securing not better government but less government. It is jealous of any increase in the

[1] Ramsay Muir, National Self-Government, pp. 166–167.

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number or power or functions, of public officials ("bureaucrats"). It is suspicious of all proposals to achieve public ends through public agencies. It seeks to stake out, as it were, around each individual an area of private self-determination in which "others" shall have no say. The function to which it would restrict the state is that of keeping the peace between these social atoms, of preventing destructive collisions between them. It is an individualism oriented toward a life of competition, tempered, at best, by laws defining the reciprocal rights of the competing individuals, with the state in the background as the big policeman to prevent or punish infringements of these rights. The idealistic theory, on the other hand, starts frankly from the *law-abiding* citizen or, in other words, from the public-spirited individual, who manages even his "private" affairs, of family or business or profession, with the clear recognition that they are his readiest and most effective channels for rendering service to the "common good". This common good it conceives as substantially realized or at least as in process of realization in the actual concrete life of the citizen's community, organized for this very purpose as a "State". Within this organized life the individual has "his station and its duties".

This is the theory of the state which is being challenged on all sides at the present day. The point at issue is not what function political theory should ascribe to the state. All sides agree with Aristotle that the state exists "for the sake of the good life". All sides agree that "man is a political animal". All sides agree, in short, that the good life is a common life and that a common life implies organization of some sort. What is disputed is that actual states as we know them fulfill the function of securing effectively the good life for all their members. What is challenged is that states as at present organized are either the only or the best possible organizations for the good life. "The state", as exhibited in actual "states", is being weighed and found wanting. Where the idealist analyzes it as realizing the common good with substantial success, the critic's verdict is that "the State is the ablest architect of moral and material ruin that man has yet

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produced".[1] The idealist theory, in short, is being attacked because it idealizes the actual, finds in it a perfection which is not there and thus stands in the way of reform.

This challenge, too, appeals to facts of experience in its support, and it is worth while for us to appreciate the nature of these facts. There is, first, the "international problem", which was barely beginning to be an ugly menace in the Mid-Victorian age but which has since turned Europe first into an armed camp and then into shambles. We have become acutely aware of how European commerce and finance, extending their operations into extra-European countries, have intensified national antagonisms in proportion as they have enlisted the support of national governments and thus added the power of armed force to the power of the purse. The dangerous relations between nation-states, each claiming absolute sovereignty, none brooking interference with its "honor" and its "vital interests", have come to loom larger in the minds of political thinkers than the relations of the citizen to the state of his loyalty and his love. But, secondly, even this latter problem has undergone profound transformation under the pressure of the "social problem". There is the class-struggle between organized "labor", seeking by the exercise of economic and political power to obtain a control over the conditions of its life, and "capital" organized to resist labor's demands. Within each nation and between the nations the dominant phenomenon has become a struggle for power—whose will is to be master.

All modern criticisms of the state are born of the profound dissatisfaction with this condition of things. They aim at finding new forms of organization which shall better correspond to the demands of social and economic justice, which shall less readily foster antagonisms between classes and nations. And the criticism of actual states has inevitably extended to the idealist theory of "the state" as seeming to ignore, if not to justify, the imperfections of the actual.

[1] E. Barker, "The Superstition of the State", Literary Supplement of the London *Times*, July 18, 1918.

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To feel the force of these critical analyses of the state, we need not go the length of Mr. Bertrand Russell's sneer that the state consists of elderly gentlemen below the average moral level of the community, and that with increasing government control the state has become a "universal prison" in which conscientious objectors are the only free men.[1] Far more solid and plausible are the theories which start from the multitudinous conflicts of interests composing the ever-shifting pattern of politics. The state, according to them, is an organization of human beings occupying a certain territory, of whom some govern and the rest are governed. The government, on behalf of the whole body, claims sovereignty, *i. e.*, unlimited authority against all alien state-bodies as well as over all groups or organizations within the state which it governs. But an empirical scrutiny of the acts and policies of any government, *i. e.*, of the men actually in control of power, leads to the conclusion that, though in theory they are functionaries of the whole body, organs of the common will, trustees of the common good, in practice they tend to identify the interests of the class to which they belong or of the influences to which they are accessible with those of the community as a whole. Though in theory they act with the consent of the governed and for the true good of the whole, in fact their actions can often not be effectively controlled by public opinion, and even wide-spread dissent may be suppressed by the exercise of force. The close union in modern politics of economic and political power lends color to this analysis. A society of which the organization is politically democratic but economically oligarchic is in an unstable equilibrium. Though theory, under the name of the "common good", may postulate a fundamental unity and harmony of interests, in actual fact rival interests are straining against each other to secure or maintain, as the case may be, control over the legislative and administrative machinery. Just as the movement for the emancipation of women has been one long struggle for the abolition of laws which, in imposing all sorts of economic and political disabilities on women, expressed

[1] See his message on "War and Individual Liberty", in *The Masses*, July, 1917.

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a false theory of their proper function and status, so the weapons by which organized labor compels governments to bargain and write the terms agreed upon into the fabric of the nation's laws are aimed not merely at the existing laws but at the inadequate theory of the welfare of the working classes held by those whose "rights" and "vested interests" are in the existing laws entrenched. In the ideal state, laws may fulfill their function of expressing impartially the common good, *i. e.*, the equitably adjusted and harmonized interests of all. In every actual state, the law, in formula and judicial interpretation, not only lags behind the effects on human happiness of economic forces and the demands of enlightened public conscience but, as it stands, embodies a theory of the common good biased by the interests of those who have the power to make the law.[1]

In the face of criticisms such as these, what defence can the idealistic analysis offer for the state? Its formula, "my station and its duties", great as were its services in giving a concrete content to Kant's empty "good will", yet seems to provide no criterion for distinguishing what is good and what is bad in different systems of stations. It defines the "good life" with equal aptness, be the citizen's state democratic or autocratic. It is neutral to that criticism and reform of constitutions and institutions of which the present world is full. It points out to

[1] Another line of criticism starts from the relation of church to state (*cf.* H. J. Laski, The Problem of Sovereignty). Can any church the theology of which distinguishes between divine and temporal authority acknowledge the absolute sovereignty of the state? Let alone the control of doctrine by the state in an "established" church, does not any church by owning property become subject to a judicial control which may claim to extend even to its dogma? Is there not always here a danger of conflict between religious freedom and political authority? Where points of conscience and of faith come into play, that "beloved community" in which Royce found the core of religion ceases to be necessarily identical with the state of which the believer is a citizen. Men have renounced their citizenship rather than submit. There are too many historical instances of such conflict to make it self-evident that every citizen can find in his state the Kingdom of God on earth. (*Cf.* "The Kingdom of God has come on earth in every civilized society where men live and work together, doing their best for the whole society and for mankind. When two or three are gathered together, cooperating for a social good, there is the Divine Spirit in the midst of them." Bosanquet, Essays and Addresses, p. 121.)

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a king that he has a function and an opportunity. It tells him to be a good king. It does not ask whether it were not better that there be no king at all. Or, to take an extreme example, could not a prostitute be said to have her station and duties? Her profession has almost always been tolerated and frequently regulated in the public interest. Reflection on this fact coupled with the unbroken history of prostitution gives point to the question. Social investigators say that prostitutes will he found to take a professional pride in satisfying their customers, in being "good" prostitutes, as other women are good mothers or wives. Clearly, the whole of civic morality cannot be compressed into the formula, "my station and its duties".

Bosanquet's handling of the problem of self-government exhibits a similar aloofness from the point of view of the student who, out of the social and political unrest of the present day, has become a critic and a reformer. To most of us the term suggests democracy, "government of the people by the people for the people". It invites to an analysis of representative institutions. It suggests constitutional experiments like proportional representation or the initiative and referendum. Yet this problem of the effective participation of the citizen in determining the legislative and foreign policy of his own state—a privilege which in the citizen of the Greek city-state Bosanquet well knows how to appreciate[1]—hardly attracts his interest in the modern nation-state at all. He praises the Greeks, in the first chapter of his *Philosophical Theory of the State*, for inventing the simple device of government by discussion and vote, with the minority acquiescing in the will of the majority, but in his analysis of the modern nation-state it receives no further attention. Yet he is well aware that philosophical interest in the state has flourished most at times when strong national sentiment has gone hand in hand with a movement towards democracy and the "sovereignty of the people". The influence of Plato has probably been decisive with him here. A citizen of an extreme democracy, Plato omits from his analysis of the ideal state every single feature of actual democracy

[1] See "Some Socialistic Features in Ancient Societies" in Essays and Addresses.

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with which he was familiar. There is no provision for government by discussion and vote. There is no opportunity for the mass of the people to have a voice in the management of their state. The rule of philosopher-kings is the rule of an enlightened bureaucracy. Granted that it would be good government, is their nothing in Mill's taunt that the worst parody of self-government is the good government of a wise and benevolent autocrat?

So, again, with Hegel, Bosanquet holds "the state" (which means, in practice, for each of us his own nation-state) to be the citizen's ultimate moral authority, the keeper, as it were, of his conscience. Hence, like Hegel, he denies that the same principles of conduct apply between states which apply between the citizens of a state or that a state can admit or consent to the creation of any authority above itself. That a state is not on all fours with the individual in the nature and conditions of its action may readily be granted. But what is the bearing of this on the practical problem of how best to give effect to the love of peace among the peoples and to their sense of common interests deeper than national divisions? Can nothing be done to curb aggressive nationalism and check the recurrence of war? Bosanquet's reply tells us, in effect, to work not for a supra-national organization but for a *purification of the will of each state*. A healthy state, he declares, is non-militant in temper. States are peaceful or warlike according as their internal condition is or is not one of stability and social justice. States in which the supreme, non-competitive, humanizing values—knowledge, art, religion, human sympathy between classes—are dominant in the lives of the citizens will live in peace with each other. As for a supra-national state, it is bound to fail for lack of a common experience, such as enables men to understand each others' ways and make allowances for each other and work together under the same laws and institutions.[1] But it may be suggested that this very condition, *viz.*, a common experience and a recognition of common interests, has largely been supplied by the war. On force alone

[1] *Cf.* the volume entitled Social and International Ideals, *passim*.

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the league of nations cannot rest. It must be rooted in a deep will to sustain it, and this will must be a will of the constituent states running through the rank and file of their citizens. We must learn to think internationally as well as to think nationally. Could not the loyal citizen be proud of the loyalty of his state to the league and watch jealously over its loyalty? If he is to do this, he and his state must certainly be ready for sacrifices and self-denying ordinances in the interests of the common society of nations. The very need of cooperation in the war has supplied some training in such sacrifices of national prestige and advantage for a common cause. The will is there in rudiment. Have we not here, then, the first germ of an evolution which will not supersede and abolish but subordinate the nation-state to a league of nations organized for their common good? Even on Hegelian principles a will for the common good must seek to create for itself an organization through which it can be effective. And against such a movement neither the fact nor the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state can stand.

III

The issue between the idealists and their critics brings to light a very genuine difficulty. They disagree just because they have a common basis in the theory that the function of the state is to be an organ of the good life. Now a theory to be true should be a rendering of facts "as they are". Hence the idealist strives, by appreciative analysis, to point out how actual states do actually fulfill the function which theory ascribes to them. The critic, also, fitting the theory to the facts, reports a misfit. No actual state, he declares, is, here and now, what a state "ought to be". It functions, indeed; but it functions most imperfectly. And thus the problem arises how it can be made to function better. The idealist has no wish to deny the need for reforms, but he is more interested in dwelling on the positive achievement and value of actual institutions. He wants illustrations of the truth of the common theory, drawn from the actual working of states, and he is driven to seek them in everything that is actual. Yet he is uneasily conscious that

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any actual institution lends itself to a counter-argument on the ground of the obvious defects of its working. It must certainly be admitted that a great deal of idealist theory of the state strikes even sympathetic readers as either not coming to close grips with the actual working of present-day institutions at all, or else as forming altogether too rosy an estimate of the sweet reasonableness of things as they are and throwing the blame of imperfections, if there are any, on the lack of character and public spirit in the citizens rather than on remediable faults in the established order. Foolish as it would be to ignore the services rendered by actual institutions or the wisdom of the homely advice to do one's best in one's station, whatever that may be, yet the "creative logic" of man cannot be debarred from remoulding the whole system of stations and the laws which define and sustain them. The well-known jibe that Hegel mistook the kingdom of Prussia for the Kingdom of Heaven is grossly unfair, yet the pull of much idealistic theory is toward conservatism. With all their fine sense for history and evolution, the thinkers of the Hegelian School write as if they sometimes forgot that states have not merely a history behind them but also a history before them, that they are not merely products of evolution but still in process of evolving. The mobile spirit of man is ever refashioning its garment of institutions. No one can ever set any limits to the experimentation in the organs of self-government which lies still before us, and no theory should ever seem to predicate of any actual set of institutions the finality of perfection.

All the criticisms of the "idealistic" theory of the state which we have just touched upon may be condensed into a single sentence: the term "the state", as used by the idealist, covers two things which the critics insist on distinguishing: it covers both the community or nation and the government—both the ideal values of which the community is the bearer and the particular arrangements or machinery by which its life is regulated. It covers—to put it crudely—both the spirit and the body. Granted that the spirit must embody itself, granted that the life of the community must be carried on in ordered forms, granted that there must be government and authority of

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some sort, does it follow from the recognition of the value of the spirit that its particular embodiment, at any one time, meets its own demands? In an ideal state, like Plato's, the contrast may be reduced to the vanishing point, but in actual states it is the ever present stimulus to reform. Moreover, Plato, we must remember, is laying down a pattern for the ideal legislator to work on; he is tracing the lineaments of a state which should be worthy of the devotion of its citizens. He is not upholding any actual state of his own time as fulfilling his ideal; still less is he writing like a "lover" of Athens in the spirit of Pericles' Funeral Oration.

Now *this* is precisely what the idealist thinkers are doing: they are writing very literally as lovers of the state. In Bosanquet's striking phrase, they seek to exhibit "the greatness and ideality of life in its commonest actual phases".[1] They "believe" in it. They are "enthusiastic" in the analysis of it.[2] They are apostles of the religion of patriotism. In fact, *the idealistic philosophy of the state is a philosophy of patriotism*, or, as Royce would have said, of loyalty. It transcribes the citizen's love for his country and his people, for its language, its history, its institutions, for its achievements in the arts and sciences, in commerce and industry, in statecraft, too, and in war. It seeks to render in explicit theory his sense of the ideal values in which, as a member of his community, he shares and through which his own life is filled with value. It seeks to exhibit as reasonable and well-grounded the citizen's conviction that, notwithstanding much which he criticizes and is dissatisfied with, his community is something in the service of which it is worth while to live and, if need be, to die. The state, approached from this angle, has a very different meaning from that which the term bears for the student of constitutional history, for the lawyer, for the politician. To them, the state means government, be it in the sense of the system and machin-

[1] Philosophical Theory of the State, p. xi.

[2] *Cf.* Bosanquet's camplaint that the critics of the state "hardly believe in actual society as a botanist believes in plants, or a biologist in vital processes. . . . Those who cannot be enthusiastic in the study of society as it is, would not be so in the study of a better society if they had it"; *op. cit.*, pp. x, xi.

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ery or in the sense of the men or classes exercising the function of governing. To the idealist, the term "state" means all that "city" (*polis*) meant to Plato and Aristotle—the community as offering to its members all the activities which make a full and rounded human life. *The state is, in short, for him a spiritual phenomenon, and citizenship a great spiritual experience.*

It seems to me undeniable that a theory framed from this point of view brings out an aspect of the experience of citizenship which historian and lawyer, politician and reformer, from their several points of view, do not cover. If the idealist's theory is often weak where their theories are strong, yet equally are theirs weak or at least incomplete, so far as they omit this line of analysis. It approaches from a fresh angle the interpretation of the common formula that the state, or, as we had better say now, the community, exists for the sake of the good life. When the idealist calls citizen-life "good", he means that it brings into the individual's existence a real and enduring value which it can not have otherwise; that in the absence of community-life human nature would be degraded to a lower level; that its needs and especially its spiritual needs would not be so fully met, even if they were met at all; that through his share in the total achievement of the community the individual's existence is enriched and developed far beyond what his own unaided effort could gain for him. That tantalizing phrase, "realization of the ideal in the actual", is but the formula for every spiritual experience. "Ideal" here means not an unrealized or not-yet-realized better or best but the *universal* or *essential* character of community-life considered from the moral point of view. This character is not exhibited by arguing merely in terms of health, contentment, pleasure, wages, hours of work, privileges, rights, justice, though according to circumstances it will include all these. But more fundamental than these is a moral service which community-life renders to human nature in individual men and women. This is the "ideal" or "universal", the realization of which in the "actual" it is the task of philosophy—deliberately likened to "the gaze of a child or of an artist"[1]—to trace, and from

[1] Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 1; *cf.* James Russell Lowell, "The Dandelion".

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which the reformer himself must draw his inspiration and the hope of his success.

What is the nature of this service? We may exhibit it in three ways. (a) There is, first, the idealist's theory of freedom. Because he is dealing with a spiritual experience and looking to what human nature demands for its full realization or satisfaction, he casts his theory in psychological language, in terms of mind, will, purpose. Here is a characteristic utterance: "If you start with a human being as he is in fact, and try to devise what will furnish him with an outlet and a stable purpose capable of doing justice to his capacities—a satisfying object of life—you will be driven on by the necessity of the facts at least as far as the State, and perhaps further".[1] We are here on the track of Rousseau's famous analysis of the three stages or phases of liberty; the natural, civil and moral—the transformation of the natural man into the moral man through his membership in the "civil state"; a typical story of the saving of the human soul. "What man acquires in the civil state is moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself. For the mere impulse of appetite is slavery; while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty".[2] Bosanquet, in his analysis of self-government and liberty,[3] has brilliantly restated the argument and drawn, in a further masterly chapter,[4] upon the resources of modern psychology in order to exhibit the life of a typical community as a tissue of minds and wills, playing into and at points against each other, but fundamentally functioning together for a common purpose, of the full scope and implications of which no single mind in the tissue is explicitly aware, and which even a sustained effort at critical analysis brings only partially to the level of reflective consciousness. The main point of the argument is, of course, the familiar one that membership in a community organized as a state does not, in principle, interfere with or repress the individual but rather interprets his will to him. It helps him to know the real meaning of his instincts and desires and provides

[1] Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

[2] Contrat Social, book i, ch. viii.

[3] *Op. cit.*, chs. iii–v.

[4] *Ibia.*, ch. vi.

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him at the same time with channels of activity through which he can satisfy them.[1]

This point of view, again, explains why the idealistic "criticism" of institutions develops into an appreciation of them as "ethical ideas", *i. e.*, as defining actual spheres and opportunities for "self-realization" through action contributing to the common good. It also explains why the burden of making the most of these opportunities is thrown everywhere on the individual's mind and character, why he is told that character is master over circumstance and that the welfare of the community depends not so much on tinkering with its institutions as on the public spirit and insight with which they are worked. Hence the appeal to citizenship: work loyally in your groove, for it is your obvious channel of service to the common good, and think chiefly of how much more you can do than you are doing.

(b) A second example of the idealistic method of interpreting the concepts of political theory in terms of spiritual experience is to be found in Bosanquet's treatment of the "general will" and its "sovereignty". What is called the "sovereignty of the state" is for Bosanquet the sovereignty of the general will. What, then, is this general will? Where is it revealed? The answer is, at first, perplexing. It is not merely the actual will of the people or of a majority of them as ascertained by election or referendum. It is not identical with the explicit consent of the governed to the acts of the government. It is not merely the will of the government acting, as it frequently does and must, without the knowledge of the governed though on their behalf. It is found only by pushing behind the surface-play of political forces, behind the details of con-

[1] The same argument has recently been freshly presented by Professor W. E. Hocking from the illuminating angle that the natural "dialectic" or "self-righting tendency" of human instincts, working out their satisfaction through trial and error in experience, issues broadly in the same preferences and valuations which the pressure and guidance of the community through its education and institutions bring home to the individual (*cf.* Human Nature and its Remaking, especially part v). Professor Hobhouse, in his criticism of the idealistic theory of freedom (*cf.* The Metaphysical Theory of the State, lect. iii, especially pp. 59 ff.), appears to ignore this side of the idealists' argument completely.

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stitutional machinery. It is the spirit of the community, expressing itself through its laws and institutions, its customs and traditions, its industry and commerce, its national art and science, its philosophy and religion. With this spirit of his community the individual learns, in his own unique way, to identify himself; he grows into one of the organs through which it lives on and develops itself. Of the complex tissue of community life the individual's conscious purposes form but a fragment, and to him and all his like its ways and achievements and institutions are the standing interpretation of their several wills. The community or general will, thus conceived, is a spiritual fact in which the good for human nature is, as an actual achievement, largely realized. Any community through membership in which the individual to any extent actually fulfills himself has a right to claim his loyalty, be its form what it may, be its name state, league of nations or the communion of saints.

(c) Our third illustration may fitly take its cue from such a characteristic phrase as this: "The moral and spiritual structure which lies behind the visible scene".[1] The visible scene, for the student of the state, is a multitude of human beings, seen as distinct bodies, repeating a specific animal type. To a deeper look, the multitude is not a mere collection or crowd but a unity or whole. They not merely happen to be there together but belong together by all sorts of relations, either shallow or deep. They are organized, which connotes at least division of labor and differentiation of function. They are centres or foci of functions. Thence the further analysis takes two complementary directions. It turns, on the one side, to the individual and traces the bearing of his social relationships and activities upon his given nature of instincts and interests, his needs and capacities. On the other, it analyzes the functions as elements in a single common life, of which the individuals are thus functionaries or organs. This yields the "concrete universal" of which the individual is a special differentiation. And yet again, the analysis may reach the same result

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society*, 1917–18, p. 494.

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by starting from the explicit purposes in the individual's mind and tracing out their full bearing and implication. Such analysis, following out the "objective content" of the individual's will into all that it presupposes or implies, will always take us beyond what the individual is actually aware of and beyond what can fairly be called "his" life and action into the lives and actions and purposes of others. As he possesses and embodies it, it is a fragment which under the pressure of analysis turns out to be not fully intelligible until the whole context of the general will has been taken into account, so that in the end it is more than a metaphor for the individual to say: "The moral universe in me expresses itself thus."[2] And thence the metaphysical imagination takes wing and, soaring aloft, bids us perceive that all the great historic achievements which we are wont to call "creations of the human spirit"—language, science, art, state, church—are at any rate not human products in the sense that, as wholes, they have been designed by any one man or any body of men planning them together. They have grown rather than been made. Even now they are growing rather than being constructed, though at the growing-points there is much play and counter-play of deliberate purposes. The pattern of the common life grows as a living tissue of wills, complementary or conflicting, none of which, being human, fully understands whither it is going or what it really wants. In the political arena, the aspirations and ideals of men clash like literal "forces". We see this easily enough when the force is against us. Is it less true when the force is in us? And, if so, is it in the end my will or a will in me, my purpose or a purpose which uses me and works through me? The suggestion is well-nigh irresistible that there is a reason greater than the merely human in these human creations. They are indeed rooted in human nature but through human nature in the universe. They are chapters in the phenomenology of spirit, appearances of the Absolute.

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[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society*, 1917–18, p. 499.

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LAMARTINE[1]

A Study of the Poetic Temperament in Politics

In the revolutionary history of Europe no movement promised so much and fulfilled so little as the Revolution of 1848. In its tragic failure to achieve the two political ideals of the nineteenth century, nationalism and democracy, lay the evil seeds that finally produced the crop of woe which was harvested in 1914. Suppressed by the autocrats, betrayed by the middle classes and suspected by the working classes, these ideals emerged discredited from the uprisings of 1848. The imperialism of Napoleon III, the "blood and iron" policy of Bismarck and the royalism of Cavour were all the direct outcome of the failure of the popular attempts to establish nationalism and democracy.

Embodying the generous hopes and the cruel failure of the Revolution is a pathetic figure, Lamartine, whose biography, in two handsome volumes by H. Remsen Whitehouse, has recently appeared. In many respects the book is a model biography. It is based on original material; it is exceedingly well written; it is full of solid information of the period; it shows careful workmanship; it is sympathetic with the subject. And yet it is not a great biography like Trevelyan's *Macaulay* or Thayer's *Cavour*. Mr. Whitehouse has chosen to describe the mortal part of Lamartine, his political career; to the immortal side of Lamartine, his poetic career, he has given comparatively little space. In the opinion of the writer, the biographer frequently misinterprets his hero because he does not fully understand his temperament. He considers him too seriously as a politician and statesman. Lamartine was neither at any time of his life. He engaged in political activities in the spirit of a Romantic poet ardently interested in public affairs as a means of self-expression. It is from the viewpoint of the poetic temperament in politics that the writer proposes to treat of Lamartine's career.

Alphonse Prat de Lamartine was born in 1790 of a wealthy, aristocratic family. Though royalists and Catholics, steeped in the traditions of the *ancien régime*, the Lamartines managed to weather the

[1] The Life of Lamartine. By H. Remsen Whitehouse. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.—Two vols.: xi, 465; vii, 527 pp.

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French Revolution, and came through with their heads and estates intact. Rich, handsome, gifted, well-connected, Lamartine started life under the best possible auspices, thanking God that he had been born "dans une famille de prédilection". The early part of his life was devoted entirely to poetry. It was the period of *Elvire*, *Le lac* and the *Méditations*, when his poetic genius was in its full bloom. In a short time he was recognized as one of the great poets of France, and his reputation has not suffered with the lapse of time. He is today universally regarded as one of the immortal figures in the literature of Europe.

Of course he fell in love. First it was with an Italian cigarette girl in Naples, later with the consumptive wife of a friend, each of whom he immortalized, the one in *Graziella* and the other in *Elvire*. But he had that terror of marrying a poor girl which, as Anatole France declares, is peculiar to his romantic fellow-countrymen. So, in 1820, he contracted a marriage with an English lady "sufficiently endowed with this world's goods". The married life of the Lamartines was a happy one to the end, although the poet never made any pretense of being in love with his wife. He wrote no poems about her.

Lamartine's family influence with the Bourbon government enabled him to secure a diplomatic appointment in Italy, where he went more for the sake of travel than for diplomacy. Mixing with diplomats and politicians, he learned that "the reputation of poet is the worst of any in the eyes of the men who rule this matter-of-fact world". Something told him that he had "the instinct of the masses", for he was consumed with the desire to be a ruler in this world. Although he wrote much poetry and prose after he entered public life, their quality was distinctly inferior to that of his earlier work.

In 1831 Lamartine was an unsuccessful candidate for Parliament as a "broad and moderate royalist", but two years later he was elected to that body and began a political career so brilliant that for a time it dimmed his reputation as a poet and placed him for half a generation in the forefront of French political affairs until it suddenly and ingloriously burst like a bubble in the fateful days of 1848.

When Lamartine entered Parliament he was asked on what side he was going to sit. His reply was, "on the ceiling". Throughout his political life he never identified himself with any party or faction, never advocated any policy of action, never held any definable political views and never formulated any political philosophy; yet he played a great rôle in the world of his day and profoundly influenced his fellow-countrymen for many years.

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How can this paradox be explained? What is the mystery of Lamartine's extraordinary career? It must be borne in mind that Lamartine was by temperament first and foremost a poet; his influence over the masses was essentially poetic, being achieved through the utterance of beautiful sentiments in beautiful language. A crowd is essentially a poetic group. Unlike the group in a factory, in a college, in an army—all of them under a discipline more or less rigid and dominated by an idea or a method more or less definite—a crowd has no idea, method or discipline. It has emotions and sentiments, and hence it is essentially a poetic grouping of individuals. The "fickleness" of the crowd, swayed in one direction by this orator and in another by that, is testimony to its poetic character, for it is vibrant to every passing breeze, attuned to every strain, sniffing at every scent. A mob orator, be he as coarse as Marat or as refined as Wendel Phillips, is always something of a poet. He captivates the crowd by his "oratory", and what is oratory if not poetry chanted to the multitude. Given a true and great poet, such as Lamartine, the crowd will listen to him gladly, caring little whether he favors good policies or bad. As an orator Lamartine was eloquence itself. Felicitous sentences succeeded one another in an endless stream. He seemed to possess a veritable fountain of beautiful words and musical phrases that gushed forth naturally, easily, enchantingly, irrigating the dry soil of political controversy and captivating the crowd that came, heard and were glad. No wonder he considered himself a "Bonaparte of the word".

What did he *say?* Was he merely a word-juggler like so many popular orators? No. He was a true nineteenth-century liberal, believing sincerely and profoundly in "principles", "ideals", "freedom", "liberty", "progress". Had he been a political philosopher such as Mill, he would have produced an orderly body of thought that would have influenced public policy. Had he been a constructive statesman such as Gladstone, he would have left behind him a great body of reforms. In truth, he had neither political ideas nor policies, only sentiments. He was a poet out of his element, hovering over the political world like a bird always on the wing, unwilling and incapable of finding a resting-place. Lamartine's contemporaries declared that he had no sense for realities and that his "opinions were constantly buffeted by the winds of his imagination." His gift of words was so great that when he delivered an excellent speech he thought that he had actually solved a problem and formulated a policy. His speeches were clear and logical; but, strangely, the logic and clarity lay in the words only, not in the ideas and policies which he was supposedly pro-

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pounding. In action Lamartine was weak, uncertain, inconsistent. No one ever knew what he was going to do for the simple reason that he himself did not know.

The tragedy of Lamartine's political life was that he did not realize that there are two political worlds which never meet. One is the world of the masses, wherein the atmosphere is surcharged with emotion and sentiment. It is a real enough world where principles and ideals have full and free sway. The crowd is always altruistic. It can be moved by appeals to patriotism, to humanity, to race, to party, to religion. Even in cases of mob violence and cruelty the motive is always altruistic, devotion to a cause. There is another world, however, small indeed but potent, the world of those who are "interested" from motives that are anything but altruistic in swaying the crowd to act in this way or that. To this world, principles are merely the mob formulas for interests, personal, party or class. The writer vividly remembers hearing an address to a popular audience by a famous public man. The crowd was deeply moved by the noble appeals of the eloquent speaker, who seemed to be consumed with devotion to his cause. After the meeting the writer, who was one of a small group invited to consult with the speaker of the evening, heard the orator, barely out of his eloquence, coolly and cynically tell how he had made this and that appeal in order to influence public opinion in favor of this and that interest. The secret of Lamartine's pathetic failure lay in the fact that he was a political monist; at no time was he conscious of the existence of these two very real but different worlds. For him as for the masses, principles and ideals were the only realities. And when, in 1848, he found himself, as he said, "alone amidst interests and passions", he went down to swift destruction, leaving behind only a pathetic memory. Had he possessed a strain of mysticism in his nature he would have identified himself wholly and completely with his principles and so might have been a political fanatic. But he was a poet; and a poet can never be a fanatic, for his emotional world is too wide and too deep to permit him to travel on one road only, no matter how straight and how long.

In religion as in politics Lamartine was always the poet. He was brought up a strict Catholic, and to the day of his death he was loyal to his faith. But at no time in his life was he a Catholic in the full meaning of that word. The French Revolution in its attack upon the church set two currents of thought in motion. One was Voltairean by inspiration and therefore rationalist in philosophy and anti-clerical in policy. It was as positive in its assertion of "no" as Catholicism

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was in its assertion of "yes" in answer to the question of the relation of man to the church. There was another, Rousseauist by inspiration, that abhorred the rationalism of Voltaire no less than the dogmatism of the church and desired to generate an atmosphere of faith without church and creed. Man was to be a spiritual adventurer in the land of God. This romantic interpretation of Christianity may be seen in Chateaubriand despite his fervent Catholicism and, most of all, in Lamennais. Lamartine's poetic temperament inclined him to the way of faith without dogma, of a church without temporal power and of a Christianity without supernaturalism. Once, recalling a time when he was alone in prayer in the sanctuary of the Holy Sepulchre, he wrote:

> Whatever the form which solitary reflection, the teachings of history, age, vicissitudes of heart and mind, have given to the religious tendencies of a man's soul; whether he has clung to the letter of Christianity, to the dogma taught by his mother, or retains but a philosophical Christianity based on reason; whether to him Christ be a crucified God, or he discern in him only the most holy of men, made divine through virtue, the incarnation of supreme Truth, and dying to bear witness of His Father; . . . to such a one Christianity nevertheless remains the creed of his memories, of his affections, and of his imagination.

He went on to say of the Holy Sepulchre that it is the tomb "of the ancient world and the cradle of the modern; no stone here below has been the foundation of so vast an edifice; no grave has been so fruitful." Mr. Whitehouse shows an acute understanding of Lamartine's religion when he writes that it "was more closely allied to imagination and sentiment than to conviction."

Like Abbé Lamennais, by whose writings he was influenced, Lamartine came to believe in the separation of church and state. His views were far from being anti-clerical, as he argued that the church would be more free to pursue its divine mission if the bonds which united it to the state were removed. The Revolution of 1830 put a legal instead of a divine stamp upon earthly authority. But, he declares, since the church still rests upon divine authority, its intervention in temporal matters has now become an anachronism.

Lamartine's political activity lay entirely within the period of the July Monarchy. Almost from the day of his entrance into Parliament he was a notable figure, partly because of his fame as a poet and partly because of his eloquence. He sat in splendid isolation, "on the ceiling", identifying himself with no party, group or faction. He was

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always in opposition to the Government, for in opposition only could his extraordinary eloquence find the fullest play and he achieve his greatest influence. Put him in the Ministry, ask him to direct a policy, and he would have been lost. His psychology abhorred action as nature abhors a vacuum.

Aristocrat and poet, he detested the crowd of newly-ennobled stock-brokers and manufacturers on whom Louis Philippe relied to bolster up his régime. He resented no less the opposition in the street, under the leadership of republican and labor agitators, that was gathering to destroy the bourgeois government. "Let us not pronounce the terrible word Revolution! Nothing justifies it but inexorable necessity", he once declared. Lamartine did indeed admire the principles of the French Revolution, "sainement compris et moralement considerées", but the practical application of these principles in 1793 was to him hideous. A poet, however, can not be relied upon to be "safe and sane". There was a quality of emotion "in the street" that appealed to his temperament; and his aristocratic opposition to Louis Philippe was in time transformed into a democratic opposition to a régime that was as dull and flat as it was cowardly and oppressive. When the September Laws against the freedom of the press were enacted, Lamartine denounced them in a series of stirring speeches which gained him immense popularity. "With a free press government may be difficult; without it, it is impossible", he declared. The radical opposition now regarded him as its leading spokesman against Louis Philippe and Guizot.

In the '40's Lamartine's attacks upon the Government were constantly increasing, both in frequency and in virulence, and were taking more and more a radical turn. He wrote in 1844,

> France is revolutionary or nothing. The revolution of '89 is her political religion. Should she relinquish the dogmas, pervert the principles, or indefinitely postpone the practical issues at stake, she stultifies herself; she remains little more than the slave of 1815, the great repentant nation craving pardon for the prejudices she destroyed, seeking forgiveness of the thrones she humbled, of Europe for her victories.

In 1847 appeared his famous *History of the Girondins*, which created an immense sensation in political and literary France. Edition after edition was rapidly exhausted. Long lines of people waited outside of the printing establishment eager to get copies from the press. This famous political pamphlet—it was not a history in any real sense—gave the author such great popularity that he could with truth style

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himself "Minister of Public Opinion". It became a political issue, for the opposition seized upon Lamartine's glorification of the French Revolution in general and of the Girondins in particular as a criticism of Louis Philippe's régime. Mr. Whitehouse's judgment of the *History* is just and eloquent.

> Into this work he [Lamartine] put all his imagination, all the magic of his style, caring little for strict historical accuracy, but ever seeking the "spirit" of the tremendous human struggle. He transposes dates, gives undue space to episodes which personally please him, suppresses or curtails important facts which lend themselves but ill to the thesis his predilection has adopted, and multiplies portraits which, in his phantasy, replace a true likeness. It is the poet and the artist who holds the pen. To the scholar who toils along the rigid lines laid down by the modern interpretation of the science of history, the work is practically valueless—a mere romance, a poetic rendering of an intensely dramatic episode. But as a picture—a highly-colored picture—as a consummate effort of staging, posturing and oratorical skill, the work is a masterpiece unsurpassed in literature. The human interest grips the reader as in a vise, hurrying him, breathless, through a succession of scenes and episodes each more vivid, each more pathetic or terrifying than the last.

The popularity of the *History* was so great that it was said to be one of the causes of the Revolution of 1848.

The lone statesman "on the ceiling" was now the most potent influence in the country. On July 18, 1847, Lamartine's constituents at Maçon gave him a banquet at which tables were set for three thousand guests. Thousands more came from far and near to witness this tribute to the national hero. On this occasion he delivered a stirring speech bitterly attacking the Government for its reactionary tendencies and for its corruption. "I said one day", he exclaimed, "'La France s'ennuie!' I add to-day, 'La France s'attriste'". His main object was not to foment revolution but to rouse public opinion in order to achieve "immense moral progress" by fanning the "sacred fire of 1789". What he desired was "a more energetic impulse in the government of France" than the Bourbons and Orleanists were capable of giving. Nevertheless, Lamartine felt that he "held a revolution in his hand", and he was more than once tempted to open it, so great was his faith in his political powers and in his ability to ride on the crest of revolutionary storms. He was not ambitious in the vulgar sense of striving after power and place; but he was inordinately vain and therefore eager to express himself at all times and sometimes at all costs. Lamartine's sincerity was tempered by a vanity so colos-

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sal that in order to satisfy his histrionic cravings he might be willing to unleash forces which, the moment they appeared, would cause him to recoil with horror and dismay. Only a sense of humor, in which he was woefully lacking, could have saved him. Humor may not be all important to a statesman or to a prophet, but it certainly is to a poet turned politician.

The Revolution of 1848 in France was of mixed origin. A confluence of turbulent political streams from many directions suddenly and swiftly overwhelmed the July Monarchy. Idealistic republicans inspired by the purest democratic motives, chauvinistic imperialists plotting to restore the empire of the Bonapartes, revolutionary socialists striving for a labor commonwealth, visionary utopians dreaming of a perfect society—all joined to overthrow a régime that was more despised than feared. The leaders of the Revolution were of a new type: journalists, students, artists and actors. The significant fact of the February Revolution, namely, the appearance of a revolutionary proletariat led by intellectuals, has for some strange reason been overlooked by most historians. A new "social stratum", the working class, had come into existence with the factory system and had taken an active part in the overthrow of Charles X. They were bitterly disappointed with the outcome of the Revolution of 1830, which had promised democracy but had given the suffrage to the propertied classes only. As a result they believed that the bourgeoisie had used a revolutionary movement for its own interest and had called it democracy. They now determined to do likewise and call it socialism.

To establish democracy in the full sense was the sincere desire of the bourgeois idealists of 1848. But the working class had now outrun that ideal. No longer satisfied with political democracy they desired a social revolution in order to establish a labor commonwealth. No sooner was Louis Philippe overthrown than two rival governments, as is well known, appeared, one Republican and the other Socialist, organized in the editorial rooms of two newspapers, the Republican *National* and the Socialist *Réforme*. A compromise was for a time effected, and a Provisional Government was established containing representatives of both elements.

Among the members of this body was Lamartine, representing the Republicans. He had not taken part in the revolutionary movement, but as the most pronounced opponent of Louis Philippe he was chosen by the Republicans as their spokesman. He now found a new audience, the savage Parisian mob, whom he charmed by the music of his eloquence. Whenever a riot threatened, not the military but Lamar-

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tine was called upon to quiet the mob, which he effectually did by the sheer power of words. He was almost a dictator by "la force morale de la parole". As a member of the Government, however, he was feeble and equivocal, utterly lost when it came to policy and action. Only once did he show decision, and that was on April 16, when he called out the troops to head off a serious uprising. He was so proud of this action, which he declared had saved France, that he never ceased referring to it.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamartine was constantly besieged by delegations from oppressed nationalities—Poles, Irish, Italians—who flocked to Paris sanguine of help from revolutionary France. To all he gave generously of his eloquence. England was especially concerned about a visit of Irishmen headed by Smith O'Brien. The Irish cause had aroused universal sympathy in France, appealing as it did to the traditional friendship between the two nations. "Les doléances irlandaises touchaient une fibre très sensible chez la population française", wrote a contemporary; "il était pour le gouvernement impossible de refuser de les écouter, et bien délicat de leur répondre." Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador and a friend of Lamartine, sought to influence the latter's attitude toward the Irish question by warning him to be prudent in his speech to the Irish delegation. In reply to the request for French assistance, Lamartine told the Irishmen that they were the representatives of "cette glorieuse île d'Érin qui, par le génie naturel de ses habitants, comme par les péripéties de son histoire, est à la fois la poésie et l'héroïsme des nations du Nord." The British Government was much relieved.

Lamartine's popularity grew apace. To an orator a revolution offers endless opportunities for making speeches, and he was delighted with his new audience, the Parisian mob. If early in life he had felt that he had an "instinct for the masses", he was now certain that this instinct would assure him a seat among the mighty immortals who had blazed new paths of human progress. What in comparison with this was the pale immortality of a poet? Lamartine had come to be intoxicated by popularity.

At the time that he was elected to the National Assembly, Lamartine was undoubtedly the most influential man in France. On him rested the hopes of the Republicans, who at first did not realize what a frail reed he was. Barely converted to republicanism, he suddenly found himself face to face with socialism, of whose ideas and tenets he had not the faintest notion. France was honey-combed with political societies opposed to the established order that had been driven under-

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ground by the hostility of the Government. The triumphant bourgeoisie, in 1830, had proclaimed freedom of speech and of the press, by which they meant freedom for everyone to agree with their views. Unlike the aristocrats and the workingmen, the bourgeoisie did not consider themselves a class; they were the "public". They therefore suppressed the journals and meetings of their opponents, the radicals and socialists, with moral fervor, feeling that in doing so they were rendering a public service. As a consequence, secret revolutionary societies were organized whose violent tendencies kept even pace with the Government's repressive measures. So numerous were these associations and so wide their ramifications that beneath the surface of society there existed an underground France where all sorts of conspiracies were hatched and rebellions fomented against the Government. The passionate hatred of the bourgeoisie generated in these political catacombs was to burst forth in the bloody June Days of 1848 and again in the Commune of 1871, each of which far surpassed the Reign of Terror in savagery and in loss of life.

With the overthrow of Louis Philippe, the Socialists came to the surface. They were divided into two factions, the one moderate, led by Louis Blanc, the other extreme, led by Louis Auguste Blanqui. Both, realizing that Lamartine was so deeply immersed in his own eloquence that he was unable to see the landmarks on the political horizon, determined to use him for their own ends by manipulating his "new audience", the Parisian mob, which was completely under their control.

Although there had been a union of Republicans and Socialists in the formation of the Provisional Government, it was destined to be short-lived. The determination of the Socialists to establish a government in the interest primarily of the working class was bound to lead to a clash with property-owning France, bourgeois and peasant. The signal was given by the abolition of the National Workshops. With the cry, "Du pain ou du plomb", the Parisian proletariat rose in insurrection. When the fighting first broke out Lamartine, relying upon his eloquence, rode up to the barricades at the head of the military. During the mêlée he was busy making speeches both to the soldiers and to the insurgents, urging them to peace and concord. One group of insurgents, overpowered by his eloquence, deserted their barricades, raided a florist's shop and covered his horse with the stolen flowers. But the situation soon passed beyond the reach of even Lamartine's eloquence. So fierce was the struggle that it took three days of the severest fighting to suppress it. Thousands fell dur-

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ing those terrible June Days, and several quarters of Paris were demolished. Among the ruins was Lamartine's political reputation. So completely discredited was he now in the eyes of all factions that from being the most popular man in France he became the must unpopular. As candidate for President in 1849 he received but a few thousand votes. Lamartine immediately sank into oblivion. He lived in retirement to the day of his death, forgotten by all save an intimate circle of friends.

Sad indeed was the fall of this hero to whom millions of Frenchmen had looked for salvation during the trying days of 1848. Lamartine's conduct during the crisis was such as to cause all parties to lose confidence in him. He tried to conciliate now the Republicans, now the Socialists, without presenting any definite program on which both might agree. No one knew where he stood or what he proposed to do. When accused of conspiring with the Socialists he replied, "Yes! I conspired with them, but as the lightning rod conspires with the thunderbolt." A contemporary critic thus describes Lamartine's vacillation: "To M. Marrast, he blamed M. Ledru-Rollin's revolutionary excesses; to M. Ledru-Rollin, he complained of M. Marrast's supineness. For each he had a good word, as also for every plan that held out promise. He flattered the National Guard and caressed Blanqui; he spared Sobrier and cajoled Caussidière. Placed on the apex of contentions, he delighted in the power this intermediary situation afforded for turning the scales; eager, moreover, to calm storms, and to act as a counterpoise and a pacificator, yet always with sufficient reserve that each expected to find in him the auxiliary of the morrow."

Students of nineteenth-century history will be grateful to Mr. Whitehouse for the full and vivid account that he gives of the February Revolution and of the part that Lamartine played in the critical situation of May–June, 1848. His biographer like his contemporaries attributes Lamartine's downfall to his desire to compromise. In one sense this is indeed a correct judgment; for had he been more of a man of "blood and iron" he would have weathered the storm and might have saved the Republic for sincere Republicans like himself and not for Louis Napoleon, who was already scheming to overthrow it. But Lamartine's vacillation, in the opinion of the writer, was not due to policy but to temperament. During his long and active political life he had all but deserted his muse. He had changed his activity from poetry to politics; he had changed his views from monarchism to republicanism; he had changed his audience from the Chamber to the

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street. But there was one thing that he could not change, and that was his temperament which remained the same throughout his life, as it does in every one else despite changes of ideas, habits and conditions. Lamertine's was the temperament of a Romantic poet, like that of Wordsworth, with whom he has frequently been compared. It was contemplative, not passionate; sentimental, not penetrating; idealistic, not practical. Such a man facing a great political crisis is bound to be destroyed because the forces that produce the crisis are beyond his comprehension. The poet lives, moves and has his being in a world quite different from the matter-of-fact world in which most of us live. He does not make mistakes; to do that implies at least a calculation of forces, though an erroneous one. Hence a poet can not succeed even in being a political failure; he can be a political tragedy, which Lamartine was. At no time in his political career was he the statesman that he and others imagined. He was still the poet of *Le lac* and the *Méditations*, an alien in the political world in which he appeared as a leader. Had he been a Romantic poet of the satanic school of Byron he might, in a moment of passion, have joined the insurgents in the street and died fighting on the barricades. But he was of the seraphic school of Wordsworth, and his "moment" was abnegation. He believed sincerely that he had sacrificed himself for the salvation of France.

After his downfall Lamartine retired to private life and lived in seclusion during the entire period of the Second Empire, little interested in public affairs. The ruin of his political hopes provoked in him not rancor or malice but a gentle sadness, since he blamed no one for his downfall. He lived at his beloved home, in Milly, a literary *roi en éxile*, surrounded by his many portraits and by a little group of admiring friends. Always lavish and extravagant, he now fell into serious financial difficulties. In order to extricate himself, he became a literary drudge, grinding out an endless number of essays, histories and literary criticisms of little or no value. He even made an undignified attempt to get up a popular subscription to pay his debts, but no one subscribed. The situation became so desperate that his estates were sold. He was saved from utter destitution by Napoleon III, through whose influence the aged poet was given a house in Paris. Poverty, neglect, grinding toil were the sad lot of Lamartine in his declining years. He died in 1869, and in compliance with his request he was buried simply and quietly. His death caused almost no comment. Truly did he once exclaim,

"J'ai vécu pour la foule, et je veux dormir seul."

J. SALWYN SCHAPIRO.

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AN ENGLISH HISTORY OF INDIA[1]

IT is difficult within the compass of a brief review to do justice to the numerous merits of Mr. Vincent A. Smith's latest book on India. It is a deeply learned work of more than 530,000 words, relating the history of a sub-continent from prehistoric times to the end of 1911. A great portion of it is a summary of the author's four previous books on India, *Asoka*, *The Early History of India*, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon* and *Akbar the Great Mogul*, each of which was the result of first-hand investigation conducted through a whole generation.

In the *Oxford History of India* the reader must not expect, however, to find the simplicity and unity that characterize the dynastic histories of China and Japan. The picture is as bewilderingly varied and diversified as that of Europe from the wars of the *Iliad* to the war against Germany. It is true, as the book before us reveals, that on various occasions *pax sarvabhaumica* (peace of the world-empire), the Indian analogue of *pax Romana*, was achieved within the boundaries of India. In fact, only once did Europe witness the formation of a unitary state with the size and area (page 105) of the Maurya Empire (B. C. 322–185). This was the Roman Empire at its zenith, during the second and third centuries A. D. Neither the heterogeneous European possessions of Charles V nor the ephemeral conquests of Napoleon acquired the dimensions of the Tughlak Empire of the fourteenth century (page 242) or of the Moghul Empire of the seventeenth (pages 365, 443) or of the Maratha Empire of the eighteenth (pages 460, 461). In terms of population and area, even the less extensive Goopta Empire of the fifth century (page 150), the Vardhana Empire of the seventh (page 166) and the Chola Empire of the eleventh (pages 211–212) were barely approached by the Empire of Charlemagne. Still it must be admitted, though not with the strictures passed by the author in his *Early History of India* (edition of 1914, pages 356–357), that the political unity of India even in British times is as great a myth as the political unity of Europe. It is a veritable "pluralistic universe" that the student has to contemplate at the threshold of Indian history in spite of the fundamental uniformity

[1] The Oxford History of India. By Vincent A. Smith. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1919.—xxiv, 816 pp.

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of the people's cultural "ideals". In trudging through Mr. Smith's jungle of facts, one needs, therefore, the patience and discrimination that are necessary for mastering the kaleidoscopic changes set forth in Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe*. The Indian continent exhibits the same development as the western half of Eur-Asia. It furnishes but another illustration of the universal sway of the Hobbesian "state of nature", the *matsya-nyaya* (or "logic of the fish"), as Hindu political philosophy calls it. The worst that can be said about the conflicting nationalities of India is not worse than the description which Depping gives in his *Histoire du commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe* (vol. ii, pages 207–214) of the relations between the Christians of Greece, Italy and Spain in the face of the Ottoman invasions. And this statement of a medieval anti-monarchist, cited in Engelbert's *De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii*, should give pause to an occidental student inclined to view the political mentality of the old Orient as something essentially distinctive: "The Roman Empire was and is always troubled by wars and rebellions; hardly ever were the gates of the temple of Janus shut; the greater number of Roman emperors have died violent deaths; and the Roman Empire has been the cause rather of disorder than of peace".

The sense of historical perspective is as a rule lacking in Mr. Smith's writings. In the present volume he has been led, in spite of himself (page xxiii), to interpret his entire story with an eye to the "event of 1757", as if the three or four thousand years of Hindu political life and Indo-Saracenic evolution were merely preliminary to Plassey! In this book (pages 67, 74, 332), as in the *Early History of India* (pages 112, 113, 119, 199), the author cannot think of Alexander's failure in India and the expulsion by the Hindus of Seleukos (B. C. 303) and Menander (B. C. 153) without a sigh, which, though subdued, is yet audible. Not until he reaches the capture of Goa by Albouquerque in 1510 does he seem to experience genuine relief. Let the occidental with a sense of humor imagine the naïve sentiments of an oriental historian, who, disappointed by the failure of the Persians at Marathon and Salamis and apprehensive for the prospects of a greater Asia, should hold his breath until Islam begins to flourish on European soil, until southeastern Europe is Mongolised to the Carpathian Mountains and the Turks are at the gates of Vienna. Mr. Smith's point of view is, however, one that naturally pervades the psychology of every European and American student of oriental culture and politics, sicklied o'er, as it is, with the dogma of the "superior race".

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But there is another prejudice in the *Oxford History*, that is born of the political propaganda on behalf of the vested interests and the powers that be, to which Mr. Smith's scholarship happens to be harnessed. The volume is to be memorized as a text-book by the undergraduates of British-Indian colleges, and the facts, therefore, have to be so manipulated that even he who runs may be convinced of the logic of the "white man's burden", and more specifically, of the righteousness of British imperialism in India. The author's treatment of the Mogul monarchy (pages 416–418) is an eminent execution in Rembrandtesque style, calculated to serve as a dismal background for the silver lining that occasionally sets off what Indian nationalists call the permanent cloud of the British régime. The sweeping estimate of Shivaji the Great and the Marathas as shameless robbers, ruffians, tyrants *etc.* (pages 436, 637) is a disgrace to British militarism, which should be able, now that a century has rolled away, to be generous to the most formidable enemy it ever encountered in the East. Altogether, in this volume, intended to be a handbook of loyalty, the reader will find the philosophy of Indian history summed up thus: The Hindus are caste-ridden and therefore inefficient as a fighting force; and the Mohammedans are at their best mere fanatics and normally the most unspeakable pests of humanity. This is the twofold message of the book to western scholars. The author's chivalrous appreciation of almost all the female rulers of India, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, such as Raziya, Durgavati, Chand Bibi, Ahalya Bai, must not, however, be ignored (pages 226, 347, 363, 577).

There are certain other defects, which are to be attributed to the author's conception of sociology, historiography and comparative politics. He is evidently inclined to read much of the liberties and institutions of the nineteenth century into the *Weltanschauung* of Periclean Athens, Imperial Rome and Catholic and feudal Europe. And so far as the Orient is concerned, his viewpoint does not seem to have advanced beyond the generalizations of Buckle, Hegel, Maine and Max Müller, in spite of his own monumental discoveries in Indian archaeology and epigraphy (pages xi, xii; *Akbar*, page 385; *Early History*, pages 357, 477).

One would expect to learn from a general history dealing with all ages what influence the people of India have exerted on the civilization of mankind. But the author does not even hint at the possible or actual contact of India with Babylonian and Pharaonic cultures. Chinese intercourse with the Hindus is, indeed, alluded to, but we do not learn that India gave China and Japan not only religion and

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mythology but dramaturgy, folklore, painting, logic, algebra and alchemy as well. Students of Chinese culture are well aware that the neo-Confucianism of the Sung period (960–1278), which furnishes even today the spiritual food of China's masses, was a direct product of the *Vikramadityan* renaissance which Fa Hien, Hiuen Thsang, Itsing and other Max Müllers of medieval China had imported from India into their native land. The influence of Hindu mathematics, medicine and chemistry on the Saracen capitals at Bagdad, Cairo and Cordova, and through them on the universities of medieval Europe, is a legitimate theme for the historian of India, but no aspect of the expansion of India finds a place in Mr. Smith's narrative. He does, indeed, say that the influence of New India on "Europe and the United States of America is no longer negligible" (page 737), but the impact of Indian thought on the modern world, which is made manifest in such publications as Victor Cousin's *Histoire de la philosophie* and exhibited in the influence of Kalidasa on Goethe and the early romanticists and of the *Geeta* on the transcendental movement in European-American poetry and fine arts deserves the special attention of the historian. Unfortunately, even the effects of the "discovery" of Sanskrit literature on the "comparative sciences" remain unnoticed in this comprehensive treatise. Nobody will charge the author with extreme phil-Hellenism, but he is still too greatly obsessed by the idea of "Greek influence on India" to estimate properly the reverse current, except possibly in the case of Gnosticism and neo-Platonism (pages 67, 134, 138–143, 160, 162–163; *Early History*, pp. 237–241, 306–307). The authorities cited in the *Oxford History*, *Akbar* and the *Early History* are so many and up-to-date that one notes with regret that the significance of Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (1915) and Mookerji's *History of Indian Shipping* (1910) in reëstimating the influence of Indian culture has been overlooked by Mr. Smith.

Altogether, the weaknesses of the author's methodology as a historian, *i. e.*, an "interpreter" of facts—this does not apply to his work as an archaeologist or antiquarian—would be felt by anybody familiar with the work of western historians who have written on any period of occidental civilization, *e. g.*, Bury's *History of Greece* or Mahaffy's *Greek Life and Thought* or Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*. It is not too much to say that an Indian scholar employing the same data used by Mr. Smith would produce a wholly different story, chapter by chapter.

The least satisfying section of the book is that dealing with the

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Sultans of Delhi (1200–1526). The author has exhausted the dictionary of abuse in vilifying the early Mohammedan rulers, who, as he has rightly pointed out, should not be called Pathan or Afghan, since they were all, with the exception of one House, Turks of various denominations. Students of medieval civilization know that the crusading zeal of Islam was felt to their sorrow by the Christian powers of Europe not less than by the people of India, and that for centuries the Mediterranean Sea was no less a Saracen lake than was the so-called Arabian Sea. The fact that they were conquered by Moslems is not more disgraceful to Hindus as a race than to Europeans. If Mr. Smith expects to foster Hindu hostility to the Moslem by raking up stories of religious persecution and wanton slaughter, he will be disappointed, for the oriental student can easily cite plenty of instances of inquisition, torture and pogroms in the annals of Christendom. The one effect that books iv and v of the *Oxford History* are sure to have on the mind of Young India is to increase the general unrest which the British are trying to allay by a thousand and one means. If there is one Mohammedan youth still left in India who is not anti-British at heart, Mr. Smith's volume is well suited to range him on the side of militant Indian nationalism. Nobody in the Mohammedan world, from Canton to Morocco, is prepared to swallow the characterization of the pioneers of Indian Islam, page after page, as worse than "ferocious beasts". In the name of "truth" our historian has dipped his pen in vitriol.

Notwithstanding his *ifs* and *buts* and general tendency to discount all "oriental" achievements as such, the author is on the whole sympathetic in his treatment of the Hindu period (see *e. g.*, *Early History*, pages 127, 298, 344). He is, in fact, its first and only historian and may even be accused by critics of partiality for the subject of his discoveries. And yet it is only fair to add that in his discussion of the political institutions of the Hindus he has scarcely done them justice (pages xi, xii). It is not necessary to wax enthusiastic, as Havell has done in his recent *History of Aryan Rule in India* or Banerjea in his *Public Administration in Ancient India*, over the so-called "village communities" or to accept at its face value every statement in the Sanskrit text-books that points toward a democratic polity. No one with a sense of humor would suggest that the British constitution was anticipated in the *mantri-parishat* (cabinet) of the Maurya monarchy or in the "five great assemblies" of the south Indian states, described in Pillai's *Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*. But on the strength of authentic inscriptions, like those of Ooshavadata at Nasik, of Rood-

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radamana in Gujarat, of the Chola Emperors and the Ceylonese dynasties as well as the Maurya *Artha-shastra* and edicts (see *Asoka*, chapters iv, v) and the reports of Megasthenes and Roman writers on Alexander, it is possible to claim that there is no European institution of any importance from Diocletian to Frederick the Great of which a counterpart is not to be found in India from B. C. 322 to A. D. 1300. The *Vehmgerichte* of the Teutons and Henry II's Assizes are anticipated in the *Oobbahika* of the Buddhist *Choollavagga* and the jury of Kautilyan land legislation. The finances of the state were not more centralized under Louis XIV than under Rajaraja the Great. It is high time to recognize the fact, as would be evident to persons utilizing the author's footnotes (pages xii, 68), that the Greek city republics which fell before the onslaughts of Macedonian gold and arms were not more "democratic" than the *ganas* or republics that opposed Alexander in in the Punjab or the commonwealths in Bihar, the president of one of which was the father of Shakya, the Buddha. Another fact that should also be known to every student of comparative politics is that neither in the theory of Hindu political philosophy nor in actual practice did the caste system affect the public services of India, civil or military, prior to the end of the thirteenth century.

The *Oxford History* is professedly a story of ruling houses and dynastic conflicts, but it is not exclusively a political and military history. There are occasional glimpses into economic conditions though these are designed mainly to throw light on the alleged misery and poverty of the people in pre-British times; every instance of famine, misrule and oppressive taxation under native rulers has been carefully noted. (By the bye, the author treats land revenue in Hindu and Mohammedan India as crown-rent without documentary evidence; Hopkins' analysis of land tenure in *India Old and New* is more accurate.) Standard books on the history of Sanskrit literature have been summarized to add to the readableness of the narrative. The references to early Tamil, Hindi, Bengali, Marathi and Urdu literature are also interesting and useful. And, since Mr. Smith has to his credit a *History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, which will remain a supplementary classic to Fergusson's older work, the reader of the *Oxford History* will find more than scrappy descriptions of the arts and crafts, especially the architectural monuments, distributed throughout its chapters. But as the author has neither the enthusiasm of a Guizot nor the scholarly eloquence of a John Richard Green for the theme of his investigations, his style seldom rises above that of the gazetteer-writer.

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Western scholars have often complained of the lack of a general history of India, even for the British period, especially one covering the recent era since the advent of the "industrial revolution" in Europe and America. The older authorities, like James Mill and Meadows Taylor, useful as far as they go, do not come near the present; and apart from the disconnected stories that can be pieced together from the volumes in the *Rulers of India Series* and the annual reports and gazetteers published by the Government of India, no student of modern civilization has been able to familiarize himself with the history of the Indian people under British rule during a period that has seen an Asian race emerge as a first-class power and challenge the domination of the East by the West. The last part of the present volume undertakes to supply this need. But the narrative unfortunately ceases to be the history of India and becomes instead the history of European rivalries and the survival of the fittest in the land of Hindus and Mohammedans. The western student, however, will be disappointed with the author's treatment, for he will not find here the philosophic view of England's expansion in India as a by-product of the whirlpool of world politics between 1688 and 1815 (including Great Britain's failure in the American colonies) which Seeley's lectures have made a matter of common knowledge for all modern history. The importance of India in its relation to British imperialism and the *status quo* in Asia, with which readers of Curzon's volumes on the Middle East and the Far East are familiar, has not left its stamp on the pages of the *Oxford History*. And, of course, the conditions since the Crimean War that eventually led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Anglo-French *Entente* and the Anglo-Russian Convention, with their momentous consequences for India, have not been analyzed by the author. The Egyptian and South African campaigns have been ignored, the Persian Gulf, Tibet and China touched upon only incidentally. To all intents and purposes, British India has been presented by the historian in a state of "splendid isolation". Even from the standpoint of the ruling race, the jewel of the Imperial crown is thus left an unintelligible phenomenon.

Under such circumstances it is too much to expect that the author should have watched the development of those intellectual and moral forces among the people of the country that make Young India a political "problem" of the British Empire as well as a sociological "study" in ethnic rejuvenation. The volume does not mention the activities of the National Congress and the Moslem League, two associations of Indian politicians eminently loyalist in their vision, not to speak of the

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"ideas of 1905", that body of philosophical radicalism which inaugurated a new era in the history of India that cannot be interpreted by any of the shibboleths of the preceding half-century. In fact, all that makes modern history worth reading, whether as an embodiment of the triumph of positivism and humanism or from the narrower angle of the expansion of Europe and America and the distinctive glory of *pax Britannica*, is virtually ignored. An American student who wishes to understand how much of modernism, *i. e.*, the spirit of science and democracy, has pervaded the life and thought of three hundred and fifteen million souls will find in Mr. Smith's history only a chronological summary of the wars (*minus* the intrigues) that governor after governor has embarked upon in quest of territorial aggrandizement and the principal statutes by which the administration of the country has been organized. He will learn nothing of the parliamentary legislation by which during two generations the indigenous industries of India were strangled in order to convert the dependency into a monopoly market for British manufactures and a helpless land of raw materials.

Mr. Smith has not forgotten, however, to discuss the comparative merits of Hastings, Wellesley, Dalhousie and Curzon nor to justify the conduct of every British exponent of *Machtpolitik*. Such phrases as "grave necessities of the situation", "urgent necessities of the time", a time when "everything was at stake", considerations of "high politics", "the agonies of millions of helpless peasants" (pages 538, 539, 581, 608) are invoked to whitewash or even defend all the "forward" policies of annexationists. Wellesley's "Foreign Office point of view", which expressed itself in the dictum that the "extension of direct British rule was an unquestionable benefit to any region annexed", is a first postulate with the author (pages 588, 604). No language, therefore, is stern enough, in his estimation, to condemn the occasional "pusillanimous policy of non-interference" (pages 581, 608).

Mr. Smith finds fault with Elphinstone for relying too much on the exaggerated reports of the Moslem chroniclers in regard to the events of medieval India (page 223). But he is guilty of a similar error not only in his acceptance of Persian and European material, whenever it suits his purpose to prove his thesis of the innate baseness of the Mohammedans (page 237), but also in his endorsement of every Tom, Dick and Harry who had anything to do with the East India Company's affairs as "a gentleman well qualified for governing", "noble", "polished" *etc.* (pages 339, 340, 383).

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While the efforts of the native rulers, the "country powers", to establish suzerainty and *pax sarva-bhaumica* are reckoned as nothing better than levying blackmail (page 469), every instance of British intrigue with "forgotten potentates" is a "deed of heroism" (page 471). Haidar Ali in the south and Ranjit Singh in the north are "fierce adventurers", Baji Rao II in the Deccan "a perjured vicious coward" (pages 544, 631). The author does not categorically uphold Clive's forgery and exactions (pages 492, 494), but, on the other hand, he seeks to explain away too easily the British failings of those "rough days" as inevitable because of the *milieu* of universal corruption among the Indians. The young men of India are invited to be loyal to the author's race by reading in his book that every Hindu and Mohammedan from 1757 to 1857 was an abominable wretch, a "scoundrel" and a "rascal" (pages 487–489, 497, 498, 506, 538–540, 545, 597, 637). In these intemperate expressions the writer has, however, only pandered to the false doctrine that in politics he who fails is an unscrupulous knave and he who succeeds a daring genius. He has therefore failed to see in the so-called Sepoy War of 1857, though abortive, and in the unrest since 1905, howsoever futile in the opinion of the military world, an expression of that most elemental feeling, the love of national independence, which surges even in oriental breasts. Not the least noticeable feature of the book is the fact that the author has not considered it worth while to mention a single great man of India since 1818. Does he wish the world to understand that *pax Britannica* breeds only Royal Bengals—or rather mere tame cats? There could be no worse impeachment of British rule.

Unbiased scholars in France, Germany, Japan, America and even in Great Britain cannot but feel that Mr. Smith has tried too palpably to create the impression that the British Empire in India is the only empire in the world's history which is not stained with the blood of innocents. The scientific poise of the *Oxford History* would have been obvious to critics if the author had only attempted to indicate that the process of imperial annexation could not have been "roses, roses all the way", and that the English people are "not too bright or good for human nature's daily food".

None the less, the value of the book is great. For one thing, it presents for the first time a comprehensive history of India, more or less encyclopedic in character, based on the results of the latest explorations and excavations. European and American sociologists who used to think of Hindu attainments in terms of the *Manu Samhita* and the

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alleged pessimism of Buddha and who know Mohammedan India only in the pages of Elphinstone have but to open Mr. Smith's volume to be struck by the enormous advance in indology that has been systematically effected by the painstaking researches of scholars of both hemispheres. The author himself is not only an honored collaborator and authority among that band, but as the whirligig of fortune would have it, he has been a direct stimulating power among the antiquarians and other intellectuals of India. As such he is, paradoxically enough, one of the unconscious spiritual fathers of that last wave of the "romantic movement" which is manifesting itself as Indian nationalism in the world forces of to-day.

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NEW YORK CITY.

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REVIEWS

Bolshevism. By JOHN SPARGO. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1919.—vi, 389 pp.

The Prelude to Bolshevism. By A. F. KERENSKY. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1919.—viii, 312 pp.

Russia 1914–1917. Memories and Impressions of War and Revolution. By GENERAL BASIL GOURKO. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.—xii, 409 pp.

Vers la Catastrophe Russe. By BORIS KRITCHEWSKY. Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1919.—271 pp.

The contrasts between the French Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century and the Russian Revolution of the beginning of the twentieth century are decided enough, but in one respect the two movements show a striking parallelism: each brought to the top, in a bitter war of factions, a radical minority who forced their extreme political and economic doctrines on their own countrymen at the point of the bayonet and raised a spectre of alarm for all the established governments of Europe. For forty years after the execution of Robespierre, monarchs and ministers (even those called "liberals") were appealing to the established traditions of the throne, the altar, the army, the school, for protection against the poisonous doctrine of the leveling "democracy" of Jacobinism. Whether Bolshevism is to play an analagous rôle in the life of the next generation is not for the historian to predict; but this much is certain: the governments of Europe and America are keenly aware of the possibility, even where they are not apprehensive of the probability, of such an event. The Red Terror is the bogey in the background of the minds of reformers and reactionaries alike, the spectre behind the turbulent scenes on the world stage today.

Although but two years have passed since Lenine and Trotzky put an end to the Kerensky régime and gained control of what remnants of organized government there were left in Petrograd and Moscow, the literature on Bolshevism is already extensive. It is almost entirely polemic or apologetic, too, as might be expected in view both of the fateful

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crisis for Russian democracy in the Bolshevist dictatorship, and of the challenge to the democracy of the world in the tyranny of the "purged" Soviet. We have impassioned pleas for the old order, like the Princess Radziwill's *The Firebrand of Bolshevism*, salutations of the new order, like Professor Ross' *Russia in Upheaval* or mere diatribes against the disorder, like Charles Edward Russell's *After the Whirlwind* and William Roscoe Thayer's *Volleys from a Non-Combatant;* and we have ardent apologetics on the other side, ranging from the products of Lenine's own prolific brain to the chirpings of the parlor Bolshevists of New York and Chicago. When writers on the Russian situation eschew polemics, it is generally not to return to the calm of historical narrative and the poise of historical criticism, but to make a tale of their own observations and impressions, like the Princess Cantacuzene's diary of *Revolutionary Days* or Carl Ackerman s *Trailing the Bolsheviki*.

A treatment of Bolshevism equally removed from passion and superficiality is found in Mr. John Spargo's volume. Not that the author is impartial to the degree of indifference. The sub-title of the book, characterizing Bolshevism as "the enemy of political and industrial democracy", shows the author's opinion of Lenine's program. But where other critics of Bolshevism rant and orate, Spargo quietly expounds the doctrine. Instead of quoting livid passages of denunciation from the enemies of Bolshevism, he takes the very words of Lenine and other Bolshevist leaders, in their numerous articles, speeches and proclamations, as the basis of his criticism. "Whoever turns to these pages", he says in the preface, "in the expectation of finding a sensational *exposure* of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki will be disappointed." His indictment is the more convincing as his argument is tempered.

The first third of the book is taken up with matter introductory to the appearance of the Bolsheviki, an historical sketch of revolutionary propaganda in Russia since the days of Nicholas I and a treatment in considerable detail of the revolution of 1905, the fortunes of the various Dumas and the effect of the early years of the war on the Russian people. Interesting as this narrative is, it compels the author to crowd the main subject of his book into far less space than it deserves and to confine the treatment of Bolshevism entirely to its effects on Russia itself. Of the tremendously important propaganda of Bolshevism in the mid-European countries; of the effect of the economic policy of the Allies toward the Provisional Government on the development of Bolshevism; of the bearing on Russian politics of the closing of markets which might have supported the Kerensky régime

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(through British "economic imperialism", as charged by Gregory Zilboorg); of the valiant attempts of the All-Russian Cooperative Union to rescue industrial Russia from Bolshevist sabotage—there is no mention. We wish that Mr. Spargo had used the pages given to his long "historical introduction" for the discussion of these and like topics.

As a socialist and a keen student of Karl Marx the author is concerned to show that the Bolshevist leaders' claim to the title of Marxian socialists is entirely unfounded. They represent rather the theories of Marx's impatient critics, the Weitlings, Kinkels and Williches, who wished to cut across the inevitable historical development of the proletariat by a *coup d'état* of the minority, relying on the weapons of reactionism. In their resort to armed conspiracy, the Bolshevists align themselves with the Black Hundreds of the old régime—and have even received recruits from them. In short "there is not much to choose between the ways of Stolypin and Von Plehve and those of the Lenine-Trotzky régime" (page 256).

One main object of Mr. Spargo's book is to disabuse American radicals of their sentimental sympathy with Bolshevism. He shows how the Bolsheviki have cynically betrayed every aspiration for real democracy and liberty in Russia. They were outvoted in every assembly or congress that could lay fair claim to be representative and then resorted to bayonets, like Napoleon at St. Cloud, to drive the delegates from their hall. They reproached the Kerensky government with delay in summoning the Constituent Assembly (a delay honestly needed for the guaranty of orderly and fair elections) and then themselves abolished the Assembly as tyrannically as the Czar's ministers dissolved Dumas. They won to their side certain sections of the peasants by outbidding Kerensky in the program of dividing the land and then cynically broke faith with them by taking over the great estates to be managed by officials as rapacious as the proprietors of the old régime—and less responsible. They covertly encouraged the conspiracy of Kornilov, against which Kerensky was struggling manfully, then loudly clamored against the "counter-revolution" which was developing "with the complicity of Kerensky acting in accord with the traitor Cadets". They preached pacifism and sowed the seeds of defeatism until they themselves got control of the military and then sneered at disarmanent as a "reactionary proposal" and spurned the quality of mercy as a puling weakness. "A suppressed class", wrote Lenine in May 1918, "which has no desire to learn the use of arms and bear arms deserves nothing else than to be treated as slaves. They must

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use these weapons not to shoot their brother workman in other countries, but to exterminate the bourgeoisie of their own country."

So the program of Bolshevism returns to a military despotism imposed by a minority in the name of eventual order—the perennial excuse of tyrants. "There is a Prussian quality in Lenine's philosophy", says Spargo: "He is the Treitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, unscrupulous, glorying in might, which is for him the only right." The remedy for the Bolshevist delusion is not in the counter attack of Kolchak, who may bring a Grand Duke into Petrograd on his crupper, but in "the removal of the oppression, poverty and servitude which produce the despair of soul that drives men to Bolshevism." But that goal is far distant in distracted Russia—and "practical" statesmen are more concerned with the next step.

A work of utterly different character from Spargo's is A. F. Kerensky's *The Prelude to Bolshevism*. The title of the book and the name of the author raise in the reader's mind the expectation of a first-hand account of the stormy summer and autumn months of 1917; for Kerensky was the outstanding figure in Russia from the reorganization of the Provisional Government in May to the Bolshevist *coup d' état* of November. But to the reader's great dissapointment the book turns out to be a tedious, verbose report of Kerensky's testimony before a Commission of Inquiry on the Kornilov conspiracy. It is as dull as the minutes of any court of record. The only relieving (or instructive) passages are explanatory historical digressions, *obiter dicta*, apologetically enclosed in brackets. The whole purpose of the book is to refute the charge that it was either the weakness or the treachery of the Kerensky government that led to the fateful triumph of the Reds. Bolshevism was indeed strengthened by the Kornilov revolt, which Lenine magnified into "a conspiracy of the whole of the bourgeoisie and of all the upper classes against democracy and the working masses". Kerensky was powerless to stem the tide of the "second revolution", partly because of incurable schism in the ranks of the socialists, partly for lack of the indispensable support of the Allies, who failed to realize in 1917 as they do now that the hope of democracy lay in the fortunes of the gifted young lawyer who rose in his brief tenure of power to the heights of unique leadership in Russia. For most readers outside of the storm area of Russian factions Kerensky's impassioned apologetic will seem superfluous. He had no need to clear his skirts of mud with which few if any believed them spattered.

In General Basil Gourko's reminiscences of the years 1914–1917 we have an admirable presentation of the war and the revolution from the

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standpoint of a moderate of the old régime; loyal to the Czar but not obsequious, while the fortunes of the Romanofs lasted; ready to obey the Provisional Goverment, so long as it was itself obedient to the supreme duty of the hour—the defense of Holy Russia against the Teutonic invasion. Gourko was a soldier of the first order, a cavalry commander in the East Prussian campaign which ended in the catastrophe of Tannenburg, general of the special wing of defense on the southern frontier (created in view of Rumania's entrance into the war), temporary chief of staff with the Emperor at Mohileff, and finally commander in chief of the armies of the western front until his imprisonment and exile by the Provisional Government for refusing to adopt policies which outraged his judgment as a soldier and his conscience as a patriot.

The reader is often wearied by long passages on the technique of campaigns and the intricate relations of a host of military officials whose names have no meaning or interest for him. But in the midst of this chaff there is much fine grain; Gourko's description of his intimate hours with the Czar, for example, is intensely interesting. So also are his pictures of the important political figures with whom he came into close contact: Rodzianko, Goutchkov, Kornilov, Protopopov and others. There is little discussion of political theory and no factional partisanship. Gourko has the soldier's pragmatic mind. Like Danton he is for conciliation and comprehension at home. "If blood is to be shed, let it be the blood of our foes." Every now and then he shows flashes of statesmanlike insight which remind one of the Mouniers and the Mirabeaus of the French Revolution. He struggled manfully against the demoralization of the army, and when he had to yield to the rising flood of demagogism, he retired in dignified quiet. His book is without a trace of rancor or revenge. It is a defense not of General Gourko but of beleaguered Russia.

Finally, in Boris Kritchewsky's *Vers la Catastrophe Russe* we have a series of letters written from Petrograd between October, 1917, and February, 1918, for the Parisian socialist newspaper *L'Humanité*, of which the lamented Jaurès was editor. The style is flamboyant, the presentation is journalistic and the scene is very much foreshortened. But the vivid pictures by an observer on the spot of what was happening in the streets of Petrograd and around the doors of St. Mary's and the Taurida will have a value for the historian. Especially interesting is Kritschewsky's constant return, for his Parisian readers, to the analogies and contrasts between the Russian Revolution and the French Revolutions, the Paris *jours* of 1792 and 1793 and Napoleon III's *coup*

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d'etat. Like Spargo, he sees in the program of Lenine a base betrayal of the Russian democracy, but while the American socialist says there is "little to choose between the ways of Stolypin and Von Plehve and those of the Lenine-Trotzky regime", the Russian socialist finds Stolypin even more considerate than the dictator of Bolshevism of the forms, at least, of law and order. Kritschewsky has no solution to offer and sees no hope, except in a definite victory of the Allies, for the restoration of peace in Russia. But victory has come since his last despairing letter was written, yet Lenine stills rules in Petrograd. Why, asks the author, has the Russian people suffered this new imposition of tyranny? Because, released only yesterday from the bonds of Czarism, it has not yet become either a nation or a conscious democracy.

D. S. MUZZEY.

Ireland and England. By EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER. New York, The Century Company, 1919.—ix, 504 pp.

Ireland's Fight for Freedom. By GEORGE CREEL. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1919.—xiv, 199 pp.

Rarely in the last half-century has the publication of a book in the United States rendered a greater service than that of Professor Turner's dispassionate, judicial and scholarly study of the subject about which so much falsehood has been uttered, commonly called the Irish Question. The spirit of the author is admirable. It is the spirit of a scholarly gentleman who seeks for the truth by laborious research and then presents it with as much kindly tact as he can use toward those whom the telling of the truth is sure to convict of misrepresentation or inflame to passionate recrimination. After reading the misleading utterances on the subject of Ireland by Barrington, Dr. Emmett, Clancy, Mitchell, Ford, Tynan, O'Connell, Devoy, Mrs. Green, Hackett, Sheehy-Skeffington, Tierney and many others, the earnest seeker after truth will rejoice that a scholar, trained in historical research, has at last written on the Irish Question. The few not very serious blemishes in the book are to be explained by the fact that the author is not as well grounded in law, political science, administration and taxation, subjects with which the Irish Question is closely interwoven, as he is in the canons of historical research and exposition. If he had been, he would not have missed the opportunity on page 145 of telling in a few lines the plain truth about the famous Report of the Childers Commission, which so many Irishmen, both Nationalists and Sinn-Feiners, roll as a sweet morsel under their tongues.

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On two questions of major importance, the Union of Great Britain and Ireland and the alleged over-taxation of Ireland, Professor Turner's book is neither wholly satisfactory nor wholly unsatisfactory. On page 111 occurs this passage, which the reviewer cannot accept: "The Union was carried in Ireland largely by intimidation and coercive persuasion and in the Irish Parliament by bribery, wholesale and open. It may be that the vote for the Union, as Lecky thought, was against the wishes of five-sixths of the people of Ireland." Professor Turner seems to be wholly ignorant of the great authority on Irish history, T. D. Ingram, who has refuted on this point both Lecky and his friend Barrington, whom Lecky carelessly accepted. Born in Donegal, Ingram, after a successful career as professor of law in India, devoted his last years to historical research of a high order. His *History of the Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland*, published in 1887, and *Critical Examination of Irish History*, published in 1900, seem to be unknown to Professor Turner. They are not referred to in the text or mentioned in the bibliography at the end of the volume. If Professor Turner consults these works before the second edition of his book appears, the reviewer feels sure that he will recast his treatment of the Act of Union. Ingram furnishes convincing evidence that the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Ireland and a large part of the laity heartily supported the Union. The representatives in the Irish Parliament from the great Roman Catholic centers, now seething with rebellion, such as Dublin, Cork, Galway and Limerick, all voted for the Union and were afterward elected members of the first Parliament of the United Kingdom by the same constituencies, where the Roman Catholics, then as now, had enormous majorities. The Presbyterians, too, heartily favored the Union. The chief opposition to it came from about one-half of the members of the English Church in Ireland. Ingram's conclusion is thus stated by himself in the preface to his History: "The whole inquiry has left a strong conviction on the author's mind that the Union was undertaken from the purest motives, that it was carried by fair and constitutional means, and that its final accomplishment was accompanied with the hearty assent and concurrence of the vast majority of the two peoples that dwelt in Ireland."

Professor Turner's treatment of the Report of the Childers Commission resembles the members of the Church at Laodicaea, being neither cold nor hot but in the nature of a compromise. The allegations of the Sinn-Feiners are set forth and then the assertions of their opponents; the author does not give his own opinion. After reading the incisive analysis of the report in Baden-Powell's *The Saving of Ireland*,

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he might revise what he has written on this subject. The recommendations of the report of a bare majority of the commission will not impress the trained economist because they are based upon a fallacy, *viz.*, that taxes are imposed upon geographical areas rather than on the people living in those areas. How absurd its recommendations are can easily be shown. A law based upon them would provide that if an Irish constituent of De Valera in East Clare should buy a quart of whiskey at home he would be required to pay as a tax only one-twentieth of the sum which he would have to pay if he were living in England as a constituent of T. P. O'Connor in the Scotland Division of Liverpool. In fact, Ireland is greatly favored under the present system of taxation.

Professor Turner's bibliography could be greatly improved by omissions and additions. Those absurd books of J. K. Maguire, *The King, the Kaiser and Irish Freedom* and *What Could Germany Do for Ireland* should find no place in the bibliography of any scholarly work. On the other hand, the volumes on the Irish Rebellion of 1916 and the Irish Convention of 1918 by Wells and Marlowe, the best books that have been published on their respective subjects, should by all means be included. One misses, too, that delightful brochure, *The Oppressed English*, by Ian Hay, which first brought the true light to many American minds. In the reviewer's opinion no one should write on the Irish Question until he has read the works of these five authors: T. D. Ingram, Sir George Baden-Powell, the Duke of Argyll, Michael J. F. McCarthy and F. Hugh O'Donnell. The last two are especially valuable for those who seek the truth about Sinn Fein Ireland. Both are Roman Catholic Irishmen who have the courage to speak the truth about some of their countrymen. Professor Turner mentions the latter's *History of the Irish Parliamentary Party*, but he should have included also his *The Ruin of Irish Education* and *Paraguay on Shannon*. Of the former's writings he should have mentioned *The Murdering Time or the Irish Rebellion, Irish Land and Irish Liberty, The Irish Roman Catholic University and the Jesuits, Priests and People in Ireland, Five Years in Ireland, The Non-Conformist Treason* and *Catholic Ireland and Protestant Scotland*. Some students of Irish history would dissent from Professor Turner's opinions of Mrs. Green's *Irish Nationality*, Francis Hackett's *Ireland* and John Leslie's *The Irish Issue in its American Aspect*.

It is to be regretted that the author has given his book a title which is really a misnomer, although it must be admitted that in choosing it he has followed in some degree Horace's adage, *usus norma loquendi*.

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But a scholar should not follow popular usage when it is misleading. The title should be *Ireland and Great Britain* or, better still, *Ireland and the United Kingdom*. One might as well speak of New York and the Philippines, meaning the United States and the Philippines, as of England and Ireland. Whatever may be alleged about the wrongs perpetrated on Ireland since 1700—and they have been enormously exaggerated—the voters in Scotland and Wales are just as much responsible for the acts of their representatives as are the voters in every state of our Union for the denial by the United States to the Philippines, Hawaii and Porto Rico, of the political and civil rights which for a century the Irishman has enjoyed in precisely the same measure as the Englishman, the Scotchman and the Welshman.

Professor Turner has given us, however, an eminently fair exposition of a most vexed and intricate question. And he has done more. In view of the part which the Irish Question has come to play in our national life it is not going too far to say that he has performed a national service in affording his fellow-countrymen the opportunity to learn truth where they have been ignorant and grossly deceived. To one who has himself been long a student of the Irish Question and who feels deeply that the American people should be told the truth about it, these words of Professor Turner are peculiarly moving:

> In America usually they tell nothing but Ireland's case, and it has been mentioned to me that my labor would be vain unless this work were thoroughly pro-Irish. I am unwilling to believe it, but in any event I am content if my account be fair and true. I can only say that I had rather the book were not written than that anything in it should even remotely injure the cause of one Irish peasant or a single laborer in Dublin; but I have been equally unwilling that England's difficulties and the good in her work and intention should fail to be stated in my pages.

Ireland's Fight for Freedom by Mr. George Creel is a book of entirely different character from Professor Turner's. Of the many misleading volumes on the Irish Question that have been published in the United States this is one of the worst. No publishing house careful of its reputation should have put its imprint on such a collection of palpably false statements. The literary adviser who recommended its publication did a wrong to his firm and an injustice to the reading public. On a question seething with passion a responsible publisher should not put forth a book unless it is based upon careful study and written in a spirit of fairness. Especially should he not do so if the question is one that may embitter international relations.

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Mr. Creel's book is a product of scissors and paste by a writer whose previous record as a journalist in no sense qualified him to speak with authority on a subject whose roots reach far back and which requires for adequate treatment a knowledge of law, political science and economics as well as of history. The book, though it gives no indication of the fact, is made up of reprints of a few hastily compiled newspaper articles printed last July in the *New York Journal*. Whoever bought those issues of Mr. Hearst's paper for a few cents bought all the matter for which the purchaser of this book will have to pay two dollars.

The title is, of course, thoroughly misleading. It should be *Sinn Fein's Fight for Independence*. Home Rule, freedom and independence are constantly used as though they were synonymous. Mr. Creel includes Butt, Parnell and Redmond as great leaders "in the fight for Irish independence", though of course they were Home Rulers and not Sinn Feiners as he implies. Especially amusing or exasperating, depending on the point of view, is the attempt to link up the cause of Sinn Fein with the American Revolution. Thirty-eight per cent. of Washington's army, Mr. Creel tells us, was Irish. Leaving aside the gross exaggeration of this statement, the informed reader will recall that the bulk of the Irish who served under Washington were Presbyterians. Were they living to-day in Ireland they would be found supporting Sir Edward Carson! The attempt to free Sinn Fein from the charge of a "German alliance" will not prove convincing to those who are familiar with the facts. But one wearies of cataloguing inaccuracies and misrepresentations in such a book as Mr. Creel has written.

GEORGE L. FOX.

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT.

China and the World-War. By W. REGINALD WHEELER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.—ix, 263 pp.

The author of this work is a member of the faculty of Hangchow College. The direct contact which he has thus had with China has stimulated his interest in her fate and in the future of her people. He writes in a spirit of fairness and sincerity, not as a partisan but as one who seeks a just solution of a complex problem in the interest of all concerned. Like many others, he hoped that the regenerative effects of the war would be apparent throughout the world; and, believing that "the standards and ideals formulated by the free peoples" contained the solution and the "only solution" of the momentous situation in the Far East, he particularly hoped that they would be applied in that quarter.

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What those "standards and ideals" were, he conceived to be both felicitously and authoritatively set forth and defined by President Wilson in the "Fourteen Points". Already China had, he tells us, been profoundly impressed by the declaration that "the world must be made safe for Democracy". In the "Fourteen Points" she hailed the detailed specification of that approaching consummation. This feeling indeed was not universal. There were doubters, skeptics, like Kang Yu-wei, who, although known at home as a reformer, ventured to declare: "There is no such thing as an army of righteousness which will come to the assistance of weak nations."

But the course of China was not to be determined by misgivings. President Wilson, says the author, had declared: "These issues must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest." China could ask nothing more. Confiding in the "standards and ideals" thus formulated, China declared war against Germany and Austria on August 14, 1917, as unconscious as was Mr. Wheeler, when he wrote his book, of the existence of the secret agreements of Great Britain, France and Italy with Japan for the disposal of Shantung. As Mr. Wheeler's volume was published in January, 1919, it furnishes us, beyond the disclosure of his expectations of a different result, no clue to his opinion of what was later done at Versailles.

Mr. Wheeler's text is supplemented with valuable appendices, containing the "Black-Dragon" statement of Japanese policy in China in 1914, the celebrated Twenty-one Demands in 1915, official statements relating to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in 1917, a summary of treaties and agreements referring to the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of China and the policy of the "open door," and a summary of treaties and agreements relating to Korea. It may be observed that Mr. Wheeler quotes (pages 165–167) a passage from the speech of Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister at Washington, at the Long Beach Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, May 31, 1917, on the question of China's relation to the world's future. No better statement of that question has ever been made, and Mr. Wheeler has done well to reproduce it. He has, indeed, made throughout a judicious and discriminating selection of materials, and has thus furnished to the reader in a comparatively small compass and with intelligent elucidation the basis of an informed judgment.

J. B. MOORE.

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Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism. By J. W. SCOTT. London, A. C. Black, Ltd., 1919.—215 pp.

Mr. Scott's very ingenious essay is really two books in one. The first is an excellent and, on the whole, convincing description of the realism of two such dissimilar thinkers as Bergson and Bertrand Russell; the second is an attempt to show that the movement toward social reconstruction which syndicalism vaguely typifies is the direct outcome of realistic philosophy. It must be said at once that the second part of Mr. Scott's book is of greatly inferior value to the first. Every philosopher who embarks upon political speculation runs the risk which attends an unnatural simplification of the data. This danger Mr. Scott has not escaped. Bergson is direct, non-rational, judges by immediate intuition; M. Sorel bids syndicalists to be direct, non-rational, intuitive. M. Sorel is a Bergsonian; therefore Bergson begot syndicalism. It would be admirable if political genealogies could be established in this appealing syllogistic fashion. But, in the first place, outside a handful of intellectuals, M. Sorel is unknown to the trade-union movement of France; and, in the second, M. Sorel, on similar Bergsonian principles, is now a monarchist clerical, still bidding his adherents be direct, non-rational and intuitive. Is this also Bergsonian? Yet if Mr. Scott would study the writings of Bourget and Charles Maurras, he would find that Comte, in a real sense the foster-child of idealist philosophy, is the spiritual parent of French monarchism.

Mr. Russell is in search of the principles of social reconstruction; and his philosophy consists in what Mr. Scott terms "the immediate apprehension of an externally-given." What he then does, still according to Mr. Scott, is "not to determine what certainly is, but how many things possibly may be." In the result Mr. Russell "empties the world" in a degree "which amounts to distortion." Exactly as the *Principia Mathematica* deprives us of our philosophical certainties, so does Mr. Russell's political work deprive us of our political certainties. The method in each case Mr. Scott takes to be the same. We are bidden to take what is "out there" as what is, with the result that all appears in a distorted perspective. So that when Mr. Russell, seeing the way in which personality is stunted by our institutions, makes havoc of them, Mr. Scott, rather after the manner of Berkeley, explains that Mr. Russell has not noticed what may be done with "the power to realize what we have already gained." Where Mr. Russell discusses the hideous results of the present laws of marriage,

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Mr. Scott, with all the virtue of a pious bachelor, bids us remember how many happy marriages there are. Where Mr. Russell indicates the danger of intellectual oppression, Mr. Scott explains that intellectual liberty does not of itself produce great men. Where, in fact, Mr. Russell urges us to the joy of creative discovery, Mr. Scott is always at hand to insist upon the beauty of what is old.

His attitude seems, apart from its philosophic foundations, to be based upon two assumptions: (1) Politics, he thinks, is a struggle for the general good; economics is but a private gamble. "Economic good", he writes, "is not essentially shareable . . . Political good, on the other hand, stands nearer to those spiritual things which spread undivided and operate unspent." Mr. Scott must indeed have lived far from the world if he thinks that such a divorce of political from economic processes is at all possible. Are the Factory Acts economic or political? In what category would he put the Trade Board Acts? More generally, does he seriously mean to separate justice from the field of economic discussion? Revolution and disintegration may, as he says, be associated with the economic motive; but the economic motive is itself only an index to impulses for which, in the governing class, Mr. Scott would find nothing but praise. And if one urges that all political struggles of importance are at bottom economic, what becomes of Mr. Scott's position?

(2) Mr. Scott has also a special hypothesis about the history of socialism. It began, in its Marxian form, as a logical account of the inevitable future. People took a prophecy for a revelation. But time showed clearly that Marx was mistaken, and "reformist" socialism became the accepted creed. Discontent with its progress resulted in a rejection of political action, and syndicalism is the natural outcome of that rejection. It is born of disappointment and bears upon its face the marks of grievance of which the first is hostility to reason. Such, in brief, is Mr. Scott's theory. But it does not betray a very profound acquaintance with the history of socialism. Rather does it read like a neat examination-summary of Mr. Kirkup's too well-known manual. The fact is that Marxian socialism, as an historic hypothesis, has had more justification from the events of the last four years than any other type. Certainly no one in the socialist camp, with the evidence at hand from Germany and Russia in revolution or from France and England in reconstruction, believes that simple political action has any final value. It is a literal fact that you cannot transform the state by the ballot-box; its processes are far too subtle for that. Every state reflects the power of its dominant economic class; and

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the over-simple refinements of the majority principle mean, in practice, only that the minority cannot rely upon the police. Nor has syndicalism any connection with theoretical socialism at its outset. The connection comes when men try, like Pelloutier, or Griffuelhes, to supply it with a philosophy. It is true enough that they express discontent with parliamentary government. But so does the average Englishman; and in America "politician" is a term of reproach. Marxism, at bottom, is only one of half-a-dozen radical solutions for a malady which, far from being confined to the disinherited, has been diagnosed by perfectly respectable conservatives like Mr. Wilson and Lord Hugh Cecil. The malady is the result of a world too big for its power of organization. So far from syndicalism being an antithesis of thought, it is one of the few intelligent efforts that have been made to discover a way out of our present *impasse*.

Mr. Scott, as a good pupil of Sir Henry Jones, is himself quite naturally an idealist, which has come to mean, politically, one who tacitly accepts things as they are with a pious hope that, if we do our duty, they may one day be better. It is, says Mr. Scott, "a policy of what has been called the intensive realization of life, a cultivation of the power to realize what we have already gained, rather than of the endless desire to be gaining more." This is an eloquent sentence; but for whom is Mr. Scott speaking in that "we"? Does he include therein the thirty per cent. whom, in London, Mr. Booth found living upon the verge of poverty? Does he include the one in three in London who die in workhouse, hospital or lunatic asylum? Does he include all outside that fraction of the population to whom an adequate education allows "the intensive realization of life"? Mr. Scott suffers from that woeful inability of his school to come to grips with the facts at issue. He is so content with the progress made that he is satisfied to await an Utopia which can hardly now be more than a few aeons distant. What does the "intensive realization of life" mean to the men and women whom Mr. and Mrs. Hammond have described in their two incomparable books, to the people of Mr. Paterson's *Across the Bridges* or to the slum-dwellers of Chicago and New York? Could we but annihilate time, idealism would be the most inevitable and luxurious of philosophies; but its incurable defect is that in its pursuit of the pure instance it loses hold of the world in which, as it happens, we live.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

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The Meaning of National Guilds. By M. B. RECKITT and C. E. BECKHOFER. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—xvi, 452 pp.

Guild socialism is rapidly becoming that type of political philosophy which it is indispensable to understand. It is an interesting attempt to combine the virtues of the socialistic outlook with the merits of syndicalism; but it omits from the one its over-emphasis upon the political state and from the other its virtual denial to the consumer of any share in government. It has thus an attractiveness for liberals who have become convinced from the pressure of events that some sort of collective-mindedness is the inevitable path of the future but yet shrink from that worship of the state to which socialism proper is prone. It has not, of course, any message of comfort to bring to admirers of the classic individualism. It starts out from a condemnation of the wages-system, and its primary article of faith is the necessity of destroying the capitalist state. In place of this it envisages a bipartite community, governed industrially by a system of guilds, which are hierarchically combined into a guilds congress, and politically by a system of geographical representation upon the lines of the House of Commons. The details of the adventure are, naturally enough, the subject of anxious debate. Some exponents, like Mr. Penty, reject altogether the continuance of large-scale industry and pin their hopes to a revival of the medieval handicraft system. Others, like Mr. Cole, assume that the great industry is inevitable and seek the means of combining efficiency with freedom.

This book is intended as an introduction to the subject for the general reader. It can hardly be said to have great value. Its philosophy seems to be derived mainly from Mr. Chesterton, and its history is a blind reproduction of Mr. Belloc's more fantastic nonsense. Where the book is general, its hypotheses are too large and too little documented to be of much assistance; where it is specific, anyone who has read Mr. G. D. H. Cole's admirable *Self-Government in Industry* will have nothing to learn from the author's suggestions. What is best in the book is its atmosphere of eager enthusiasm and its careful study of a too little known literature. But it is unoriginal; and the writers know too little of the general problems of the modern state to make their analysis of its future appear convincing.

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Authority in the Modern State. By HAROLD J. LASKI. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1919.—398 pp.

We stand on the threshold of one of those critical periods in the history of mankind when the most fundamental notions present themselves for analysis . . . it is already possible vaguely to discern the character of that dissatisfaction from which a new synthesis is ultimately born.

Since time began how many thoughtful men in their late twenties have stood on that old familiar threshold and detected the vague symptoms of a new synthesis! And what appalling bulk the literature of political science would present if all those millions of eager spirits had been endowed with Laski's industry and literary facility in promulgating the content of their visions!

In the present volume we have some little mangling of the corpse of pseudo-Austinism, which the author slew in his *Problem of Sovereignty* (*cf.* POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, volume xxxii, page 503); but the significant feature of the later work is the revelation and formal justification of the positive theory that is to supplant the superstition of the effete past. The essence of this theory is in substance this:

There is in human society no authority that is absolute or ultimate or paramount. The state in particular is none of these; for the state is really but the government, and the government is merely an association for the promotion of the social good in a limited sphere by a particular means. Many other kinds of association contribute to the social purpose, but the state "is not necessarily more in harmony with the end of society than a church or a trade union or a freemasons' lodge". In structure as in function society is federalistic. Authority therein is not hierarchical but coordinate. One association may be more important than another for the social purpose, but it is not likely to remain so. As conditions ceaselessly change the church may be at one time the most important, the trade union at another and then the freemasons' lodge. What seems particularly clear from Mr. Laski's work is that the state is the one form of association that must never be recognized as the most important. He admits that the state does in fact absorb the vital part of social power (page 81), but he finds in this a deplorable situation, to be ended as soon as possible.

The way out that appeals to him is not that of the anarchist, denying the need of any authority, or that of the syndicalist, limiting authority to the producers of wealth. Feeling that the most serious problem of the day is that touching the production of wealth, Laski thinks a solution will be reached somewhat as follows: The state will

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represent, as at present, the interest of consumption and will continue to act through an organ like the national legislature. By the side of this body will be set up a similar one to represent the interest of production and to be controlled by labor. Each will legislate in its appropriate sphere. Neither will be "uniquely sovereign". Disputes between the two will be decided by a specially dignified tribunal like the Supreme Court of the United States (page 88). To anyone who recalls how smoothly such a system as is here suggested operated in the Middle Age, when spiritual and secular interests were somewhat similarly organized, and in the middle 1800's, when the interests of North and South in the United States were in conflict, the promise of peace and order in Mr. Laski's proposal will make a peculiarly winning appeal.

It should be mentioned at once, however, that the author will not recognize that order is necessarily the primary end of law. "There are times", he says, "when the business of the law is not the maintenance of an old equilibrium but the creation of a new one" (page 379). And again, "We cannot wander on blindly with self-shut eyes, merely because order is convenient and rebellion attended by the gravest dangers" (page 375).

The last two quotations are both taken from the concluding essay of the volume. Here the author's thought takes a more radical trend than elsewhere in the book. His essay, "Administrative Syndicalism in France", is a thorough and sympathetic description of the movement of the officeholders (*fonctionnaires*) to organize in trade unions and to employ against their superiors in the service the same methods for raising wages, reducing labor *etc.* that are in vogue in private industry, including the strike. Mr. Laski greets this movement as a promising step toward the democratizing of administration, analogous to the democratizing of industry that he foresees in private enterprise. His essay is in every way highly illuminating.

The other three essays in the volume deal with three distinguished French thinkers of the post-revolutionary decades: Bonald, Lamennais and Royer-Collard. These men are used by Mr. Laski to furnish, not always very obviously, texts for the illustration of his particular doctrines; but the great usefulness of his full and scholarly treatment of their thought is in affording to American readers the chance to know about men who figure nowhere else in accessible English literature.

It must be said with regret that the proof-reading in this, as in the author's preceding volume, is scandalously bad. Indeed there is war-

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rant for the suspicion that Laski has taken over from his master Figgis the slovenliness that marred that admirable scholar's literary style. Certainly something more than oversight in proof-reading must account for the grotesque designation, on page 236, of the work in which Lamennais found happiness.

WILLIAM A. DUNNING.

Industry and Humanity: A Study in the Principles Underlying Industrial Reconstruction. By W. L. MACKENZIE KING. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.—xx, 567 pp.

Among the incidental benefits of the World War, causing its calamitous consequences to stand out only the more sharply, is the demonstration it has afforded that vast productive powers lie latent in every modern industrial community. It showed that when employers and employees put aside their differences and unite with singleness of purpose in the effort to turn out a maximum volume of munitions or other needed products, the results are truly astounding. Students of the labor problem, like Dr. Mackenzie King, knew that the wastes resulting from the present unsatisfactory organization of industry were great, but the war's proof that immense gains would result from a better organization has strengthened the faith that was in them and encouraged the publication of idealistic plans like that unfolded in the book under review.

Industry and Humanity is one of the best discussions of the labor problem that has yet appeared. The many important positions, including that of Canadian Minister of Labor, which the author has held, made it certain that any work from his pen would show full knowledge of the details of the problem and of the attempts that have been made to solve it. But the book is more than a well-ordered and well-informed discussion. It displays constructive insight of a high order and literary skill in the presentation of the argument that must go far to convince even the sceptical.

Believing that "the crux of the labor problem" lies "in the disappearance of the personal relationships between the parties to Industry" (page 57), the author outlines his remedy as follows:

> A solution of the problems of Industry is not to be looked for in forms; something more vital than forms is needed. A new spirit alone will suffice. This spirit must substitute Faith for Fear. It must breathe mutual confidence and constructive goodwill. It must be founded on a belief in an underlying order which presupposes between individuals, not conflict, but

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community of interest in all that pertains to human well-being. Once such a spirit is imparted to the parties to Industry, once it is accepted with all that it presages of individual gain and public service, Industry itself will win a new position and a new vitality, and prosperity will follow in the wake of industrial enterprise [page 148].

In the absence of this "mutual confidence and constructive goodwill", we have the situation that is only too familiar.

Denied opportunity to *co-operate* with Capital, Labor *competes* with Capital. Industrial life, instead of being in the nature of a partnership, becomes a sort of guerrilla warfare in which Capital seeks to increase profits at the expense of Labor, and Labor seeks to increase wages at the expense of Capital. On the one side is a misunderstanding of producing costs; on the other side, a misunderstanding of the workers' needs and aspirations. Strikes and lockouts are the crude expression of the resentment which this misunderstanding begets [pages 378–379].

But how develop the "new spirit" now so conspicuously absent? In brief, through an organization which shall realize in the industrial field Pym's formula for good political government: "That form of Government is best which doth actuate and dispose every part and member to the common good" (page 423). A first step in this direction is an accurate analysis of the factors which contribute to production. In addition to those commonly recognized in current discussion, *viz.*, labor, capital (including land) and management, the author emphasizes the importance of the "community".

It is the Community which provides the natural resources and powers that underlie all production. Individuals may acquire title by one means or another, but it is from the Community, and with the consent of the Community, that titles are held. It is the Community, organized in various ways, which maintains government and foreign relations, secures law and order, fosters the arts and inventions, aids education, breeds opinion and promotes, through concession or otherwise, the agencies of transportation, communication, credit, banking, and the like, without which any production save the most primitive, would be impossible. It is the Community which creates the demand for commodities and services, through which Labor is provided with remunerative employment, and Capital with a return upon its investment. Apart from the Community, inventive genius, organizing capacity, managerial or other ability would be of little value. Turn where one may, it is the Community that makes possible all of the activities of Industry, and helps to determine their value and scope [pages 133–136].

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Given the four factors in production enumerated, a partnership organization requires not only that these should receive each its fair share of the products of industry but that each should have a reasonable voice in deciding both what these shares shall be and how industry shall be organized and carried on for the common benefit. Dr. King thus describes the prevailing organization:

> Instead of a united control expressive of a harmony of interests among partners, it is a struggle for supremacy of control. . . . A militant Trade-unionism claims exclusive right to speak in the name of Labor and to enforce its newly acquired control by the weapon of the strike, regardless altogether of the interest and well-being of Capital, Management and Community. An autocratic management seeks the maintenance of its accustomed control by exercising arbitrary powers . . . while denying to Labor the right of membership in associations for its self-protection. A defiant Capitalism asserts its privileged control by thwarting the principle of Collective Bargaining. . . . Finally, a State, becoming more and more socialistic, proclaims the Community's long neglected authority by a control which Capital and Management feel is indifferent to their functions [pages 380–381].

Instead of this struggle for autocratic control by one of the factors we must have an organization that insures joint control. Management should continue to be exercised by those best qualified for this function, but above management should be a directorate in which, along with it, labor, capital and the community are equally represented. In developing and defending this proposal, constant reference is made to parallels in the political field. Industrial democracy, or responsible self-government in industry, must be sought along the same path that has led to responsible self-government in politics. In his concluding chapter Dr. King further strengthens his argument by describing at some length the plan for labor representation introduced by the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company and the joint councils recommended by the Whitely Committee in England and already introduced in several important British trades. In the development of joint control he advocates the fullest use of existing organizations both on the side of labor and on that of the employers and insists that one of the essential provisions in the statement of principles, Labor's Magna Charta, that must precede the adoption of a plan of joint control is recognition of labor's right to membership in labor organizations of its own choosing.

Dr. King does not contend that there is some discoverable economic law that decrees precisely what share of the product each of the four

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factors in production should receive. On the contrary, he says, following Jevons, "where each is necessary to the other, and all are essential and interdependent, it is impossible to say what the relative contributions are, and to accord differences of degree and precedence" (page 257). This being the case, it might be objected that with or without joint control there will still be a struggle to determine what share of the joint product each is to receive. The difference will be, in the author's view, that with fair recognition of labor's right to an equal voice in the decision, reliance in this struggle will no longer be on force but on reason. Next to outright injustice in labor's bill of grievances, he points out, is lack of recognition. With recognition and a voice in the decision there will come, he believes, the "mutual confidence and constructive goodwill" so much needed.

To make more certain the triumph of reason and justice in the settlement of disputes he urges eloquently the adoption of Canada's plan, of which he was the author, for the compulsory investigation of industrial disputes before strikes or lockouts are permitted to embitter relations between the disputants. The superiority of this plan, with its strong inducement to conciliation, over the Australasian system of compulsory arbitration is explained, and many of the arguments against it are conclusively answered. With it as a check on hasty and ill-considered action and the reports of the investigating boards as guides to public opinion, he thinks that orderly progress would be assured toward a reasonable solution of issues as they arise. How far this solution would lead in the direction of the absorption by the community of all unearned incomes, the nationalization of essential monopolistic industries or other fundamental changes, he does not attempt to forecast, but his sympathy is clearly indicated with all progressive changes that promise improvement in the common lot.

In this outline of Dr. King's constructive proposals, scant justice is done to the descriptive and critical portions of his book. In the chapters on "The Principles Underlying Peace", "Work" and "Health" there are penetrating discussions of different plans of conciliation and arbitration, wage-payment and profit-sharing, trade-unionism, industrial copartnership, socialism and syndicalism and social insurance. Those on "Representation and Industry" and "Government in Industry" contain excellent treatments of these topics. Finally, in an appendix, charts are given showing the relation among the different groups and influences which shape industrial society, which attest the thoroughness with which every aspect of the subject has been thought

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out. All in all, this is a book that can be warmly commended to all readers interested in the labor problem and that is full of promise of permanent benefit from some of the lessons taught by the war.

HENRY R. SEAGER.

Industrial Justice through Banking Reform. By HENRY MEULEN. London, Richard S. Janes, 1917.—xi, 324 pp.

Mr. Meulen's object in preparing this book was "to show that a paper exchange medium, issued by private bankers, is the natural outcome of a movement which has been proceeding from the earliest days of the division of labor, and that an essential feature of the movement has been the gradual displacement of a commodity exchange medium by a circulating paper evidence of mutual trust." The book begins with an attack on the socialistic theory of economic organization and a statement of the central disadvantage of state socialism, which, the author thinks, is "the unresponsive nature of its mechanism." Mr. Meulen then proceeds to restate the social problem, which, he says, is essentially the excess of labor supply over demand, resulting in a general glut of goods in the hands of producers. The introduction of cheaper credit into an industrial system stimulates consuming power and then tends to use up the productive power of the community which called the credit into existence. Hence any restriction which causes the provision of credit to lag behind the desire to exchange goods already produced tends to raise the price of credit. A supply of credit adequate to the needs of producers enables consumption to keep pace with production.

This general view of the social problem, so called, is followed by a chapter on the principles of exchange, which covers more or less familiar ground but concludes with the general forecast that "the battle of the future will be fought around the question whether the introduction of a commodity medium is necessary to the exchange of goods." The history of exchange is then reviewed, and an outline of the British Bank Act of 1844 and its effects is presented. This brings Mr. Meulen to an examination of present economic "symptoms" which he believes to be in part the result of unsatisfactory credit or, as he expresses it, "the fundamental basis of credit restriction." He concludes that there is something wrong with the channel through which labor and capital meet, namely, banking.

It is not very easy to find out what Mr. Meulen thinks is wrong with banking at the present time except in so far as the difficulty may be

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described in the general expression "restriction of credit", but eventually it appears that the "injection of fresh credit" into the modern industrial system "is an injection of fresh purchasing power", while expensive credit results in unwillingness to use it, so that it will not be thus "injected" when needed. Unforeseen withdrawal and exportation of the country's gold reserves causes trouble and leads to credit restriction. Help could be obtained by relieving banks of the necessity of maintaining fixed cash reserves and by developing a greater degree of "confidence". An invariable unit of value, it is urged, would likewise be desirable. The credit restrictions which to-day prevent the due utilization of any fresh productive ability, says Mr. Meulen, furnish the key to the problem since banks have been prevented from bringing into commerce the present worth of a future profit. With a flexible credit system any appearance of cheap labor would immediately cause a general increase of industry. All this is decidedly vague, and it would be anything but easy to state expressly how the author would proceed in his elimination of present restrictions on credit.

On the whole, *Industrial Justice through Banking Reform* is a book which contains some information and many interesting and rather acute observations. The volume is one of a group which has been produced by the present disturbances to credit and which is based on the theory that some artificial means can be found to rectify or improve a state of things essentially due to misuse or abuse of a banking or money mechanism which, if properly treated, would have yielded satisfactory results. The idea of an invariable standard of value, attractive as it is, is not one that is free from objection and certainly not one that can be applied as a substitute for banking and credit soundness. "Industrial justice" is, however, altogether too vague and pointless as an object of public policy, to afford very much danger from the standpoint of immediate results.

H. PARKER WILLIS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

The Food Problem. By VERNON KELLOGG and ALONZO E. TAYLOR. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918.—xiii, 213 pp.

This book will continue to be useful for years to come notwithstanding the fact that it was written before the war came to an end. Its value consists in the general discussion of the fundamentals of the food problem in time of international war and in the account of the

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plans followed by different nations in the solution of the problem. The general setting of the subject is given as an introduction by Herbert Hoover.

The authors in the first chapter give statistics showing the situation with respect to the food supply among the allied nations. The relative importance of animal and vegetable foods receives attention. The question of food prices comes in for prominent mention, and it is admitted that price control is a problem as yet largely unsolved since commodities are bound to respond to a great extent to economic forces which are not easily guided or checked by government action. It is admitted that prices in the allied countries rose a full hundred per cent. during the first three years of the war, but it is held that food control ought to mean that these prices are not "unnecessarily high", that is to say, that the opportunity which the abnormal times of war offer to the shrewd speculator are limited by action of the government.

The second half of the book has to do with the technology of food use, which is dealt with in a manner that can be understood by non-technical readers. The physiology and the sociology of nutrition are the main headings used in the treatment of this part of the work. Under the latter of these topics is discussed the effect of food shortage on the nation as a whole. This is viewed from the standpoint of the different groups within the whole. There are many divisions: those based on occupations, as the farmers, the laboring classes, the city people; those based on age, as the children, the aged, the invalids. However, these classes of people are dealt with incidentally under the headings pertaining to the various kinds of food. One after another of the principal foods is viewed from the standpoint of its importance in keeping people well fed and satisfied. Economy in producing foods and particularly in transporting them is given prominence.

It is not the intention of the authors to prescribe a program for carrying all these principles into effect. Rather it appears to be their aim to impress upon the reader the advisability of adopting the programs which seem feasible in order to produce the desired results, trusting to the patriotism and ingenuity of the people concerned.

The authors have done well in steering clear of misstatements concerning the many phases of foods and food production. Nevertheless, the impression left concerning the sources of dairy feeds is hardly correct, and the lay mind will be slow to agree that margarine is not a substitute for butter. All in all, the authors show a remarkable familiarity with food problems and a keen insight into the social side of the question.

B. H. HIBBARD.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.

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The Expansion of Europe (1415–1789): A History of the Foundations of the Modern World. By WILBUR CORTEZ ABBOTT. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1918.—Two volumes: xxi, 512; xiii, 463 pp.

In his preface to these volumes Professor Abbott states that his purpose in writing them was to combine "three elements which need correlation to provide a proper basis for the understanding of what has happened during the past five hundred years, and of the situation which confronts us today." The elements that he has in mind are: "the connection of the social, economic and intellectual development of European peoples with their political affairs"; "the inclusion of the progress of events among the peoples of eastern Europe, and of the activities of Europeans beyond the sea"; and "the relation of the past to the present—the way in which the various factors of modern life came into the current of European thought and practice, and how they developed into the forms with which we are familiar."

Whatever the purpose of the author, he has produced substantially a treatise on narrative political history, on what might be called the "self-enlargement" of Europe in those phases of life and thought which are connoted by the word "civilization", and on the process of European colonization. Through them he has endeavored to trace the origins of the modern world, both European and Europeanized, measuring the successive stages in the growth of civilization in Europe at intervals of approximately half a century. Whether such a conception of the expansion of Europe is tenable or not must depend upon the point of view that is taken. The reviewer himself is unable to accept it.

As commonly used, the word "expansion", as an historical term applicable to the development of modern Europe, refers to the acquisition of territory and to the diffusion of a type of civilization beyond the physical borders of Europe itself. In this sense it would mean not what went on exclusively within that continent and its adjacent islands but what occurred outside, so far as Europeans were concerned in it. Only by a violent stretch of the imagination can "expansion" be made to connote primarily phenomena peculiar to Europe proper and secondarily those associated with European activities abroad. To intercalate the story of European enterprise overseas into a work devoted very largely to matters more or less extraneous to that theme is permissible enough if the resultant product be given an appropriate designation. But to call what is essentially a process of internal

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development the "expansion of Europe" is surely a misnomer. The logic of the situation, indeed, is rendered all the more perplexing by virtue of the fact that the author regards civilization rather than politics as his major theme.

Now, while it is true that the "expansion of Europe" is taken ordinarily to mean the acquisition of territory and the diffusion of a type of civilization beyond the physical borders of Europe itself, the concept is susceptible of a much broader interpretation without straining the accepted definition unduly. The latter of the two courses of action obviously is the one of chief importance. Moreover, it should be made to include not merely the imparting of that civilization but the actual effects of it on the lands and peoples concerned. These effects, in turn, would apply to the Europeans themselves, to the areas in which they settled and to the native inhabitants of such areas. Quite as legitimately, on the other hand, the idea of the "expansion of Europe" should be made to connote also the reflex influence of the contact with non-European lands and peoples upon the life and thought of Europe itself. In short, it means constructively what the Europeans have given and what they have received for the weal or woe of civilization the world over.

By comprehending in his survey of the expansion of Europe elements extraneous to it and by allotting to them so great an amount of space Professor Abbott has, in effect, limited his field of vision beyond the confines of that continent to little more than an account of European colonization. Except for his employment of generalizations applied to the very period in which given events occurred and unsupported by concrete contemporary evidence, he has not in reality perceived the blend of European with non-European in the formation of our present-day life and thought, much less traced it from its sources. Neither has he observed how mutual the influence exerted by the contact of the two elements was or how potent the course of action and reaction between Europe and the rest of the world for advantage or detriment to both. For example, alluding to the reaction upon Europe, he asserts that the effect of the first voyage of Columbus "upon European thought was immediate and profound", in that a "thousand years of ecclesiastical conceptions of earth and man fell at a stroke" (I, page 99). How could this have been the case at a time when, as the author admits on the very same page, "the truth was not yet known"? Statements of the sort are unsusceptible of proof, even if their meaning were altogether intelligible.

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Apart from these characteristics of the work, which relate more particularly to a definition of the phrase "expansion of Europe", there are certain other features of it which suggest comment. To begin with, the author appears to have made no especial study of comparative colonization. Had he done so, he might have fallen into fewer errors and misconceptions—notably in regard to Hispanic America. It was unwise to reproduce Jacobs' sketch maps without ascertaining in advance their reliability. As the entire treatise is much more than an account of European colonization, so it is much less than a description of the foundations of the modern world; for, while it narrates the history of Europe proper, its chronological scope goes no farther back than the later Middle Ages. If the present two volumes are to be supplemented by a third "which will continue the narrative from the period of the French Revolution to the present time" (I, page ix), the author's sense of proportion is open to question. Were what has taken place during the hundred and twenty years since that event to be accorded anything like the recognition in space which has been given to the period 1415–1789, he would need to write at least four volumes instead of one. In many places, furthermore, a perusal of the text leaves the impression that what it furnishes is annals of politics and culture rather than a compactly organized presentation of historical causes, processes and consequences. This is noticeably the case when the author strives to demonstrate the existence of some vital relationship between oversea activities and contemporaneous happenings in Europe, although the association may have been one of coincidence merely in point of time.

A tendency to obscureness is another feature of the work. The subject matter of the two opening chapters covers chronologically and materially much the same ground. The reader is often at a loss to know just when the Middle Ages ended, since he finds their termination made to range anywhere from the beginning of the thirteenth century to the early seventeenth, without a satisfactory explanation of the divergence. He will observe that a given date or epoch has been chosen as a starting point, only to discover that much of the text that follows it deals with conditions long antecedent. Conversely, he is quite as much puzzled about the practice of alluding to a celebrity like Giordano Bruno a hundred pages and more before his place in the realm of thought is estimated and of referring to a remote incident like the "height of English attack" on Buenos Aires hundreds of years before it occurred. One cannot always be sure, in fact, of just what century the author has in mind at any particular stage of the

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discussion, even with the aid of marginal dates. Passing mention, finally, of personages like Aurispa, Aphra Behn and Chaha Dingaan, would seem to suggest less of a desirability on the reader's part of "looking them up" than of a possible fear on the author's part lest he might omit something.

In the opinion of the reviewer, nevertheless, Professor Abbott has written what is probably the best general history of European civilization, within the period chosen, which has appeared as yet in English. It aims to establish a new and rightful standard for the composition of historical manuals, in that it makes life and thought and not politics and war, the theme of major interest. It excels all previous works that have borne the same title or have purported to treat the subject it represents. Fundamentally, however, it does not deal with the "expansion of Europe."

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD.

A History of British Socialism. By M. BEER. Volume I. London, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1919.—xxi, 361 pp.

An age that is as fertile in socialistic theorizing and experiment as our own cannot afford to be uninterested in the history of socialistic thought. Mr. Max Beer, in the first volume of his *History of British Socialism*, recounts a very important part of this history. He traces the development of communistic and socialistic opinion and argument in England from "earliest times" to the thirties of the nineteenth century, leaving for a second volume, soon to be published, the continuation of the story to the early years of the twentieth. The work is based upon the author's *Geschichte des Sozialismus in England*, which was published in 1912.

In the first part of the volume Mr. Beer deals with English communistic thought in the pre-industrial era. Having long failed to give the industrial revolution its due we are now in some danger of running to the opposite extreme and viewing everything before the days of Arkwright and Watt as archaic. Wycliffe and John Ball, Sir Thomas More and Gerrard Winstanley are far enough removed from the smoke and roar of modern industry, but they have this in common with the modern socialist: they were protesting, all and several, against the evils of private property and individualistic economy. In the second and longer part of the volume Mr. Beer expounds modern English socialistic thought as it developed under stress of the transformation of industry that began in the last half of the eighteenth century.

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More than thirty years ago an Austrian jurist, Dr. Anton Menger, traced the historical development of the central economic tenet of modern proletarian socialism, the right of the worker to the whole produce of his labor, in a work entitled *Das Recht auf den Vollen Arbeitsertrag in Geschichtlicher Darstellung*. He argued that there were brave men before Agamemnon and held that the doctrines of Marx were based upon the writings of a group of earlier English thinkers, to three of whom, Godwin, Charles Hall and William Thompson, he devoted separate sections of his book. Godwin he regarded as the first scientific socialist of modern times, and from Thompson he asserted that the later French and German socialists had derived their opinions. In fact Menger went near to accusing Marx of plagiarism. In 1889 his book was published in English translation with an introduction by Professor H. S. Foxwell, which analyzed the thought of the early English socialists: Godwin, Charles Hall, William Thompson, John Gray, Thomas Hodgskin and John Francis Bray. Foxwell agreed fully with Menger, whose book, he said, "conclusively proves that all the fundamental ideas of modern revolutionary socialism, and especially of the Marxian socialism, can be definitely traced to English sources." The reason why the English socialist pioneers had been neglected and forgotten in England, he said, was because English economists after Ricardo devoted themselves largely to "sterile logomachy and academic hair-splitting" and because the early, home-bred English socialism declined rapidly after the middle of the century. The later socialist movement in England dating from the eighties was exotic and inspired by Marx and Lassalle and Henry George. "It seemed to have altogether lost touch with the parent school of Thompson and his contempories." It was Foxwell who revived for English economists the writings of the early English socialists. But Mr. R. H. Tawney, who contributes an introduction to Mr. Beer's work, is in error when he says that no other adequate exposition of their writings has appeared in English. Miss Esther Lowenthal's *Ricardian Socialists*, published in 1911, contains a detailed analysis of the theories of Thompson, Gray, Hodgskin and Bray.

Mr. Beer places these and other early English critics of capitalistic industry in their historical setting and makes clear their place in the development of socialistic thought. He shows the influence upon them of Owen and Ricardo and their relation to the Chartist movement and the syndicalist trade-unionism that followed the reform of 1832. The story of the labor movement immediately after the Reform Act, when class warfare was the order of the day and the merits of the "general

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strike" were diligently canvassed, sounds strangely modern. In view of current interest in soviet theories the following extract taken by Mr. Beer from an issue of *The Crisis*, a proletarian organ, in 1834 deserves to be quoted:

> We have never yet had a House of Commons. The only House of Commons is a House of Trades, and that is only just beginning to be formed. We shall have a new set of boroughs when the unions are organized: every trade shall be a borough, and every trade shall have a council of representatives to conducts its affairs.

Perhaps Mr. Beer is right in saying, "The English intellect, from its sheer recklessness, is essentially revolutionary . . . when the dynamic forces of society are vehemently asserting themselves, the English are apt to throw their mental ballast overboard and take the lead in revolutionary thought and action."

R. L. SCHUYLER.

From Pericles to Philip. By T. R. GLOVER. New York. The Macmillan Company, 1917.—xi, 405 pp.

The title of this volume indicates at once what the author had in mind in writing it. Pericles stands for everyone as the personification of Athens at the height of its glory as a republic from a political point of view, as a school of all Hellas from an intellectual point of view, as the cynosure of all eyes and the model for all from an artistic and literary point of view. Philip, on the other hand, represents a larger Hellas, no longer a city-state but a nation, with political hegemony exercised by a national monarchy. The author has done well in choosing as his period that which nine out of ten people have in mind when they think of Greece or the Greeks.

There is no doubt that this period has been treated before by competent scholars; both Dr. Glover's text and notes make ample acknowledgment of the work and the views of previous writers. The author does not adopt an unduly critical attitude. He comes upon the field frankly as an earnest—and certainly a doughty—champion of things Greek and contributes his meed of assistance to his fellow students, not as a pleading advocate but as a fighting scholar.

Four chapters, one third of the book, are devoted to Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon, the three historians of the period. Professor J. B. Bury's *Ancient Greek Historians* seemed at the time of its publication to be the last word on its subject. But Dr. Glover has so ingeniously intertwined what the historians have to say for themselves

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and what he has to say about them that he has added to the high estimation in which they are held by humanizing them and by showing through them the fulness of life of the Greeks in a deeper and broader way.

The author is on his mettle in the chapter entitled "The Age of Pericles". In it he compares Periclean Greece with Elizabethan England and then brings the reader to a full realization that in the age of Pericles impulses springing from individualistic development were active that carried poetry, art, architecture, history, philosophy and music to the highest point of attainment. No such perfection of result has ever been achieved at any other period in the history of the world. Pericles attributed it all to the Athenian democracy and public spirit.

It is generally acknowledged that Thucydides is responsible for the amount of space given in the older histories of Greece to the Peloponnesian War. It has recently been the fashion to pay less attention to that war, and rightly so. At the same time, as Dr. Glover makes clear, it did alter the economic condition of all Greece and even "changed the very axioms of political thought." When Athens embarked on the Peloponnesian War, it was totally unaware of the pitfalls that lie alike before success or failure in war. Pericles had been for years the one man of Athens, but he had no experienced men of his own caliber who could carry on if he died. His strategy for the war was good, although over hard on the country citizen whose land would be ravaged by annual Spartan raids, and it was based on sound knowledge of Athenian finances and the possibility of food supply and of Spartan inability to finance a long war. But with his death in the second year of the war the state could fall back only upon its supposedly perfect democracy. It had, however, no representative system, no cabinet, no diplomatic service, no budget, no real responsibility; in a word, it had none of the checks which we take for granted as inherent in a democracy. Yet the very fact that for twenty-seven years Athens weathered demagogues and traitors, disasters and follies, shows how much strength really is inherent in even a primitive democracy lacking previous experience both of itself and of others.

There are two chapters in the book which treat new subjects with refreshing vigor. One brings Persia into more prominence than it has previously been accorded in connection with Greek history; the other, "The House of Pasion", gives a rather startling survey of the relations between Athenian citizens and Piraean newly rich metics and introduces the concomitant sombre element of a reconstruction period.

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The book has some faults which a frank review must mention, though they are not serious. There is an overdeveloped tendency to bring into the text out of their proper place in the notes the names of too many modern writers. The author is not too British, for he is guilty of only a few real insularisms; yet there are several places where one pauses to wonder whether the paw of the British lion is not peeping from beneath the skirt of scholastic respectability (see, for example, page 38). The author has not solved the difficulty regarding the spelling of proper names. It is wholly capricious to write the name *Alcibiades* with a *c* and *Antalkidas* with a *k;* or *Hecataios* on the same page with the Latinized *Herodotus* or the Anglicized *Hesiod* and *Homer;* or the oft-repeated *Peiraieus* when there are *Piräeus*, *Peiraeus* and *Piraeus* from which to choose. Outside of technical works it is not desirable to go far from the Latinized forms of Greek words.

The last chapter in the book, "Under Which King, Bezonian?" is much below the standard of the others. The author has too much to say to avoid detail, with the result that the pages are overcrowded and the reader feels that the author has for the moment forgotten the restraint which is so peculiarly classical Greek. Or is a plethora of detail the acme of art where an author is describing the period when Greek restraint had broken down?

All in all, however, *From Pericles to Philip* is an excellent book and Dr. Glover an excellent exponent of the spirit which quickened a wonderful people into marvels of achievement, and which is still able to quicken a wearied world.

RALPH VAN DEMAN MAGOFFIN.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Alsace-Lorraine Since 1870. By BARRY CERF. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919.—190 pp.

This is an interesting and useful book, a storehouse of precise and definite facts bearing upon every aspect of its subject. The facts and opinions are drawn largely from German sources verified as scrupulously as was possible under the conditions under which the author worked. The book was completed in July, 1918, before the issue of the war was clear—before the tide had turned. Out of their own mouths the Germans stand condemned both for their annexation of the provinces in 1870 and for their egregious misrule of them since that date.

Maximilian Harden has said that "the most profitable achievement of the Germans in the nineteenth century was the war of 1870", a statement essentially borne out by Sir Robert Giffen in his study on

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"The Cost of the Franco-Prussian War" in his *Essays in Finance*. Giffen estimates that the war cost Germany three hundred million dollars. The indemnity exacted from France was one billion dollars. Thus war emphatically does pay—when you win it and liquidate it in the Prussian fashion. Alsace-Lorraine was, from the financial point of view, an additional bonus of incalculable value, a pearl of great price, costing nothing.

Mr. Cerf has a talent for truthful and telling summaries. With regard to the German annexation and administration of Alsace-Lorraine he says, "Germany took Alsace and Lorraine into her nation on the ground that they were German and then proceeded to treat them as French. She hailed Alsatians and Lorrainers as 'long-lost brothers' and proceeded to treat them as an inferior race." This is the literal fact, abundantly supported by the evidence cited.

Mr. Cerf shows the methods followed in the attempted Germanization and their utter failure, the German-speaking parts of Upper Alsace being the most pronouncedly pro-French in sentiment. One of the freshest and most informing chapters in this study describes the history of Alsace-Lorraine during the present war. No other book in English contains as good a treatment of this special phase of the matter.

Of particular value is chapter vii on "The Economic Question". Any one who thinks that in the economic sphere the annexation to Germany has been a clear advantage to Alsace-Lorraine should read and ponder this substantial and illuminating chapter, solidly buttressed as it is by German statistics. These forty pages affirm, from official statistics and expert studies, that "Alsace has lost greatly in population and immensely in industrial prosperity by the annexation of 1870" and that "from the economic as well as from the administrative point of view, Germany has treated Alsace and Lorraine as conquered provinces, as colonies." Their economic prosperity has been "regularly subordinated to that of Germany." The author's discussion of this topic is most instructive.

CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN.

John Marshall and The Constitution (The Chronicles of America Series, Volume 16). By EDWARD S. CORWIN. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1919.—ix, 242 pp.

It is no easy task to tell the story of John Marshall so that laymen can get an accurate and vivid picture of his part in American history. Professor Corwin deserves high praise for his success in a difficult

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undertaking. He gives us an engaging portrait of Marshall the man; he shows him as a contestant in the political struggles of his time; and he presents a condensed and clear summary of the important judicial opinions in which the great Chief Justice established the lines of our constitutional system. Less than a third of the book is specifically devoted to these judicial opinions, but the rest of the story is told for its bearing on the crowning achievements which make Marshall a permanent factor in American life.

Professor Corwin brings out clearly that Marshall's strength lies more in the reasoning and rhetoric of his opinions than in the specific decisions which he reached. He implies some dissent from the estimate expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes when he doubts "whether, after Hamilton and the Constitution itself, Marshall's work proved more than a strong intellect, a good style, personal ascendency in his court, courage, justice, and the convictions of his party" (page 121), for he calls this a "somewhat too grudging encomium" (page 122). But the difference between the judge and the author seems to be that the former is thinking as a lawyer and the latter as an historian. For Mr. Corwin recognizes that Marshall "owed much to the preconceptions of his contemporaries" (page 123); he tells of his debt to Hamilton and Pinkney and Webster; and he emphasizes the fact that Marshall's methods and his conception of his opportunity were not limited to the traditionally accepted functions of a judge. After saying that "it was no ordinary skill and courage which, assisted by a great office, gave enduring definition to the purposes of the Constitution at the very time when the whole trend of public opinion was setting in most strongly against them" (page 122), the author adds:

> Marshall's own outlook upon his task sprang in great part from a profound conviction of calling. He was thoroughly persuaded that he knew the intentions of the framers of the Constitution—the intentions which had been wrought into the instrument itself—and he was equally determined that these intentions should prevail. For this reason he refused to regard his office merely as a judicial tribunal; it was a platform from which to promulgate sound constitutional principles, the very cathedra indeed of constitutional orthodoxy. Not one of the cases which elicited his great opinions but might easily have been decided on comparatively narrow grounds in precisely the same way in which he decided it on broad, general principles, but with the probable result that it would never again have been heard of outside the law courts. To take a timid or obscure way to a merely tentative goal would have been at variance equally with Marshall's belief in his mission and with his instincts as a great debater. Hence he

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forged his weapon—the *obiter dictum*—by whose broad strokes was hewn the highroad of a national destiny [pages 122–123].

These characteristics of Marshall's opinions are clearly brought out in the author's discussion of his great cases. There is abundant evidence, too, of Marshall's "quest . . . for the axiomatic, for absolute principles" (page 123). On the other hand, Marshall at times felt his way cautiously. The reader may possibly gain a false impression from the author's emphasis on those qualities of Marshall's mind which were most striking and characteristic. Even in dealing with the commerce clause, Marshall left a way open to compromise by confessing the difficulty of drawing a line between the acknowledged powers of the states and the restrictions thereon by reason of the grants of power to Congress. His pronouncements were not infrequently couched in such broad terms or so qualified by expressions elsewhere that his successors have been able to quote them for opposing purposes.

Professor Corwin introduces the discussion of technical constitutional issues so skilfully that it seems but part of the larger personal story. At the same time he makes the personal story always contributory to the climax of Marshall's work on the bench. The early days in Virginia, the direct and indirect clashes with Jefferson, the Burr trial, are all seen as fruits of Marshall's constitutional convictions and as factors in their intensification. Jefferson's vain attempts to undermine his hated cousin are related in connection with Marbury *v.* Madison and the Burr fiasco; and Marshall's serene pricking of his political opponents is told to the complete satisfaction of those of us who still cherish the prejudices so carefully inculcated by the Massachusetts school of historians. Our greatest Chief Justice was a very human person. Professor Corwin does not spare him from criticism. But he leaves no uncertainty as to the greatness of the man and of his work.

THOMAS REED POWELL.

Bulletin de l'Institut Intermédiaire International. Publication trimestrielle. Nos. 1–2, Janvier–Avril, 1919. Harlem (Pays–Bas) H. D. TJEENK WILLINK ET FILS; La Haye (Pays-Bas) MARTINUS NIJHOFF.

The object of the *Institut Intermédiaire International*, the new foundation of which the present publication is the organ, is to furnish information concerning matters of international interest, not of a secret or private character, whether relating to the law of nations, to the application of law, national or international, or to economic and statis-

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tical questions or questions of commercial policy. Such information will be furnished free or, if the executive committee so directs, at cost. The *Institut* is to be conducted by an administrative council, under the supervision of a *Conseil Protecteur*, four-fifths of whose members must be Dutch subjects. For the present the president of the foundation is Dr. Loudon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the president of the *Conseil Protecteur* is Dr. van Karnebeek, Minister of State.

The word *intermédiaire* is intended to denote that the purpose of the foundation is to serve as a link between those who desire to increase their knowledge of the institutions and conditions of countries other than their own. A person in China wishes to learn some detail concerning Spain; a person in England wants information about Russia, or in Chile about Belgium, or in Germany about Peru, and so on: the *Institut* offers itself as an intermediary.

The first place in the present bulletin is given to a collection of documents designed to show the "genesis of the peace". These documents embrace President Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 11, his four points of February 12 and his speech of September 27, 1918; the Vienna note of September 14, 1918; Mr. Balfour's London speech; the various armistices; and other papers, covering altogether pages 25–104 of the bulletin. In some instances the date given is that of the journal from which the text is taken and not that of the utterance itself, while the language also is perhaps that of the journal and not that of the speaker or writer. The rule on these points is not uniform. From the scientific point of view the original text should be given as far as possible. Probably stricter attention will be paid to this in future issues.

The next seventy-five pages are devoted to private international law or, as it is commonly called in English-speaking countries, the "conflict of laws". Then follow papers relating to double taxation (pages 178–196), international contractual relations (200–232), Zionism (233–245) and the war (246–258). In conclusion there are answers to questions (259–272). The questions relate chiefly to points of law. Experience no doubt will lead to the conclusion, which many of the present responses would seem to foreshadow, that, so far as such inquiries seek to elicit opinions, the attempt to answer them is more difficult than it is useful.

The object of the new foundation is altogether praiseworthy, and its success will depend not only upon the intelligence and fidelity of those by whom its work is carried on but also upon their possession of ade-

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quate resources to enable them to obtain the materials which they need. The gathering of authentic documentary materials is not an easy matter, nor is it inexpensive. It requires organization and constant watchfulness. The mere republication, in collected form, of materials, documentary or otherwise, gleaned from newspapers and periodicals, while it might be useful as grist for journalists, would not meet the requirements of scientific inquirers.

J. B. MOORE.

Effects of the War upon Insurance, with Special Reference to the Substitution of Insurance for Pensions. By WILLIAM F. GEPHART. New York, Oxford University Press, 1918.—vi, 302 pp.

Professor Gephart's contribution to the *Preliminary Economic Studies of the War,* edited by Professor David Kinley for the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a compilation of quotations, forms and figures, with certain incidental remarks, rather than a study. It was impossible at the time it was prepared, December 1, 1917, to write anything approaching a complete study, since only data from the early period of the war were available. It will, therefore, be found that the original portion of the text discusses in a very general way the actual and possible effects of the war on insurance. The quotations, largely from *The Economic World*, furnish a considerable body of interesting material on the results of the war, but leave one with an impression of indefiniteness and the feeling that many of them might better have been relegated to the appendices, leaving the author free to develop his subject in a compact, logical and more completely original statement. At almost no point in the book has the author attempted to make statistical studies of his own. Statistics there are in profusion, but practically all of them are contained in the quotations, so that they do not contribute so directly or so concisely to the discussion as might be wished.

As an example of the inadequacy of certain quotations, that from a "Memorandum . . . on the Law of Trading with Enemy" given on pages 25 and following may be taken. This memorandum begins with three headings containing statements of points of law governing trading with the enemy, supported by citations and excerpts from judicial opinions. Further headings contain only the subjects treated in the excerpts or citations to which they refer, while on several subjects for which citations alone are given it would be necessary to go to the original opinions in order to learn what decisions had been rendered. Here, as in many other places, a simple, clear statement of the prin-

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cipal points involved would have better served the purpose. Source material has been used in the body of the text to such an extent as to render the work cumbersome and confusing.

Exception must be taken to the unqualified statements (page 6): "Insurance does not replace nor produce either tangible or intangible capital. It simply distributes what is already in existence." "Insurance itself is an economic and social burden." Willett in his *Economic Theory of Risk and Insurance* has analyzed the relation of insurance to economic life and has explained in illuminating fashion why it should be considered under the head of production. That analysis is hardly adequate which considers only the function of insurance in the distribution of loss and which fails to consider the effect of this distribution on the elimination of risk and the consequent increased production. Professor Gephart has adopted the less adequate analysis although he recognizes insurance as "a constructive agency."

Throughout the book there is evidence of haste and inadequate revision. For example, the Wisconsin state life-insurance venture is used as an instance of public insurance in the United States (page 44), no mention being made of the more numerous and more successful workmen's compensation insurance funds. Reference is made (page 59) to three classes of policy holders, only two of which are described. On pages 61 and following figures are given as the work of "the committee"; of what committee is not explained. On page 111 reference is made to the "American Actuarial Society" instead of the Actuarial Society of America.

On page 103 the "writing down of the security values which has been in progress in some companies and the resulting increase in interest return, as well as the possibility of a future increase in the actual value of these depreciated securities", are listed among the favorable influences of war on the finances of life-insurance companies. The *reductio ad adsurdum* method might well be applied to this sort of reasoning, especially since the author lists under unfavorable influences "the heavy depreciation of securities".

This work finds its value as a collection of source material, figures, opinions and references. It is both informing and suggestive, and it is to be hoped that a study covering completely the effects of the war on insurance will be issued as soon as practicable. The present volume would be a valuable aid in such a study and points the way to its development.

RALPH H. BLANCHARD.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

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BOOK NOTES

We have been led to expect contributions to knowledge rather than compendiums of knowledge in British governmental reports. The one in hand, *Report of an Inquiry as to Works Committees Made by the British Ministry of Labor* (Reprinted by Industrial Relations Division, United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, Philadelphia, 1919; 131 pp.) is no exception to the rule. It is a study of existing types of representative machinery within the local shop. The application of the representative idea to industry is receiving wide attention today; and the effort in this report is to examine the organizations that are at the base of the hierarchy—the works committees. Beyond emphasizing the necessity for a maximum devolution in industrial organization and for getting the local representation as accurate and direct as possible, the study raises more questions than it settles. This is inevitable because of the newness of the experiment in machinery which is representative of an entire "works" or factory. The distinction must be kept in view between the long-standing shop committees, chapels and shop stewards of the unions and the works committee which aims to be representative of all the departments of a plant. There is need of an organization which will supplement the craft bodies and speak for all the workers on matters of their common interest. Such questions as how the delegates shall be chosen, how large the committee shall be, how many workers shall be brought into a voting unit and given a representative, have only to be put for one to see that we are at the threshold of an era of experimentation in constitutional government in industry which promises to be as variegated and valuable as our experimentation in political forms. This report throws important light on certain of these questions. It is a needed addition to the library of experience in methods of getting the democratic idea acted upon. It forms an interesting companion volume to the study by Mr. A. B. Wolfe, entitled *Works Committees and Joint Industrial Councils,* which is concerned more especially with American plans. The Industrial Relations Division of the Emergency Fleet Corporation has performed a public service in making both of these studies available in pamphlet form for American readers.

In the effort to develop better relations between employers and employees several of the labor-adjustment boards established by the

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government during the war included in their awards the creation of shop committees. *The Shop Committee: A Handbook for Employer and Employee* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1919; iv, 105 pp.) by William Leavitt Stoddard is an interesting discussion of the shop committees established by the National War Labor Board, for which he was an administrator. In addition to describing at length several different plans of shop-committee organization, he devotes special chapters to "Election Machinery", "Procedure" and "Shop Committees in Action" and concludes with a discussion of the vexed question of "The Shop Committee and the Union". He recognizes clearly the antagonism between the local self-government of shop committees and the central government of American trade unions as thus far developed but believes a reconciliation and fusion of the two movements to be not only possible but inevitable. For, as he says in conclusion, "The Shop Committee . . . is not a device of capital to prevent unionism: its seeds lie deep in the soil of unionism, so deep that unionism of employees alone cannot cause them to grow and flourish. The shop committee has in it the germ of the hope of the future of industrial peace and the cooperative commonwealth."

Cooperation: The Hope of the Consumer (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918; xxii, 328 pp.) by Emerson P. Harris is a timely discussion of one way of grappling with the high-cost-of-living problem that is receiving all too little attention in the United States. As President of the Montclair Cooperative Society the author writes with full knowledge of the difficulties to be overcome as well as of the benefits to be enjoyed. After considering in Parts I and II "The Failure of Our Middlemanism" and "Reasons and the Remedy", he discusses in Part III the means to "Practical Cooperation" and concludes in Part IV and the appendices with a history of cooperative efforts in Europe and America. The greatest merits of the book are its convincing exposure of the demoralizing results of our present distributive system and its inspiring portrayal of the moral gains to be secured by substituting distribution through cooperating consumers. Mere desire to reduce expenses will not, he thinks, long hold together an American group of cooperators. The temptations of the bargain-counter are too omnipresent and too alluring. To succeed, an American group of cooperators must deliberately choose cooperation because it is the better as well as the cheaper way. Because of its interesting style, its skilful handling of information and its happy blending of idealism and common sense, the

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book takes its place as easily the best available American treatise on the subject.

A rather remarkable work is *The Economic Life of a Bengal District* (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1916; 158 pp.) by J. C. Jack, of the India Civil Service. It is remarkable because, although the statistics were collected between 1906 and 1910 and took much time and labor to tabulate, the writing of the book itself, as the author tells us in his foreword, occupied just five days, which were all that Mr. Jack had at his disposal before going to the front in the Royal Field Artillery. The accomplishment of such a result is possible only in the case of one who is full of his subject. While the text is interesting, even a tyro will realize at a glance that many of the problems are superficially treated. The sketch, moreover, presents a picture of economic life which appears unduly favorable. When we are told that only four and three-tenths per cent. of the people are "struggling in the grip of want", we must believe that, if the statement is true, the district of Faridpur in Bengal, with a population of over two million people, is in a very exceptional position. Again, we are told, on page 127, that Bengal is more lightly taxed than any other civilized country in the world, and "not only more lightly taxed, but far more lightly taxed"! Taking it all in all, it must be said that this five days' "study" gives a picture of India through the spectacles of an Indian civil servant.

The recent return of France to the system of direct personal taxes lends interest to the study of M. Pierre Edm. Hugues on what he terms an income tax at the time of the revolution, which appears under the title *Histoire de la contribution patriotique dans le Baslanguedoc* (Paris, Champion, 1919; 330 pp.). This so-called patriotic contribution of 1789 consisted, as is well known, of a twenty-five per cent. income tax, which turned out to be far from successful. M. Hugues studies the reasons for this in detail, as applied in a comparatively small section of France, and presents a clear picture of the reasons why it did not succeed. Neither he nor the *ancien ministre,* M. Paul Delombre, who contributes a long preface, is favorably inclined to the new fiscal paths upon which France has entered, and both seem to find in the history of the patriotic contribution some justification for their fears. They do not, however, pay sufficient attention to the profound differences, economic, social and political, between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. As an historical study, however, the work of M. Hugues is important and illuminating.

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A contribution well worth making to industrial history is *Household Manufactures in the United States, 1640-1860* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1917; xii, 413 pp.) by Rolla Milton Tryon, associate professor of the teaching of History, University of Chicago. The author has made good use of contemporary accounts, personal recollections, local histories and census returns and has been able to present a clear picture of the development and status of household manufacture. By this term, however, he means only those articles made by members of the family or plantation household from raw material produced chiefly on the farm where the manufacturing was done. He points out clearly the various stages in the development and especially the transition to shop-made and factory-made goods. The chief criticism to be urged is the continual use of the term "family factory", although in numberless cases the author makes a clear distinction between family-made and factory-made goods. While household manufactures is a thoroughly suitable and accredited term, "family-factory" involves a confusion of thought.

In *The Foundations of National Prosperity* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918; xxix, 378 pp.) Professors Richard T. Ely and Ralph H. Hess of Wisconsin, Thomas Nixon Carver of Harvard and Charles K. Leith, who occupies a chair of geology at Madison, have contributed some interesting studies on the conservation of permanent national resources. Professor Ely discusses conservation and economic theory, Professor Hess treats of conservation and economic evolution, Professor Leith takes up the conservation of certain mineral resources and Professor Carver deals with the conservation of human resources. One of the most striking contributions is that of Professor Hess in his chapter on conservation and the theory of investment. Professor Carver appears in his now somewhat familiar rôle as an economic moralizer, whose fundamental conception is put into the following language (page 361): "It is to be hoped also that some preacher of righteousness may see that nothing is righteousness except that which economizes and makes productive the energy of the people, and that nothing is sin except that which wastes or dissipates that energy." We can safely leave him to the indignation of the religious and ethical reformer.

An exceptionally good doctor's dissertation is the study in two parts on *Legislative Regulation of Railway Finance in England* (Urbana, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 1918; 196 pp.) by Ching Chun Wang, Director of the Kin-han Railway in China and sometime honorary Fellow in Economics. Mr. Wang

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has made the first detailed investigation into the English control of railway securities and the regulation of railway accounts and has collected in detail a mass of interesting and valuable information. The book, moreover, is written in an English style so admirable as not to betray the nationality of the author.

Among the many books dealing with the recent reform of French public finance and especially with the income tax, perhaps the most authoritative is that of M. Lucien Bocquet, a prominent tax official of Paris, entitled *L'Impôt sur le revenu cédulaire et général* (Librairie Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1918; 620 pp.). After a short introductory historical sketch, M. Bocquet takes up in detail each of the different schedules into which the new income tax is divided and gives a clear picture of the detailed problems in each case. The volume contains the texts of the various laws together with the interpretation put upon them by the administrative authorities and the courts. A recently published supplement covers the changes made by the law of June, 1918.

The general condemnation visited in France and elsewhere not only on the present-day German Socialists but especially upon Karl Marx, as the alleged founder of Pan-Germanism, has led the well-known socialist leader, M. Jean Longuet, to take up the cudgels in an interesting volume entitled *La Politique Internationale du Marxisme* (Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1918; 293 pp.). M. Longuet draws much of his material from the recently published correspondence between Marx and Engels and finds no difficulty in showing that the accusations are entirely unfounded and that Marx, like Lenine today, was a thorough internationalist. This point of view emerges with especial clearness during the period of the Franco-Prussian war when Marx, while indeed in favor of German unity, showed himself thoroughly opposed to anything that savored of military nationalism or imperial capitalism.

Among the many economic studies that have been evoked by the war in France, a prominent place must be accorded to the book of M. Georges Renard, Professor at the Collège de France, entitled *Les Répercussions Economiques de la Guerre Actuelle sur la France* (Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1917; 516 pp.). Although the account is continued only to the end of 1917, Professor Renard was so sure of ultimate victory, with a large indemnity from Germany, that he was able to frame some important conclusions. The major part of the book deals with the history of the economic conditions of the war, divided into three parts: circulation, including commerce and

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transportation; production, both industrial and agricultural; and consumption, including high prices and public finance. In each case, Professor Renard deals with the *post bellum* outlook, and it is significant that he is far from being a pessimist with reference to France's economic future. What he especially emphasizes, however, is the rôle that education must play in the economic progress of the country.

Students of the railway problem have long been familiar with the authoritative work on the French railways in six volumes, of which the first edition appeared as long ago as 1887, by M. Alfred Picard, a member of the Institute and Director General of Bridges and Highways. M. Picard was engaged in preparing a definitive edition of his treatise at the time of his death, in 1913, but had completed only a small part of the revision. The Ministry of Public Works in France decided to publish as a memorial volume a part of this revision, which has now appeared under the title of *Les Chemins de Fer* (Paris, H. Dunod et E. Pinat, 1918; xiv, 856 pp.). The volume contains an historical sketch of French railways, a study of the economic results of railway transportation and a discussion of competition among railways and between the rail and water transportation. While most of the material is taken from France, not a little attention is paid to other countries, including the United States. The work will be found valuable to students of the recent history of French railway transportation.

In *American Railway Accounting* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1918; x, 465 pp.) Professor H. C. Adams gives a brief and simple discussion of the fundamental principles of railroad accounting and shows how they have been applied or misapplied by the Interstate Commerce Commission. His comments on such controversial topics as the division of costs of labor and materials, valuation of real estate, discounts of securities, depreciation, taxes and improvements are both interesting and illuminating. The appendices contain the voluminous text of the revised accounting rules and regulations issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1914. The book should be of value to students of transportation and to practical accountants who desire a knowledge of the principles of railroad accounting.

During January and February of 1918 the *Ligue du libre-échange* conducted at the *École des hautes-études sociales* a series of six conferences on the general subject of international free trade. The conferences were addressed by Yves-Guyot, Germain Paturel, G.

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Schelle, J. Pierson and Frederic Mathews, and the lectures are published under the title *Le Libre-échange International* (Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1918; iv, 228 pp.). For the most part the addresses, as was perhaps inevitable, consist of repetitions of the familiar classical arguments for free trade and of protests against any tendency to make permanent the government control of commerce brought about by the war. M. Pierson, a nephew of the well-known economist of the same name, compresses within brief space, however, a considerable body of too little known facts concerning the progress of Dutch industry and commerce under free trade, and M. Yves-Guyot offers some sensible observations on the maintenance of the blockade during the transition from war to peace. It is a pity that the allied diplomats did not have the wisdom to heed his suggestions more promptly. In addition to the lectures, the little book contains the statutes of the league and a letter addressed to the members of that organization in 1915 by its president, Yves-Guyot, and its indefatigable secretary, Daniel Bellet, since unhappily deceased.

Breaches of Anglo-American Treaties (New York, Sturgis and Walton Company, 1917; xi, 248 pp.) by John Bigelow, Major U. S. Army, retired, is devoted principally to a discussion of the controversies between Great Britain and the United States over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Central American Question. Although the volume appeared during the war, the author states that, except for some revision and amplification, it was finished before the war began, so that it was not written with a view to influence opinion on any phase of the great conflict. The author seems to have been impelled to undertake the work by reflections on the United States made in certain English publications. Among these he quotes the *Saturday Review* as having abandoned the expectation that President Taft (*nota bene*, not ex-President Taft) could "act like a gentleman", and as declaring that it would be a delusion to imagine that "'American politicians would be bound by any feeling of honor or respect for treaties"; the *Morning Post* as suggesting that "Americans might ask themselves if it is really good foreign policy to lower the value of their written word in such way as to make negotiations with other powers difficult or impossible"; and Sir Harry Johnstone, in *Common Sense in Foreign Policy,* as declaring that "treaties in fact only bind the policy of the United States as long as they are convenient" and are "not really worth the paper they are written on". The author, as the result of his

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investigations, not only pronounces these charges to be substantially unfounded but concludes that in the main the violations have been on the other side. It may be observed that the question of treaty violation is not always one that can be precisely determined, owing to the lack of an impartial and authoritative interpretation. It is a curious fact that the attacks above quoted on the conduct and integrity of the United States in its attitude toward treaties were made in the discussion of the Panama Canal tolls question, in respect of which the British Government has admitted that no actual violation by the United States was committed. It is true that President Wilson, in asking for the repeal of the clause in the Act of 1912 exempting coastwise vessels from the payment of tolls, apparently proceeded on the contrary supposition. But if any one wishes to become acquainted with the subject and to understand its merits, he should read the diplomatic correspondence, where the facts may be found.

The student of modern history and international law will find *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1918; xii, 403 pp.), edited by Sir Augustus Oakes and R. B. Mowat, an admirable source-book. It brings together about twenty-five documents, all of first-rate importance to any one who seeks to understand the development of contemporary Europe. It contains only treaties concluded between European nations and subsequent to the fall of Napoleon. The selections have been wisely made and serve effectively to illustrate the chief phases of the diplomacy of the nineteenth century. Opening with the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, the editors proceed to furnish us with documents of great interest and value concerning the creation of the Kingdoms of Greece and Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, concerning Turkey and the Balkan states, the Danish duchies, the unification of Italy and Germany, the relations of Austria and Prussia, the Franco-German war, the Triple Alliance and the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. The treaties are preceded in each case by brief historical sketches, which give us the current situation and the setting. These little essays are notable for their conciseness, lucidity and balanced judgment. Much learning has been condensed into a few phrases and those chosen with the greatest care. Only a few errors have been noticed and they are comparatively unimportant. This very useful book is rendered still more useful by ten excellent black and white maps. The first chapter contains an interesting discussion of the war on treaties.

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Pillars of the Empire (London, Jarrolds, 1918; 331 pp.) by W. L. Courtney and Mrs. J. E. Courtney is a series of biographical studies of men who, the authors believe, have done abiding service for the British Commonwealth in the era of imperial history that began after the end of the American Revolution. Men who served British political civilization in India and the Far East, as well as those who served it in Canada, Australasia and South Africa, are included in the series. The idea from which the book apparently originated was an excellent one. Hitherto there has been no single book in which the services of these men—soldiers and explorers as well as statesmen—were recorded and appraised. There are thirty or more biographical studies and impressions in this volume; and in view of the fact that it is a book of only 331 pages it can be said that many of the studies are ample and that most of them are well done. The careers of these men, moreover, recall much colonial and imperial history with freshness and interest. The men to whom Mr. and Mrs. Courtney give most prominence—those whom they seem to regard as most noteworthy—are Durham, Macdonald, Strathcona, Laurier and Borden; Sir George Grey, Frere, Rhodes, Milner, Chamberlain, Botha and Smuts; Parkes and Seddon; Gordon, Cromer and Kitchiner; and Clive and Curzon. It is not likely that every Dominion will concede that full justice has been done to its galaxy of statesmen and empire-builders, though Mr. and Mrs. Courtney would no doubt be able to justify the selections they have made. It should be added that as a preface to this volume there are some surprisingly frank studies of English political leaders of the era of the World War.

Filial affection rather than a critical estimate of the value of the material evidently led the daughter of Sir Benjamin Chapman Browne to publish *Selected Papers on Social and Economic Questions* (Cambridge, University Press, 1918; xvii, 287 pp.). Sir Benjamin Chapman Browne was a typical Englishman of good upper-middle-class family. He was an engineer, a model employer of labor of the nineteenth-century type, with the traditional English desire for public service. He was charitable, kindly, faithful and strongly imbued with a sense of responsibility in the use of his wealth. But he had no inkling of the more modern attitude in questions of capital and labor, of employers and workers, of wealth and taxation. His writings may be useful in illustrating the older ways of thinking, and in showing how the political economy of the nineteenth century moulded the ideas of men who clung to free trade and free use of capital as though these were the gospel of salvation for the poverty

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and distress of the whole world. There is no use, however, in reading these old-time papers in the search for light on the problems which are facing the world during this period of reconstruction.

Lieutenant Davidson's *The Northwest Company* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1918; xi, 349 pp.) is a careful and fully documented piece of research. It covers the history of the fur trade in the northern part of North America from the coming of the white man to the union of the two rival fur companies—the Northwest Company and the Hudson Bay Company—in 1821, apart from the development of the Hudson Bay Company, the history of which had already been written. The Hudson Bay Company comes into the picture only when the Northwest Company began to feel its rivalry and to enter into the conflict which ended in the union of the two companies. The Northwest Company, unlike the Hudson Bay Company, had no royal charter. It was an association of traders without monopoly rights. It had no objection to such privileges, and several times it solicited them from the British Government, but in vain. It depended upon its established trade and its energetic and sometimes unscrupulous agents to obtain its share of the furs of the Northwest. Lieutenant Davidson tells briefly how it came into existence, who formed it and what expeditions they undertook. Enough romance and adventure is indicated in these pages to fill several volumes. The work serves not only to explain much of the early history of Canada but also to make clear many of the border difficulties that disturbed the early relations between the United States and the British possessions to the north. It is published as volume vii of the University of California Publications in History.

Lord Selkirk's Work in Canada (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1916; 240 pp.) was apparently undertaken by Mr. Chester Martin with a view to vindicating the reputation of Lord Selkirk from the undeserved obloquy under which it long rested. Occasionally the book becomes almost apologetic in tone. The story, as gathered from Lord Selkirk's papers and from government documents, shows with almost startling clearness the blundering ineptitude of the British government and the total lack of intention on the part of British statesmen in the nineteenth century of founding a great English-speaking empire. The empire grew despite the British government. It grew because individual Englishmen and Scotchmen and Irishmen had the vision to plant and water it and to accept temporary failure without losing that courage and pertinacity which form the outstanding British characteristics. Lord Selkirk was one of the

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founders of the empire. His settlements on Prince Edward Island, at Baldoon on Lake St. Clair, at Sault Ste. Marie and finally and most important on Lake Winnipeg, show a comprehension of the vital points in British North America. The Red River settlement practically preserved the great Northwest for Great Britain. Yet the men in authority both in Canada and Great Britain could see no value in the vast tract of country—termed by them polar regions—which now forms the granary of the empire. "Seldom", writes Mr. Martin of Lord Selkirk's venture, "has immediate reward been so paltry, outlay so enormous, and ultimate vindication of practical foresight at once so tardy and so complete." The book is published as volume vii of the Oxford Historical and Literary Studies. It is well documented, and the appendices include the charter of the Hudson Bay Company and the vast grant of land in Assiniboia made to Lord Selkirk by the Hudson Bay Company—a grant of 115,000 square miles of the richest grain land in the world, which instead of enriching its new proprietor completely bankrupted him both in name and fortune.

The third and last volume of the history of Germany by Sir Adolphus William Ward, *Germany 1815-1890,* Volume III (Cambridge University Press, 1918; xvi, 437 pp.), follows in its method of treatment the previous volumes. It covers the period from 1871 to 1890. Two supplementary chapters have, however, been added. In one of these the author gives a survey of the intellectual and social life of the Germans during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and in the other, under the title, "The New Reign, 1890-1907", he touches the chief points in German political history during the first two decades of the reign of William II. His reason for carrying his subject beyond the limit set in the title of his work is that he believes that in 1907 or 1908 forces making for war between Germany and her adversaries got the upper hand of those making for peace. The chapter which deals with the *modus vivendi* between the Church of Rome and the German Protestant governments is a marvel of involved lucidity; it has poignancy without temper, yet wields a two-edged sword of justice. The chapter on "Internal Politics and Parties" is excellent and tells a clearer story than does the chapter on "Foreign Policy". The author gives no evidence of being affected by "war psychology".

Les Appetits Allemands (Paris, Alcan, 1918; 244, 228 pp.) is the startling title of two small volumes of "conference reports" of the Paris Geographical Society, of which the one treats of German

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ambitions in Europe and the other of German dreams of world leadership. Compiled in the midst of the World War, both were intended as French propaganda, but in view of the scholarly fame of many of the contributors — Henri Lichtenberger, Georges Blondel, Joseph Barthélemy, René Henry, Henri Froidevaux and Jean Dybrowski — they are not without some permanent value. Especially illuminating is Professor Henry's summary, in the second volume, of the origins and program of Pan-Germanism. Unfortunately the whole work leaves the reader with an uncomfortable impression that the authors do not so much hate German imperialism as love the imperialism of France.

A recent volume in the *Bibliothèque France-Amérique* is Professor Georges Weill's *Histoire des États-Unis de 1787 à 1917* (Paris, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1919; 216 pp.). The *Comité France Amérique,* which edits the *Bibliothèque,* was founded some ten years ago to promote closer relations between France and the nations of the western hemisphere, and by reason of the war its activities have been increased and have acquired added significance. Professor Weill's volume is a product of the new interest felt by the people of France in the American Republic and should prove helpful in satisfying that interest. It is without doubt the best brief general history of the United States written in French. The author has made good use of several standard histories of the United States, especially McMaster's and Rhodes', and of some specialized works. At a time like the present, when the propagandist is abroad, appealing to history, duly "reconsidered", to give solidity to his cause, it is gratifying to note that the author has not tried to promote greater friendship between his country and ours by historical *legerdemain.* He has made no effort to conceal the fact that on several occasions Franco-American relations have been seriously strained. He has written throughout as an historian, not as a propagandist.

The purchase by the United States of the Virgin Islands lends especial timeliness to the book of Waldemar Westergaard, Assistant Professor of History at Pomona College, on *The Danish West Indies under Company Rule* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1917; 359 pp.). The author was led to undertake the investigation by Professor H. Morse Stephens, of California, and it was written before the negotiations for the transfer of the islands. The present volume, which was submitted as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and which is largely based upon original records, deals with the period from 1671 to 1754 and gives a good

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picture of the age when sugar was king. Professor Westergaard proposes to publish a second volume bringing the history to the end of the Napoleonic Wars and a third volume to deal with subsequent developments to the present day. In view of the recent purchase of the islands, however, a short supplementary chapter has been included in the present work, giving in bare outline a history of the period from 1755 to 1917.

Mr. James MacKaye's *Americanized Socialism* (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1918; vi, 191 pp.) is a popularized, socialistic criticism of the existing economic order, expressed in every-day American terms. It makes no pretense to scholarly exposition; but as an *argumentum ad hominem* it is so plausibly and speciously contrived as to make a strong appeal to those readers whose usual literary diet is the daily newspaper and whose wavering attitude toward public policies is colored by a consciousness of shortcomings in the prevailing economic régime. More than two-thirds of the little volume are devoted to this popularly-phrased critical analysis. The author's constructive program, outlined in the last two chapters, is equally plausible in the simplicity of its central suggestion. "The safest, best and quickest method to successfully substitute a new and improved institution for an old one is the method employed in engineering to substitute a new and improved structure for an old one. . . . . The engineer in charge . . . . first tries a few samples of the new machinery. He gives them a try-out in practical competition with the old ones, under comparable conditions, and carefully notes the result. . . . . Successful and undisturbed operation are both assured by employing the experimental method of procedure." The author believes that "this method will be as successful as a method of substituting socialism for capitalism in industry as it would be for substituting turbine for reciprocating engines in a power station". Thus, progressive, experimental substitutions will solve transitional problems, and abolition of the right of inheritance in property so taken over will guarantee the permanency of resulting socialistic arrangements.

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